{"title":"NDM和医疗保健指南:需要更多地关注现状、复杂性和背景","authors":"D. Matlock, R. Glasgow","doi":"10.1177/1555343418778703","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Evidence-based medicine and guidelines cannot solve all problems in healthcare (Kemm, 2006). Indeed, it can be exceedingly frustrating for a clinician when the quality of his or her care gets measured based on adherence to guidelines that do not apply to a given patient (Boyd et al., 2005). Common examples of this are blood pressure and diabetes treatments for older adults. Lowering both blood pressure and glucose levels are important but can also be quite harmful for individual patients who are at higher risk for falls, incontinence, hypoglycemia, and cognitive impairment if either is controlled too aggressively. In this issue, Dr. Falzer (2018) contributes an article titled “Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and the Practice of Health Care.” He argues that the “best practices regimen”—an approach based on evidence and guidelines—has not worked due to a fundamental fallacy that they are overly simplistic and do not account for the nuances of modern medicine in the way that NDM could. He further asserts that implementation science approaches have not helped because they only serve to support and perpetuate the flawed “best practices regimen” approach. His point is well taken that some of the evidence and some (generally older) guidelines fall far short of providing guidance for the complex patient. However, the argument has important weaknesses. The reasoning seems to begin with a conclusion that is supported by an argument based on older thinking about implementation science and guidelines that support the a priori conclusion. This type of reasoning is a classic example of confirmation bias— a common risk when people are left to NDM approaches (Nickerson, 1998). One weakness of this paper is that it appears to be based on an outdated understanding of implementation science. Since the Lomas (Lomas et al., 1989) definition, the field of implementation science has evolved extensively and includes an understanding of how treatments reach the maximum number of eligible patients, how they are adapted to fit into different clinical contexts, how they are sustained, and how both changes in context and potential unintended consequences can be anticipated and avoided (Brownson, Colditz, & Proctor, 2017; Chambers, Glasgow, & Stange, 2013; Glasgow et al., 2012; Stirman et al., 2012). Since the articles referenced within the manuscript, there have been multiple advances in our understanding of both how to disseminate 778703 EDMXXX10.1177/1555343418778703Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision MakingNdm and Healthcare Guidelines 2018","PeriodicalId":46342,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making","volume":"12 1","pages":"202 - 205"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2018-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1555343418778703","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"NDM and Healthcare Guidelines: More Attention to the Current Status, Complexity, and Context Is Needed\",\"authors\":\"D. Matlock, R. Glasgow\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/1555343418778703\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Evidence-based medicine and guidelines cannot solve all problems in healthcare (Kemm, 2006). Indeed, it can be exceedingly frustrating for a clinician when the quality of his or her care gets measured based on adherence to guidelines that do not apply to a given patient (Boyd et al., 2005). Common examples of this are blood pressure and diabetes treatments for older adults. Lowering both blood pressure and glucose levels are important but can also be quite harmful for individual patients who are at higher risk for falls, incontinence, hypoglycemia, and cognitive impairment if either is controlled too aggressively. In this issue, Dr. Falzer (2018) contributes an article titled “Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and the Practice of Health Care.” He argues that the “best practices regimen”—an approach based on evidence and guidelines—has not worked due to a fundamental fallacy that they are overly simplistic and do not account for the nuances of modern medicine in the way that NDM could. He further asserts that implementation science approaches have not helped because they only serve to support and perpetuate the flawed “best practices regimen” approach. His point is well taken that some of the evidence and some (generally older) guidelines fall far short of providing guidance for the complex patient. However, the argument has important weaknesses. The reasoning seems to begin with a conclusion that is supported by an argument based on older thinking about implementation science and guidelines that support the a priori conclusion. This type of reasoning is a classic example of confirmation bias— a common risk when people are left to NDM approaches (Nickerson, 1998). One weakness of this paper is that it appears to be based on an outdated understanding of implementation science. Since the Lomas (Lomas et al., 1989) definition, the field of implementation science has evolved extensively and includes an understanding of how treatments reach the maximum number of eligible patients, how they are adapted to fit into different clinical contexts, how they are sustained, and how both changes in context and potential unintended consequences can be anticipated and avoided (Brownson, Colditz, & Proctor, 2017; Chambers, Glasgow, & Stange, 2013; Glasgow et al., 2012; Stirman et al., 2012). Since the articles referenced within the manuscript, there have been multiple advances in our understanding of both how to disseminate 778703 EDMXXX10.1177/1555343418778703Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision MakingNdm and Healthcare Guidelines 2018\",\"PeriodicalId\":46342,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"202 - 205\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-08-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1555343418778703\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/1555343418778703\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1555343418778703","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
摘要
循证医学和指南不能解决医疗保健中的所有问题(Kemm,2006)。事实上,当临床医生根据不适用于特定患者的指南来衡量其护理质量时,这可能会让他们非常沮丧(Boyd等人,2005)。常见的例子是老年人的血压和糖尿病治疗。降低血压和血糖水平很重要,但如果控制得过于激进,对跌倒、失禁、低血糖和认知障碍风险较高的个别患者来说也会非常有害。在本期文章中,Falzer博士(2018)发表了一篇题为《自然主义决策与医疗保健实践》的文章。他认为,“最佳实践方案”——一种基于证据和指南的方法——没有奏效,因为存在一种根本的谬论,即它们过于简单化,没有像NDM那样考虑到现代医学的细微差别。他进一步断言,实施科学方法没有帮助,因为它们只会支持和延续有缺陷的“最佳实践方案”方法。他的观点得到了很好的理解,一些证据和一些(通常是旧的)指南远远不能为复杂的患者提供指导。然而,这一论点有重要的弱点。推理似乎始于一个结论,该结论得到了基于对实现科学和支持先验结论的指导方针的旧思想的论点的支持。这种类型的推理是确认偏见的一个经典例子——当人们被NDM方法所左右时,这是一种常见的风险(Nickerson,1998)。这篇论文的一个弱点是,它似乎是基于对实现科学的过时理解。自Lomas(Lomas et al.,1989)定义以来,实施科学领域已经发生了广泛的发展,包括了解治疗如何达到符合条件的患者的最大数量,如何适应不同的临床环境,如何持续,以及如何预测和避免背景变化和潜在的意外后果(Brownson,Colditz,&Proctor,2017;Chambers,Glasgow,&Stange,2013;Glasgow等人,2012年;Stirman等人,2012)。自手稿中引用的文章以来,我们对如何传播778703 EDMXX10.1177/155533418778703《认知工程与决策杂志》和《2018年医疗保健指南》的理解取得了多项进展
NDM and Healthcare Guidelines: More Attention to the Current Status, Complexity, and Context Is Needed
Evidence-based medicine and guidelines cannot solve all problems in healthcare (Kemm, 2006). Indeed, it can be exceedingly frustrating for a clinician when the quality of his or her care gets measured based on adherence to guidelines that do not apply to a given patient (Boyd et al., 2005). Common examples of this are blood pressure and diabetes treatments for older adults. Lowering both blood pressure and glucose levels are important but can also be quite harmful for individual patients who are at higher risk for falls, incontinence, hypoglycemia, and cognitive impairment if either is controlled too aggressively. In this issue, Dr. Falzer (2018) contributes an article titled “Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and the Practice of Health Care.” He argues that the “best practices regimen”—an approach based on evidence and guidelines—has not worked due to a fundamental fallacy that they are overly simplistic and do not account for the nuances of modern medicine in the way that NDM could. He further asserts that implementation science approaches have not helped because they only serve to support and perpetuate the flawed “best practices regimen” approach. His point is well taken that some of the evidence and some (generally older) guidelines fall far short of providing guidance for the complex patient. However, the argument has important weaknesses. The reasoning seems to begin with a conclusion that is supported by an argument based on older thinking about implementation science and guidelines that support the a priori conclusion. This type of reasoning is a classic example of confirmation bias— a common risk when people are left to NDM approaches (Nickerson, 1998). One weakness of this paper is that it appears to be based on an outdated understanding of implementation science. Since the Lomas (Lomas et al., 1989) definition, the field of implementation science has evolved extensively and includes an understanding of how treatments reach the maximum number of eligible patients, how they are adapted to fit into different clinical contexts, how they are sustained, and how both changes in context and potential unintended consequences can be anticipated and avoided (Brownson, Colditz, & Proctor, 2017; Chambers, Glasgow, & Stange, 2013; Glasgow et al., 2012; Stirman et al., 2012). Since the articles referenced within the manuscript, there have been multiple advances in our understanding of both how to disseminate 778703 EDMXXX10.1177/1555343418778703Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision MakingNdm and Healthcare Guidelines 2018