交易所上市对公司治理的影响:来自直接上市的证据

IF 2.6 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE FINANCIAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2022-11-15 DOI:10.1111/fire.12327
Dan W. French, Thibaut G. Morillon, Adam S. Yore, Andrew E. Kern
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们使用公开的无援助REITs(PNLR)的事先直接上市来探索交易所会员资格对公司治理的影响。我们在一个独特的环境中研究了拥有公开但非上市股票的公司,在这个环境中,上市的影响与筹资的混杂效应截然不同。有证据表明,更年轻、利润更高、治理能力更强、管理专业的公司更有可能直接上市。上市后机构所有权增加,这些变化并非由于未来的融资。此外,内部公司治理的改善超出了交易所的要求,尤其是对于那些股票流动性更强、机构所有权更强的公司。
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The impact of exchange listing on corporate governance: Evidence from direct listings

We use prior direct listings by public nonlisted REITs (PNLRs) to explore the impact of exchange membership on corporate governance. We study companies with public, but nonlisted shares in a unique setting where the influence of listing is distinct from the confounding effect of capital raising. Evidence suggests younger, more profitable companies with stronger governance and professional management are more likely to directly list. Institutional ownership increases after listing and these changes are not due to future capital raising. Moreover, internal corporate governance improves beyond the exchange's requirements, especially for those companies with greater stock liquidity and more institutional ownership.

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来源期刊
FINANCIAL REVIEW
FINANCIAL REVIEW BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
28.10%
发文量
39
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