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引用次数: 1
摘要
在这篇文章中,克里斯托弗·彼得斯回应了肯尼斯·西蒙斯在《平等主义规范的逻辑》(The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. REV. 693(2000))中提出的论点,在这篇文章中,西蒙斯教授捍卫了平等待遇的规范价值,反对彼得斯早期的批评。彼得斯首先解释并证明了他对平等待遇的义务论动机而不是结果主义动机的攻击。然后,他阐明了两种截然不同的“治疗”概念之间的区别:以结果为中心的概念和整体概念。彼得斯认为,任何捍卫义务论平等理论的人都必须接受整体概念。然后,彼得斯解释了西蒙斯为义务论平等辩护的某些论点是如何反映了对以结果为中心的治疗概念的错误依赖,或者对整体概念的含义的误解。
In this article, Christopher Peters responds to arguments made by Kenneth Simons in The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693 (2000), in which Professor Simons defends the normative value of equal treatment against Peters’s earlier critiques. Peters first explains and justifies his attack on deontological rather than consequentialist motivations for equal treatment. He then articulates a difference between two distinct conceptions of “treatment”: an outcome-focused and an holistic conception. Peters argues that the holistic conception must be accepted by anyone who defends a deontological theory of equality. Peters then explains how certain of Simons’s arguments in defense of deontological equality reflect either a mistaken reliance on an outcome-focused conception of treatments or a misunderstanding of the implications of an holistic conception.
期刊介绍:
The Boston University Law Review provides analysis and commentary on all areas of the law. Published six times a year, the Law Review contains articles contributed by law professors and practicing attorneys from all over the world, along with notes written by student members.