战争力量

IF 0.6 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy Pub Date : 2009-10-14 DOI:10.2307/j.ctv173f229.8
M. Paulsen
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This does not mean that everything that the courts will decide on such matters is right. Nor does it mean even that everything that the courts say should be followed by the other branches of government. (Another aspect of the separation of powers is that the Framers regarded the power to interpret law - the power of constitutional interpretation - as another power too important to vest exclusively in any one branch of government. It too - like the war power - is a divided, shared power.) The political branches thus rightfully may use the constitutional powers at their disposal to resist judicial encroachments on the Constitution’s assignments of war powers to them. The power to authorize war properly rests with Congress, but Congress has exercised that power to grant the President enormous discretion to wage war. The Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) of September 18, 2001 is the broadest declaration of war in our nation's history, lawfully delegating to the President sweeping authority to use force against a wide array of enemies. Coupled with statutes like the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Congress has added practically all of the war powers within its control to the President, and even endorsed a surprisingly pro-presidentialist view of the Constitution's allocation of powers. The Commander in Chief Clause power of the President, correctly understood, vests the President with essentially plenary U.S. constitutional power with respect to the conuct of war. This is a fearful and formidable power, but one inherent in the nature of the power to conduct war and the decision of the Framers to vest the power of military command in a single individual. The President, and not Congress, decides when and where to attack, whom to attack, how hard to attack, what the strategic and tactical objectives are, and when to cease fighting. (Or not to fight at all: the executive and Commander in Chief powers of the President vest him with a nearly plenary power to declare peace, as an incident of his sole discretionary power over the conduct of war). The President, and not Congress, decides what to do with respect to issues of the capture, detention, interrogation, military punishment for law-of-war violations of enemy combatants. He decides what to do with regard to interception of enemy communications. He exercises the power to interpret and apply international law for purposes of executing the power to wage war. In starkest terms, the Commander in Chief Clause power means that the President, and not Congress, possesses the constitutional power to decide whether or not to kill, capture, hold, interrogate, grant or withhold the protections of international law to, or even torture, members of enemy armed forces (of either the lawful or unlawful varieties). Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have departed from the Constitution's allocation of war powers, in several respects. To the extent they do so, those decisions are not constitutionally binding on the other branches of the national government.","PeriodicalId":46083,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"33 1","pages":"113"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2009-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"THE WAR POWER\",\"authors\":\"M. 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引用次数: 5

摘要

这篇短文试图对宪法对战争权力的分配进行全面而简短的概述,并将这些经验教训应用于最近和当前战争实践中最具标志性、最具争议的问题:对开战决定的控制;控制战争执行的所有方面,包括俘虏、审讯、拘留和对敌方战斗人员的军事惩罚(合法和非法);拦截:拦截与敌人的通信;司法宪法解释触及(并干涉)宪法对战争权力的分配。宪法对战争权力的分配是制宪者在宪法设计中对三权分立的依赖的经典应用。制宪者认为战争权力太重要了,不能交给一群人,因此,通过有意识的设计,将它分开,并将部分权力分配给各个部门,将一些权力专门赋予每个部门,并规定了一些重叠的领域,从而在权力之间共享权力。首先,宪法赋予国会而不是总统发动战争的决定权——使国家进入战争状态的权力。第二,宪法赋予总统而不是国会发动战争的权力。这些权力中的每一个基本上都是独立于其他分支的权力的,因此在很大程度上不受其他权力的控制。第三,宪法没有赋予司法部门实质性的战争权力。但是,宪法对战争权力的分配问题仍然可以是司法问题。这并不意味着法院在这类问题上的所有裁决都是正确的。这也不意味着法院所说的一切都应该被政府的其他部门所遵循。(三权分立的另一个方面是,制宪者认为解释法律的权力——宪法解释权——是另一种过于重要的权力,不能只赋予任何一个政府部门。它也像战争权力一样,是一种分裂的、共享的权力。)因此,政治部门可以正当地使用宪法赋予它们的权力来抵制对宪法赋予它们的战争权力的司法侵犯。正确授权战争的权力属于国会,但国会行使这一权力赋予总统发动战争的巨大自由裁量权。2001年9月18日的授权使用军事力量(AUMF)是我国历史上最广泛的宣战,合法地授予总统对各种敌人使用武力的广泛权力。再加上《2006年军事委员会法案》(MCA)等法规,国会几乎将其控制范围内的所有战争权力都赋予了总统,甚至出人意料地支持了宪法权力分配的亲总统主义观点。总统的总司令权力条款,如果得到正确理解,就赋予总统在战争行为方面基本上拥有美国宪法赋予的全部权力。这是一种可怕而可怕的权力,但它是发动战争的权力的本质和制宪者决定将军事指挥权授予一个人的固有权力。总统,而不是国会,决定何时何地攻击,攻击谁,攻击的难度,战略和战术目标是什么,以及何时停止战斗。(或者根本不打仗:总统的行政和总司令权力赋予他几乎完全的权力宣布和平,作为他对战争行为的唯一酌处权的一个事件)。总统,而不是国会,决定如何处理俘虏、拘留、审讯、对违反战争法的敌方战斗人员的军事惩罚等问题。他决定如何拦截敌人的通讯。他行使解释和适用国际法的权力,以行使发动战争的权力。最直白地说,“总司令”条款的权力意味着,总统而不是国会拥有宪法权力,可以决定是否对敌方武装部队(无论是合法的还是非法的)成员进行杀害、俘虏、关押、审讯、给予或拒绝国际法保护,甚至是酷刑。最高法院最近的判决在几个方面背离了宪法对战争权力的分配。就他们这样做的程度而言,这些决定对国家政府的其他部门没有宪法约束力。
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THE WAR POWER
This short paper attempts to set forth a comprehensive, but brief, overview of the Constitution's allocation of war powers and to apply those lessons to the most signal, controversial issues of recent and current war practice: control of the decision to go to war; control over war-execution in all respects, including capture, interrogation, detention, and military punishment of enemy combatants (lawful and unlawful); interception of communications with the enemy; judicial constitutional interpretations touching on (and interfering with) the Constitution's allocation of war powers. The Constitution's allocation of war powers is a classic application of the Framers’ reliance on separation of powers in the constitutional design. The Framers regarded the war power as too important to be vested in a single set of hands and so, by conscious design, divided it and allocated portions of that power to various branches, giving some powers exclusively to each branch and also providing for some areas of overlap - and thus shared authority - among them of powers. First, the Constitution vests, in the main, in Congress, and not in the President, the decision to initiate war - the authority to take the nation into a state of war. Second, the Constitution vests in the President, and not in Congress, the power to conduct war. Each of these powers is, in the main, autonomous of the powers of the other branch and thus to a substantial degree immune from control by the other’s powers. Third, the Constitution vest no substantive war powers in the judiciary. But questions of the Constitution’s allocation of war powers nonetheless can be judicial questions. This does not mean that everything that the courts will decide on such matters is right. Nor does it mean even that everything that the courts say should be followed by the other branches of government. (Another aspect of the separation of powers is that the Framers regarded the power to interpret law - the power of constitutional interpretation - as another power too important to vest exclusively in any one branch of government. It too - like the war power - is a divided, shared power.) The political branches thus rightfully may use the constitutional powers at their disposal to resist judicial encroachments on the Constitution’s assignments of war powers to them. The power to authorize war properly rests with Congress, but Congress has exercised that power to grant the President enormous discretion to wage war. The Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) of September 18, 2001 is the broadest declaration of war in our nation's history, lawfully delegating to the President sweeping authority to use force against a wide array of enemies. Coupled with statutes like the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Congress has added practically all of the war powers within its control to the President, and even endorsed a surprisingly pro-presidentialist view of the Constitution's allocation of powers. The Commander in Chief Clause power of the President, correctly understood, vests the President with essentially plenary U.S. constitutional power with respect to the conuct of war. This is a fearful and formidable power, but one inherent in the nature of the power to conduct war and the decision of the Framers to vest the power of military command in a single individual. The President, and not Congress, decides when and where to attack, whom to attack, how hard to attack, what the strategic and tactical objectives are, and when to cease fighting. (Or not to fight at all: the executive and Commander in Chief powers of the President vest him with a nearly plenary power to declare peace, as an incident of his sole discretionary power over the conduct of war). The President, and not Congress, decides what to do with respect to issues of the capture, detention, interrogation, military punishment for law-of-war violations of enemy combatants. He decides what to do with regard to interception of enemy communications. He exercises the power to interpret and apply international law for purposes of executing the power to wage war. In starkest terms, the Commander in Chief Clause power means that the President, and not Congress, possesses the constitutional power to decide whether or not to kill, capture, hold, interrogate, grant or withhold the protections of international law to, or even torture, members of enemy armed forces (of either the lawful or unlawful varieties). Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have departed from the Constitution's allocation of war powers, in several respects. To the extent they do so, those decisions are not constitutionally binding on the other branches of the national government.
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期刊介绍: The Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy is published three times annually by the Harvard Society for Law & Public Policy, Inc., an organization of Harvard Law School students. The Journal is one of the most widely circulated student-edited law reviews and the nation’s leading forum for conservative and libertarian legal scholarship. The late Stephen Eberhard and former Senator and Secretary of Energy E. Spencer Abraham founded the journal twenty-eight years ago and many journal alumni have risen to prominent legal positions in the government and at the nation’s top law firms.
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