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My concept will differ from Mill's in that I reject the notion that happiness is synonymous with pleasure and the absence of pain, although both are part of happiness. Because Mill adopted this definition, his theory produced many anomalies. For example, in order to maintain that intellectual activities are morally superior, Mill was led to introduce qualities of pleasure. This maneuver is inconsistent with his empiricism. Moreover, the activities that are most approved from a moral point of view cannot be explained by the pleasure principle. The broad concept of happiness can account for the primacy of intellectual activities and those activities that are most often morally approved. MILL AND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE Utilitarians would have little difficulty in convincing their peers that pleasure is a good; the difficulty lies in convincing moralists that pleasure is the good. 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引用次数: 11

摘要

我提出了一个广义的幸福概念,作为一个最终的道德目标,这与反思者的愿望和人们普遍认可的目标是一致的。广义的幸福包括多种多样的快乐,最少的痛苦,积极主动的生活和对可以获得的东西的意识。除了在密尔书中发现的这些特征之外,我还补充说,身心能力的发展必须与生物潜能相一致,人们必须能够选择能够锻炼其已发展的能力的活动,并且必须能够实现其活动所追求的许多目标。这种说法可以通过考虑科学数据和分析道德家通常认可的东西来建立。根据它,智力活动将被发现是幸福的最重要方面。我的概念与密尔的不同之处在于,我反对将幸福等同于快乐和没有痛苦的观点,尽管两者都是幸福的一部分。由于密尔采用了这个定义,他的理论产生了许多反常现象。例如,为了坚持智力活动在道德上是优越的,穆勒引入了快乐的品质。这种策略与他的经验主义不符。此外,从道德角度来看最受认可的活动不能用快乐原则来解释。广义的幸福概念可以解释智力活动和那些通常在道德上得到认可的活动的首要地位。密尔和快乐原则功利主义者不难说服他们的同辈相信快乐是一件好事;困难在于使道德家相信快乐是好的。至少从表面上看,人们追求的目标与快乐无关,认可不追求快乐的人的生活,并经常把这样的生活当作榜样。伟大的道德体系通常赞成奋斗、努力工作和利他主义,而不赞成为了享乐而享乐。具体来说,追求艺术的完美、智力的发展和科学知识被视为值得追求的目标。利他主义,当它没有被狂热地表达时,被视为可取的。这些目标通常因其本身的原因而被批准。
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A Concept of Happiness
I propose a broad concept of happiness as an ultimate moral goal that is consistent with what reflective people desire and what people generally approve. Broad happiness includes many and various pleasures, a minimum of pain, a predominately active life and awareness of what can be attained. Besides these characteristics, which are found in Mill, I add that mental and physical faculties must be developed in accord with biological potential, people must be able to choose activities that exercise their developed faculties and must be able to achieve many of the goals toward which their activities aim. This claim can be established by considering scientific data and analyzing what moralists usually approve. According to it, intellectual activities will be found to be the most important aspects of happiness. My concept will differ from Mill's in that I reject the notion that happiness is synonymous with pleasure and the absence of pain, although both are part of happiness. Because Mill adopted this definition, his theory produced many anomalies. For example, in order to maintain that intellectual activities are morally superior, Mill was led to introduce qualities of pleasure. This maneuver is inconsistent with his empiricism. Moreover, the activities that are most approved from a moral point of view cannot be explained by the pleasure principle. The broad concept of happiness can account for the primacy of intellectual activities and those activities that are most often morally approved. MILL AND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE Utilitarians would have little difficulty in convincing their peers that pleasure is a good; the difficulty lies in convincing moralists that pleasure is the good. On the surface at least, people seek goals not involving pleasure, approve the lives of non-pleasure seekers, and often treat such lives as models. Great moral systems generally approve striving, hard work, and altruism, while disapproving of pleasure for its own sake. Specifically, seeking artistic perfection, intellectual development, and scientific knowledge are looked on as worthwhile goals. Altruism, when it is not fanatically expressed, is treated as desirable. These goals are usually approved for their own sake.
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