Does Action Theory Rest on a Mistake

The overwhelming majority of action theories have relied on a Humean model of causality and of explanation; even those theories that explicitly reject aspects of that model uncritically adopt others. The atomistic presuppositions embodied in the model are unable to account for either the dynamic and fabric-like nature of action or the features of control and meaning present therein. It is these atomistic presuppositions that give rise to the "Gettier-like vexations" that are common counterexamples in action theory. The Humean requirement that cause and effect be only contingently connected and generalizable into a covering law is also discussed with respect to the explanation of action. Representatives of the three major approaches to the problem of action: causal (including intentional, volitional, as well as agent causation and reasons-as-causes theories), behaviorist, so-called "contextual", and teleological theories are examined. Awareness of the distinction between human action proper and "mere behavior" so-called can be traced at least as far back as Aristotle, but it has been only about thirty years or so that the study of action became a specialized area of investigation in its own right. At least three major types of theories have been offered of the nature of human action: (1) Causal Theories; (2) Behaviorist-contextual theories, and (3) Teleological theories. The inadequacy of each of these, however, has convinced students of the subject that they are in for a long siege. When encountering what purports to be a novel approach, the distinct and disturbing impression is that the modified version is in fact an old and frayed theory in merely patched-up clothing. Like the various attempts a few years ago to mend the justified true belief analysis of knowledge in the face of ever-recurring Gettier-like objections, the inability of e.g., causal theories of action, despite periodic modifications, to counteract objections such as Chisholm's well known "murder of the rich uncle" example, suggests the possibility that these deficiencies may be due to uncritically accepted presuppositions _common to alL If so, continual patchings-up of the difficulties provide only temporary, superficial relief.