R. Ricco, H. Koshino, Anthony Sierra, Jasmine Bonsel, Jay Von Monteza, Da’Nae Owens
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Individual differences in analytical thinking and complexity of inference in conditional reasoning
Abstract An outstanding question for Hybrid dual process models of reasoning is whether both basic (e.g., modus ponens - MP) and more complex (e.g., modus tollens - MT) forms of conditional inference result from intuitive, type 1 processes. The present study considers whether a proclivity, ability, or capacity to engage in analytical (type 2) thinking might be more closely related to performance on MT than to performance on MP. Such a finding would suggest that the extent to which MT is intuitive for an individual is a function of analytical thinking level and that, in general, MT is not as intuitive an inference form as MP. The present study tested this prediction by way of a conditional reasoning task on which instructional set (belief or logic), congruency, and complexity of inference were manipulated. While results varied somewhat across experiments, it was generally the case that differences in performance between low and high levels of analytical thinking proclivity (AOT), ability (CRT), and capacity (Working Memory Span) were greater for MT problems than for MP problems suggesting that these inference forms may not be equally intuitive.