Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2276975
Maarten van Doorn
Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supported. Contrary to what’s often assumed, these phenomena need not indicate motivated irrationality, even though they are instances of belief-consistent information processing. Second, I engage with arguments purporting to show that belief-consistent information processing does not indicate motivated irrationality because of its mere differential treatment of confirming and non-confirming evidence, but rather because it reveals the undermining presence of an irrelevant influence, such as a desire or partisan identity-driven cognition. While linking belief-consistent reasoning to a deeper source of directional motivation to make good on the claim that it indicates motivated irrationality is indeed what’s needed, two prominent such arguments fail. The non-normativity of many reasoning processes often taken to indicate motivated irrationality is not in fact well established.
{"title":"The skeptical import of motivated reasoning: a closer look at the evidence","authors":"Maarten van Doorn","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2276975","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2276975","url":null,"abstract":"Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supported. Contrary to what’s often assumed, these phenomena need not indicate motivated irrationality, even though they are instances of belief-consistent information processing. Second, I engage with arguments purporting to show that belief-consistent information processing does not indicate motivated irrationality because of its mere differential treatment of confirming and non-confirming evidence, but rather because it reveals the undermining presence of an irrelevant influence, such as a desire or partisan identity-driven cognition. While linking belief-consistent reasoning to a deeper source of directional motivation to make good on the claim that it indicates motivated irrationality is indeed what’s needed, two prominent such arguments fail. The non-normativity of many reasoning processes often taken to indicate motivated irrationality is not in fact well established.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"23 34","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135390647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-28DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2259546
Wangbing Shen, Bernhard Hommel, Yuan Yuan, Qiping Ren, Meifeng Hua, Fang Lu
AbstractCreative association is inherent and essential to creativity and insight. Here we utilised a Chinese compound Remote Associates Task (cRAT) to identify the potential impact of word order (i.e., solution position hereinafter) and word frequency on creative association across two behavioural experiments. Experiment 1 identified the effects of (a) word order and word frequency on cRAT-induced association without considering the specific strategies used during solving such problems and (b) their interaction not only on performance in solving the cRAT, including solution time and accuracy, but also on difficulty rating. Following a coarse-to-fine approach, Experiment 2 examined the effect of both factors on creative association determined according to each participant’s trial-by-trial reports regarding insight solution strategies. Main effects of word order and word frequency, and a two-way interaction, were found on the accuracy and self-rated difficulty. These findings shed light on creative association, multiply-constrained problem solving and constructing compounds.Keywords: Creative associationword frequencysolution positionword orderproblem solving Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Word frequency was mainly determined according to a well-known and widely used word frequency dictionary, listing more than 1.8 million Chinese words or characters, published by the Beijing Language College Institute of Language Studies (Citation1986; the English version is available from the University of Virginia). If the frequency of a word was fewer than 10 times, with a percentage of cumulative frequency less than 5% (the taken threshold of 5% is largely based on a general threshold view drawn from the widely used statistical significance of p < 0.05 in psychological studies wherein an event with a probability/frequency of occurrence of less than 5% is considered a small probability or uncommon/infrequent event. Actually, the word-frequency dictionary authors also considered a word with fewer than 10 appearances, namely, word frequency, as a low-frequency word, which is also manifested in their sampling process), it was considered a low-frequency word; otherwise, it was viewed as a high-frequency word (not fewer than 10 times), occupying more than 95% in terms of percentage of cumulative frequency. It should be noted that the selected items in this study were from an original set of 192 developed items, such that some confounding variables (e.g., chronological effect) were excluded.2 In these two experiments, participants were instructed to try their best to solve each cRAT problem and simultaneously process them. To reduce the complexity and difficulty in design and statistical analysis, the three Chinese characters of a cRAT problem was controlled (not fixed but randomly), and presented simultaneously (not sequentially).3 Here we provided a brief description on the simple effect of two-way interac
{"title":"When word frequency meets word order: factors determining multiply-constrained creative association","authors":"Wangbing Shen, Bernhard Hommel, Yuan Yuan, Qiping Ren, Meifeng Hua, Fang Lu","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259546","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractCreative association is inherent and essential to creativity and insight. Here we utilised a Chinese compound Remote Associates Task (cRAT) to identify the potential impact of word order (i.e., solution position hereinafter) and word frequency on creative association across two behavioural experiments. Experiment 1 identified the effects of (a) word order and word frequency on cRAT-induced association without considering the specific strategies used during solving such problems and (b) their interaction not only on performance in solving the cRAT, including solution time and accuracy, but also on difficulty rating. Following a coarse-to-fine approach, Experiment 2 examined the effect of both factors on creative association determined according to each participant’s trial-by-trial reports regarding insight solution strategies. Main effects of word order and word frequency, and a two-way interaction, were found on the accuracy and self-rated difficulty. These findings shed light on creative association, multiply-constrained problem solving and constructing compounds.Keywords: Creative associationword frequencysolution positionword orderproblem solving Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Word frequency was mainly determined according to a well-known and widely used word frequency dictionary, listing more than 1.8 million Chinese words or characters, published by the Beijing Language College Institute of Language Studies (Citation1986; the English version is available from the University of Virginia). If the frequency of a word was fewer than 10 times, with a percentage of cumulative frequency less than 5% (the taken threshold of 5% is largely based on a general threshold view drawn from the widely used statistical significance of p < 0.05 in psychological studies wherein an event with a probability/frequency of occurrence of less than 5% is considered a small probability or uncommon/infrequent event. Actually, the word-frequency dictionary authors also considered a word with fewer than 10 appearances, namely, word frequency, as a low-frequency word, which is also manifested in their sampling process), it was considered a low-frequency word; otherwise, it was viewed as a high-frequency word (not fewer than 10 times), occupying more than 95% in terms of percentage of cumulative frequency. It should be noted that the selected items in this study were from an original set of 192 developed items, such that some confounding variables (e.g., chronological effect) were excluded.2 In these two experiments, participants were instructed to try their best to solve each cRAT problem and simultaneously process them. To reduce the complexity and difficulty in design and statistical analysis, the three Chinese characters of a cRAT problem was controlled (not fixed but randomly), and presented simultaneously (not sequentially).3 Here we provided a brief description on the simple effect of two-way interac","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"216 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136158572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2259550
Rakefet Ackerman, Liat Levontin
AbstractUnderstanding time investment while solving problems is central to metacognitive research. By the Diminishing Criterion Model (DCM), time regulation is guided by two stopping rules: a confidence criterion that drops as time is invested in each problem and the maximum time to be invested. This combination generates curved confidence–time associations. We compared the belief that intelligence is malleable, a growth mindset, to the belief that intelligence is fixed, and to neutral control groups. We hypothesized that a growth mindset leads people to selectively invest time in problems carrying the hope of improvement. This extra time makes the curved DCM pattern curvier. In two experiments, participants primed with growth, fixed, or control mindsets solved analogies (Experiment 1) and compound remote associates (Experiment 2). As expected, in both experiments a growth mindset exhibited a curvier confidence–time pattern, while the fixed mindset and control groups replicated previous confidence–time associations. Most additional time was invested in problems with intermediate difficulty levels, suggesting strategic time allocation. The study offers useful measures for delving into factors that affect thinking time allocation.Keywords: Growth mindsetproblem-solvingmeta-reasoningmetacognitiontime regulation AcknowledgmentsWe thank Meira Ben-Gad for editorial assistance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In Ackerman, Yom-Tov, et al. (2020), the confidence scale appeared on a separate page. The rest of the solving procedure was identical.2 We used this phrase as the low end of the scale consistently across the experiments, rather than a phrase conveying guessing by chance. This was done so that the scale would start at zero in both experiments, regardless of whether the task format was multiple-choice or open-ended.3 For addressing the lack of remaining self-report difference in mindset at the end of the task, we made several additional analyses. First, we analyzed the two experiments together, examining the tendency towards a fixed mindset by an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with experiment and group as two between-participant factors. We found a main effect of the group, F(2, 304) = 4.95, MSE = 23.47, p = .008, η2p = .032. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that there was a significant difference between fixed and growth mindsets, p = .005, while other differences were not significant, both ps > .09. Importantly, there was no interactive effect with experiment, F(2, 304) = 0.574, MSE = 2.72, p = .564, η2p = .004, suggesting on comparable manipulation effect on both experiments. Second, we examined order effects within the set of problems each participant solved on the central analysis for this study, of confidence-time association. Indeed, the curve difference was found in the second half of the task, β = -1.34, SE = 0.39, t(2137) = 3.47, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.44, -0.33], indicating that the effe
摘要理解解决问题时的时间投入是元认知研究的核心。根据递减准则模型(DCM)，时间调节由两个停止规则指导:一个是随着每个问题投入时间的增加而下降的置信准则，另一个是投入的最大时间。这种组合产生了弯曲的信心时间关联。我们比较了智力是可塑的，一种成长心态，和智力是固定的，以及中立的控制组。我们假设，成长型思维模式会导致人们有选择地把时间投入到带有改善希望的问题上。这段额外的时间使弯曲的DCM模式更加弯曲。在两个实验中，被试分别被增长型、固定型和控制型思维模式启动，分别解决了类比(实验1)和复合远程关联(实验2)。正如预期的那样，在这两个实验中，增长型思维模式呈现出曲线型的信心时间模式，而固定型思维模式和控制型思维模式重复了之前的信心时间关联。大多数额外的时间都花在了中等难度的问题上，这表明时间分配是有策略的。这项研究为深入研究影响思考时间分配的因素提供了有用的方法。关键词:成长心态解决问题元推理元认知时间调节感谢Meira Ben-Gad的编辑协助。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1在Ackerman, yo - tov, et al.(2020)中，置信度量表出现在单独的页面上。其余的求解过程是相同的在整个实验中，我们一直使用这个短语作为量表的低端，而不是一个表达偶然猜测的短语。这样做是为了在两个实验中，无论任务形式是选择题还是开放式的，量表都会从零开始为了解决在任务结束时缺乏自我报告的心态差异，我们做了一些额外的分析。首先，我们一起分析了两个实验，通过方差分析(ANOVA)，以实验和群体作为两个参与者之间的因素，检验了固定心态的倾向。我们发现主效应组，F(2,304) = 4.95, MSE = 23.47, p = 0.008， η2p = 0.032。Tukey事后检验显示，固定心态和成长心态之间存在显著差异，p = 0.005，而其他差异不显著，均为p = 0.09。重要的是，与实验没有交互作用，F(2,304) = 0.574, MSE = 2.72, p = 0.564， η2p = 0.004，表明两个实验的操作效果可比较。其次，我们在本研究的中心分析中检查了每个参与者解决的问题集内的顺序效应，即置信度时间关联。事实上，在任务的后半段发现了曲线差异，β = -1.34, SE = 0.39, t(2137) = 3.47, p < .001, 95% CI[-1.44， -0.33]，表明这种效果一直持续到这个高要求任务的后期阶段。本研究得到了以色列科学基金会的支持。
{"title":"Mindset effects on the regulation of thinking time in problem-solving","authors":"Rakefet Ackerman, Liat Levontin","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259550","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractUnderstanding time investment while solving problems is central to metacognitive research. By the Diminishing Criterion Model (DCM), time regulation is guided by two stopping rules: a confidence criterion that drops as time is invested in each problem and the maximum time to be invested. This combination generates curved confidence–time associations. We compared the belief that intelligence is malleable, a growth mindset, to the belief that intelligence is fixed, and to neutral control groups. We hypothesized that a growth mindset leads people to selectively invest time in problems carrying the hope of improvement. This extra time makes the curved DCM pattern curvier. In two experiments, participants primed with growth, fixed, or control mindsets solved analogies (Experiment 1) and compound remote associates (Experiment 2). As expected, in both experiments a growth mindset exhibited a curvier confidence–time pattern, while the fixed mindset and control groups replicated previous confidence–time associations. Most additional time was invested in problems with intermediate difficulty levels, suggesting strategic time allocation. The study offers useful measures for delving into factors that affect thinking time allocation.Keywords: Growth mindsetproblem-solvingmeta-reasoningmetacognitiontime regulation AcknowledgmentsWe thank Meira Ben-Gad for editorial assistance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In Ackerman, Yom-Tov, et al. (2020), the confidence scale appeared on a separate page. The rest of the solving procedure was identical.2 We used this phrase as the low end of the scale consistently across the experiments, rather than a phrase conveying guessing by chance. This was done so that the scale would start at zero in both experiments, regardless of whether the task format was multiple-choice or open-ended.3 For addressing the lack of remaining self-report difference in mindset at the end of the task, we made several additional analyses. First, we analyzed the two experiments together, examining the tendency towards a fixed mindset by an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with experiment and group as two between-participant factors. We found a main effect of the group, F(2, 304) = 4.95, MSE = 23.47, p = .008, η2p = .032. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that there was a significant difference between fixed and growth mindsets, p = .005, while other differences were not significant, both ps > .09. Importantly, there was no interactive effect with experiment, F(2, 304) = 0.574, MSE = 2.72, p = .564, η2p = .004, suggesting on comparable manipulation effect on both experiments. Second, we examined order effects within the set of problems each participant solved on the central analysis for this study, of confidence-time association. Indeed, the curve difference was found in the second half of the task, β = -1.34, SE = 0.39, t(2137) = 3.47, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.44, -0.33], indicating that the effe","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"216 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136263580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2259541
Siegfried Macho, Thomas Ledermann
The framework of elementary probabilistic operations (EPO) explains the structure of elementary probabilistic reasoning tasks as well as people’s performance on these tasks. The framework comprises three components: (a) Three types of probabilities: joint, marginal, and conditional probabilities; (b) three elementary probabilistic operations: combination, marginalization, and conditioning, and (c) quantitative inference schemas implementing the EPO. The formal part of the EPO framework is a computational level theory that provides a problem space representation and a classification of elementary probabilistic problems based on computational requirements for solving a problem. According to the EPO framework, current methods for improving probabilistic reasoning are of two kinds: First, reduction of Bayesian problems to a type of probabilistic problems requiring less conceptual and procedural competencies. Second, enhancing people’s utilization competence by fostering the application of quantitative inference schemas. The approach suggests new applications, including the teaching of probabilistic reasoning, using analogical problem solving in probabilistic reasoning, and new methods for analyzing errors in probabilistic problem solving.
{"title":"Elementary probabilistic operations: a framework for probabilistic reasoning","authors":"Siegfried Macho, Thomas Ledermann","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259541","url":null,"abstract":"The framework of elementary probabilistic operations (EPO) explains the structure of elementary probabilistic reasoning tasks as well as people’s performance on these tasks. The framework comprises three components: (a) Three types of probabilities: joint, marginal, and conditional probabilities; (b) three elementary probabilistic operations: combination, marginalization, and conditioning, and (c) quantitative inference schemas implementing the EPO. The formal part of the EPO framework is a computational level theory that provides a problem space representation and a classification of elementary probabilistic problems based on computational requirements for solving a problem. According to the EPO framework, current methods for improving probabilistic reasoning are of two kinds: First, reduction of Bayesian problems to a type of probabilistic problems requiring less conceptual and procedural competencies. Second, enhancing people’s utilization competence by fostering the application of quantitative inference schemas. The approach suggests new applications, including the teaching of probabilistic reasoning, using analogical problem solving in probabilistic reasoning, and new methods for analyzing errors in probabilistic problem solving.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135199682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2259539
Paweł Brzóska, Magdalena Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Jarosław Piotrowski, Bartłomiej Nowak, Peter K. Jonason, Constantine Sedikides, Mladen Adamovic, Kokou A. Atitsogbe, Oli Ahmed, Uzma Azam, Sergiu Bălțătescu, Konstantin Bochaver, Aidos Bolatov, Mario Bonato, Victor Counted, Trawin Chaleeraktrakoon, Jano Ramos-Diaz, Sonya Dragova-Koleva, Walaa Labib M. Eldesoki, Carla Sofia Esteves, Valdiney V. Gouveia, Pablo Perez de Leon, Dzintra Iliško, Jesus Alfonso D. Datu, Fanli Jia, Veljko Jovanović, Tomislav Jukić, Narine Khachatryan, Monika Kovacs, Uri Lifshin, Aitor Larzabal Fernandez, Kadi Liik, Sadia Malik, Chanki Moon, Stephan Muehlbacher, Reza Najafi, Emre Oruç, Joonha Park, Iva Poláčková Šolcová, Rahkman Ardi, Ognjen Ridic, Goran Ridic, Yadgar Ismail Said, Andrej Starc, Delia Stefenel, Kiều Thị Thanh Trà, Habib Tiliouine, Robert Tomšik, Jorge Torres-Marin, Charles S. Umeh, Eduardo Wills-Herrera, Anna Wlodarczyk, Zahir Vally, Illia Yahiiaiev
AbstractUnfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates.Keywords: Unfounded beliefsCOVID-19conspiracy beliefshealth beliefscross-cultural Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThe work of Magdalena Żemojtel-Piotrowska and Jarosław Piotrowski was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland under Grant [2017/26/E/HS6/00282]. The work of Peter Jonason was partially supported by the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange under Grant [PPN/ULM/2019/1/00019/U/00001] the National Science Centre of Poland under Grant [2019/35/B/HS6/00682]. The participation of Iva Poláčková Šolcová was supported by the National Plan of Recovery “Systemic Risk Institute” under Grant [LX22NPO5101], funded by European Union - Next Generation EU (Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, EXCELES). The work of Narine Khachatryan was supported by the RA Science Committee, in the frames of the research project No. 20TTSH-070. In accordance with the national law of several countries, there were no direct collaboration between researchers from conflicting countries.
{"title":"Testing the underlying structure of unfounded beliefs about COVID-19 around the world","authors":"Paweł Brzóska, Magdalena Żemojtel-Piotrowska, Jarosław Piotrowski, Bartłomiej Nowak, Peter K. Jonason, Constantine Sedikides, Mladen Adamovic, Kokou A. Atitsogbe, Oli Ahmed, Uzma Azam, Sergiu Bălțătescu, Konstantin Bochaver, Aidos Bolatov, Mario Bonato, Victor Counted, Trawin Chaleeraktrakoon, Jano Ramos-Diaz, Sonya Dragova-Koleva, Walaa Labib M. Eldesoki, Carla Sofia Esteves, Valdiney V. Gouveia, Pablo Perez de Leon, Dzintra Iliško, Jesus Alfonso D. Datu, Fanli Jia, Veljko Jovanović, Tomislav Jukić, Narine Khachatryan, Monika Kovacs, Uri Lifshin, Aitor Larzabal Fernandez, Kadi Liik, Sadia Malik, Chanki Moon, Stephan Muehlbacher, Reza Najafi, Emre Oruç, Joonha Park, Iva Poláčková Šolcová, Rahkman Ardi, Ognjen Ridic, Goran Ridic, Yadgar Ismail Said, Andrej Starc, Delia Stefenel, Kiều Thị Thanh Trà, Habib Tiliouine, Robert Tomšik, Jorge Torres-Marin, Charles S. Umeh, Eduardo Wills-Herrera, Anna Wlodarczyk, Zahir Vally, Illia Yahiiaiev","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259539","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractUnfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates.Keywords: Unfounded beliefsCOVID-19conspiracy beliefshealth beliefscross-cultural Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThe work of Magdalena Żemojtel-Piotrowska and Jarosław Piotrowski was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland under Grant [2017/26/E/HS6/00282]. The work of Peter Jonason was partially supported by the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange under Grant [PPN/ULM/2019/1/00019/U/00001] the National Science Centre of Poland under Grant [2019/35/B/HS6/00682]. The participation of Iva Poláčková Šolcová was supported by the National Plan of Recovery “Systemic Risk Institute” under Grant [LX22NPO5101], funded by European Union - Next Generation EU (Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, EXCELES). The work of Narine Khachatryan was supported by the RA Science Committee, in the frames of the research project No. 20TTSH-070. In accordance with the national law of several countries, there were no direct collaboration between researchers from conflicting countries.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135386283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AbstractWe investigated the causal responsibility attributions of adults and children to mechanical devices in the framework of the criticality-pivotality model. It establishes that, to assign responsibility, people consider how important a target is to reaching a positive outcome (criticality) and how much the target contributed to the actual outcome (pivotality). We also tested theoretical predictions about relations between the development of counterfactual thinking and assessments of pivotality. In Experiment 1, we replicated previous findings in adults using our task. In Experiment 2, we administered this task and a brief counterfactual reasoning questionnaire to children aged between 8 and 13 years. Results showed that children also considered both criticality and pivotality when they attributed responsibility. However, older children were more sensitive than younger ones to pivotality. Also, we found a positive correlation between children’s pivotality judgements and a measure of counterfactual thinking. Results are discussed regarding the model’s relation to counterfactual thinking.Keywords: Responsibility attributionpivotalitycriticalitydevelopment of causationcounterfactual thinking Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 The “order” factor was used as a control in our experiment. Although we had no initial predictions, we analysed the effect of this factor in participants’ prospective and retrospective judgments. A more detailed description of the “order” factor effect can be found at DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.23503548Additional informationFundingThis research was funded by the Spanish Government, Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (PGC2018-095868-B-I00) and by the Junta de Andalucía -Conserjería de Universidad, Investigación e Innovación - Project (P21_00073).
摘要在关键-枢纽模型的框架下，研究了成人和儿童对机械装置的因果责任归因。它表明，为了分配责任，人们会考虑目标对达到积极结果(关键性)的重要性，以及目标对实际结果的贡献程度(枢轴性)。我们还测试了关于反事实思维发展与支点评估之间关系的理论预测。在实验1中，我们在使用我们的任务的成年人中重复了之前的发现。在实验2中，我们对8 - 13岁的儿童进行了这个任务和一个简短的反事实推理问卷。结果表明，儿童在归因责任时也同时考虑了关键性和支点性。然而，年龄较大的儿童比年龄较小的儿童更敏感。此外，我们还发现儿童的关键判断与反事实思维之间存在正相关。讨论了该模型与反事实思维的关系。关键词:责任归因关键关键因果发展反事实思维披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突注1本实验以“序”因素作为对照。虽然我们没有最初的预测，但我们分析了这个因素对参与者的前瞻性和回顾性判断的影响。关于“顺序”因子效应的更详细描述可以在DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare上找到。本研究由西班牙政府经济和竞争力部(PGC2018-095868-B-I00)和Junta de Andalucía -Conserjería de Universidad, Investigación e Innovación - Project (P21_00073)资助。
{"title":"Responsibility attribution about mechanical devices by children and adults","authors":"Cristina Gordo, Jesica Gómez-Sánchez, Sergio Moreno-Ríos","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259549","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractWe investigated the causal responsibility attributions of adults and children to mechanical devices in the framework of the criticality-pivotality model. It establishes that, to assign responsibility, people consider how important a target is to reaching a positive outcome (criticality) and how much the target contributed to the actual outcome (pivotality). We also tested theoretical predictions about relations between the development of counterfactual thinking and assessments of pivotality. In Experiment 1, we replicated previous findings in adults using our task. In Experiment 2, we administered this task and a brief counterfactual reasoning questionnaire to children aged between 8 and 13 years. Results showed that children also considered both criticality and pivotality when they attributed responsibility. However, older children were more sensitive than younger ones to pivotality. Also, we found a positive correlation between children’s pivotality judgements and a measure of counterfactual thinking. Results are discussed regarding the model’s relation to counterfactual thinking.Keywords: Responsibility attributionpivotalitycriticalitydevelopment of causationcounterfactual thinking Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 The “order” factor was used as a control in our experiment. Although we had no initial predictions, we analysed the effect of this factor in participants’ prospective and retrospective judgments. A more detailed description of the “order” factor effect can be found at DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.23503548Additional informationFundingThis research was funded by the Spanish Government, Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (PGC2018-095868-B-I00) and by the Junta de Andalucía -Conserjería de Universidad, Investigación e Innovación - Project (P21_00073).","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135816473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2259542
Esther Boissin, Serge Caparos, Wim De Neys
AbstractDoes avoiding biased responding to reasoning problems and grasping the correct solution require engaging in effortful deliberation or can such solution insight be acquired more intuitively? In this study we set out to test the impact of deliberation on the efficiency of a de-bias training in which the problem logic was explained to participants. We focused on the infamous bat-and-ball problem and varied the degree of possible deliberation during the training session by manipulating time constraints and cognitive load. The results show that the less constrained the deliberation, the more participants improve. However, even under extremely stringent conditions (high time-pressure and dual task load), participants still show a significant improvement. Critically, this “intuitive” insight effect persists over two months. This suggests that deliberation helps reasoners benefit from the training, but it is not indispensable. We discuss critical applied and theoretical implications.Keywords: Reasoninginsightheuristics & biasesde-biasingintuition Disclosure statementNone.Open data statementRaw data can be downloaded from our OSF page (https://osf.io/3b4jy/?view_only=a388443c8fc34310b9f908fe847f077b).Notes1 Hence, whenever we report null findings, we cannot exclude that with a more powerful design the effects might be significant.2 Participants solved three training problems and read an explanation for each one. We focused on the problem solution times for the two problems after the first explanation (i.e., the third and fourth problem of the whole intervention).3 Given that all reading times were fixed at 8 seconds in the fast group (i.e., participants could not advance earlier), this analysis was not informative in this group.Additional informationFundingThis study was supported by the Idex Université Paris Cité ANR-18-IDEX-0001 and by a research grant (DIAGNOR, ANR-16-CE28-0010-01) from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche, France.
{"title":"Examining the role of deliberation in de-bias training","authors":"Esther Boissin, Serge Caparos, Wim De Neys","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259542","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractDoes avoiding biased responding to reasoning problems and grasping the correct solution require engaging in effortful deliberation or can such solution insight be acquired more intuitively? In this study we set out to test the impact of deliberation on the efficiency of a de-bias training in which the problem logic was explained to participants. We focused on the infamous bat-and-ball problem and varied the degree of possible deliberation during the training session by manipulating time constraints and cognitive load. The results show that the less constrained the deliberation, the more participants improve. However, even under extremely stringent conditions (high time-pressure and dual task load), participants still show a significant improvement. Critically, this “intuitive” insight effect persists over two months. This suggests that deliberation helps reasoners benefit from the training, but it is not indispensable. We discuss critical applied and theoretical implications.Keywords: Reasoninginsightheuristics & biasesde-biasingintuition Disclosure statementNone.Open data statementRaw data can be downloaded from our OSF page (https://osf.io/3b4jy/?view_only=a388443c8fc34310b9f908fe847f077b).Notes1 Hence, whenever we report null findings, we cannot exclude that with a more powerful design the effects might be significant.2 Participants solved three training problems and read an explanation for each one. We focused on the problem solution times for the two problems after the first explanation (i.e., the third and fourth problem of the whole intervention).3 Given that all reading times were fixed at 8 seconds in the fast group (i.e., participants could not advance earlier), this analysis was not informative in this group.Additional informationFundingThis study was supported by the Idex Université Paris Cité ANR-18-IDEX-0001 and by a research grant (DIAGNOR, ANR-16-CE28-0010-01) from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche, France.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135816007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-22DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2259548
Henry W. Strudwicke, Glen E. Bodner, Paul Williamson, Michelle M. Arnold
AbstractDispositional measures of actively open-minded thinking and cognitive reflection both predict reasoning accuracy on conflict problems. Here we investigated their relative impact on meta-reasoning. To this end, we measured reasoning accuracy and two indices of meta-reasoning performance – conflict detection sensitivity and meta-reasoning discrimination – using a ratio-bias task. Our key predictors were actively open-minded thinking and cognitive reflection, and numeracy, cognitive ability, and mindware instantiation were controlled for. Actively open-minded thinking was a better predictor of reasoning accuracy and meta-reasoning discrimination than cognitive reflection, and was the only dispositional measure to significantly predict conflict detection sensitivity. Thus, susceptibility to biased reasoning and meta-reasoning may be better captured by a reasoner’s ability to engage in open-minded thinking than by their ability to engage in reflective thinking.Keywords: Meta-reasoningindividual differencesbias susceptibilitythinking dispositions AcknowledgmentsThis research was supported by an HDR Research Award from the College of Education, Psychology and Social Work at Flinders University. The authors would like to thank Matthew Christian and Olivia Burton for their feedback on an earlier draft of this manuscript.Author contributionsH.W.S and M.M.A conceived the study. H.W.S programmed the experiment and collected the data. H.W.S and P.W analyzed the data. H.W.S and G.E.B co-wrote the manuscript and P.W made critical edits.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Data availability statementThe data are publicly available at Open Sciences Framework: https://osf.io/jm63r/?view_only=15070473806541548adc224496c86660
{"title":"Open-minded and reflective thinking predicts reasoning and meta-reasoning: evidence from a ratio-bias conflict task","authors":"Henry W. Strudwicke, Glen E. Bodner, Paul Williamson, Michelle M. Arnold","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259548","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractDispositional measures of actively open-minded thinking and cognitive reflection both predict reasoning accuracy on conflict problems. Here we investigated their relative impact on meta-reasoning. To this end, we measured reasoning accuracy and two indices of meta-reasoning performance – conflict detection sensitivity and meta-reasoning discrimination – using a ratio-bias task. Our key predictors were actively open-minded thinking and cognitive reflection, and numeracy, cognitive ability, and mindware instantiation were controlled for. Actively open-minded thinking was a better predictor of reasoning accuracy and meta-reasoning discrimination than cognitive reflection, and was the only dispositional measure to significantly predict conflict detection sensitivity. Thus, susceptibility to biased reasoning and meta-reasoning may be better captured by a reasoner’s ability to engage in open-minded thinking than by their ability to engage in reflective thinking.Keywords: Meta-reasoningindividual differencesbias susceptibilitythinking dispositions AcknowledgmentsThis research was supported by an HDR Research Award from the College of Education, Psychology and Social Work at Flinders University. The authors would like to thank Matthew Christian and Olivia Burton for their feedback on an earlier draft of this manuscript.Author contributionsH.W.S and M.M.A conceived the study. H.W.S programmed the experiment and collected the data. H.W.S and P.W analyzed the data. H.W.S and G.E.B co-wrote the manuscript and P.W made critical edits.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Data availability statementThe data are publicly available at Open Sciences Framework: https://osf.io/jm63r/?view_only=15070473806541548adc224496c86660","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136060934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-21DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2259543
Ming-Hong Tsai, Verlin B. Hinsz
AbstractPeople often make less risky decisions for themselves than others. We examined how people allocated risks (i.e., determining the ratio of uncertain outcomes to certain outcomes) between themselves and others. We also investigated gain (vs. loss) domain and social value orientation as predictors of risk allocations. The results of three experiments demonstrated that participants were more likely to share their risks equally between themselves and others than distribute risk unequally. In the gain (vs. loss) domain, participants allocated fewer risks to themselves and more risks to the other person for unequal risk allocations. Compared to proselfs, prosocials were more likely to allocate risks equally. We also found stronger domain effects on unequal risk allocations for proselfs than for prosocials. Therefore, our findings clarify the effects of risk distribution, domain, and social value orientation on interpersonal allocation decisions and highlight equal risk distribution between oneself and others.Keywords: Allocation decisionrisk distributiongain-loss domainsocial value orientationself-other Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For the options of risk allocation, a percentage refers to the proportion of an uncertain outcome to a total outcome allocated to oneself or another individual.2 We declare that there is no conflict of interest. We also confirm that the manuscript adheres to ethical guidelines specified in the APA Code of Conduct and our national ethics guidelines. Please see the data and analysis codes at https://osf.io/zmwfc/?view_only=95de83989f50460c97477aa6cb5239b0.3 We conducted power analyses to demonstrate that our sample sizes have sufficient power in Experiments 1-3. We also ran additional analyses to demonstrate the even distribution of sample sizes across different conditions before and after filtering the data in Experiments 1 and 2. These are presented in the supplemental materials.4 We followed the incentive instructions to pair participants, calculate each participant’s final points, and awarded the three participants accordingly in each condition with the incentive instructions (in Experiments 1 and 2).5 We also ran additional analyses without the controls for the differences in the items and choices, and the results demonstrated consistent patterns between the results with and without controls, which suggests that the differences in the first-stage allocations did not significantly influence our results. Please see the relevant results in the section titled “Results without Controls for the Allocation Outcomes During the Initial Decisions in Experiments 1 and 2” in the supplemental materials.6 The percentage refers to the average difference of the selection likelihood of a specific risk-distribution option between the gain and loss conditions.
{"title":"Gain-loss domain and social value orientation as determinants of risk allocation decisions","authors":"Ming-Hong Tsai, Verlin B. Hinsz","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259543","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractPeople often make less risky decisions for themselves than others. We examined how people allocated risks (i.e., determining the ratio of uncertain outcomes to certain outcomes) between themselves and others. We also investigated gain (vs. loss) domain and social value orientation as predictors of risk allocations. The results of three experiments demonstrated that participants were more likely to share their risks equally between themselves and others than distribute risk unequally. In the gain (vs. loss) domain, participants allocated fewer risks to themselves and more risks to the other person for unequal risk allocations. Compared to proselfs, prosocials were more likely to allocate risks equally. We also found stronger domain effects on unequal risk allocations for proselfs than for prosocials. Therefore, our findings clarify the effects of risk distribution, domain, and social value orientation on interpersonal allocation decisions and highlight equal risk distribution between oneself and others.Keywords: Allocation decisionrisk distributiongain-loss domainsocial value orientationself-other Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For the options of risk allocation, a percentage refers to the proportion of an uncertain outcome to a total outcome allocated to oneself or another individual.2 We declare that there is no conflict of interest. We also confirm that the manuscript adheres to ethical guidelines specified in the APA Code of Conduct and our national ethics guidelines. Please see the data and analysis codes at https://osf.io/zmwfc/?view_only=95de83989f50460c97477aa6cb5239b0.3 We conducted power analyses to demonstrate that our sample sizes have sufficient power in Experiments 1-3. We also ran additional analyses to demonstrate the even distribution of sample sizes across different conditions before and after filtering the data in Experiments 1 and 2. These are presented in the supplemental materials.4 We followed the incentive instructions to pair participants, calculate each participant’s final points, and awarded the three participants accordingly in each condition with the incentive instructions (in Experiments 1 and 2).5 We also ran additional analyses without the controls for the differences in the items and choices, and the results demonstrated consistent patterns between the results with and without controls, which suggests that the differences in the first-stage allocations did not significantly influence our results. Please see the relevant results in the section titled “Results without Controls for the Allocation Outcomes During the Initial Decisions in Experiments 1 and 2” in the supplemental materials.6 The percentage refers to the average difference of the selection likelihood of a specific risk-distribution option between the gain and loss conditions.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136237559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-21DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2023.2259537
Martin Dockendorff, Hugo Mercier
AbstractThe public is largely innumerate, making systematic mistakes in estimating some politically relevant facts, such as the share of foreign-born citizens. In two-step or multistep flow models, such mistakes could be corrected if better-informed citizens were able to convince their peers, in particular by using good arguments citing reliable sources. In six experiments, we find two issues that dampen the potential power of this two-step flow process. First, even though participants were more convinced by good than by poor arguments, many did not change their minds, even when confronted with good arguments. Second, participants are not inclined to spontaneously generate arguments that cite reliable sources, even when they have just been influenced by such arguments. Both issues should put a significant brake in the spread of political numeracy through the two-step flow process, in particular in non-dialogic contexts.Keywords: Political numeracytwo-step flowargument evaluationargument productionargument transmission AcknowledgementsThis work was supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR) under grants ANR-17-EURE-0017 FrontCog and ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL. We thank John Sides for providing constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.Disclosure statementThe authors report there are no competing interests to declare.Notes1 All Experiments were conducted between Fall 2016 and Summer 2017.2 The distribution is thus far from being normal. However, since t-tests are very robust against non-normality, we have relied on them rather than on Wilcoxon tests (Rasch & Guiard, Citation2004). The same analyses using Wilcoxon signed-rank test can be found in the ESM.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR) under grants ANR-17-EURE-0017 FrontCog and ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL.
{"title":"Argument evaluation and production in the correction of political innumeracy","authors":"Martin Dockendorff, Hugo Mercier","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2023.2259537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2259537","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe public is largely innumerate, making systematic mistakes in estimating some politically relevant facts, such as the share of foreign-born citizens. In two-step or multistep flow models, such mistakes could be corrected if better-informed citizens were able to convince their peers, in particular by using good arguments citing reliable sources. In six experiments, we find two issues that dampen the potential power of this two-step flow process. First, even though participants were more convinced by good than by poor arguments, many did not change their minds, even when confronted with good arguments. Second, participants are not inclined to spontaneously generate arguments that cite reliable sources, even when they have just been influenced by such arguments. Both issues should put a significant brake in the spread of political numeracy through the two-step flow process, in particular in non-dialogic contexts.Keywords: Political numeracytwo-step flowargument evaluationargument productionargument transmission AcknowledgementsThis work was supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR) under grants ANR-17-EURE-0017 FrontCog and ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL. We thank John Sides for providing constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.Disclosure statementThe authors report there are no competing interests to declare.Notes1 All Experiments were conducted between Fall 2016 and Summer 2017.2 The distribution is thus far from being normal. However, since t-tests are very robust against non-normality, we have relied on them rather than on Wilcoxon tests (Rasch & Guiard, Citation2004). The same analyses using Wilcoxon signed-rank test can be found in the ESM.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR) under grants ANR-17-EURE-0017 FrontCog and ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136102051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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