{"title":"为什么审查是自我破坏:约翰·斯图亚特·密尔被忽视的言论自由论点","authors":"N. Shah","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akab010","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Two prejudices have hampered our understanding of John Stuart Mill’s central argument for free speech. One prejudice is that arguments for free speech can only be made in terms of values or rights. This prejudice causes us to miss the depth of Mill’s argument. He does not argue that silencing speech is harmful or violates rights, but instead that silencing speech is a uniquely self-undermining act; it undermines the ground upon which it is based. But even if we overcome this prejudice and appreciate the self-undermining character of Mill’s argument, the prejudice that epistemic justification is a completable task blinds us to the role of open-mindedness in his argument; and failing to see this leads us to wrongly conclude that his argument is invalid. It is only once we have overcome both prejudices that we can appreciate the depth and power of Mill’s argument for free speech.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why Censorship is Self-Undermining: John Stuart Mill’s Neglected Argument for Free Speech\",\"authors\":\"N. Shah\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/arisup/akab010\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Two prejudices have hampered our understanding of John Stuart Mill’s central argument for free speech. One prejudice is that arguments for free speech can only be made in terms of values or rights. This prejudice causes us to miss the depth of Mill’s argument. He does not argue that silencing speech is harmful or violates rights, but instead that silencing speech is a uniquely self-undermining act; it undermines the ground upon which it is based. But even if we overcome this prejudice and appreciate the self-undermining character of Mill’s argument, the prejudice that epistemic justification is a completable task blinds us to the role of open-mindedness in his argument; and failing to see this leads us to wrongly conclude that his argument is invalid. It is only once we have overcome both prejudices that we can appreciate the depth and power of Mill’s argument for free speech.\",\"PeriodicalId\":100121,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akab010\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akab010","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
两种偏见阻碍了我们对约翰•斯图尔特•密尔(John Stuart Mill)关于言论自由的核心论点的理解。一种偏见是,对言论自由的争论只能从价值观或权利的角度出发。这种偏见使我们错过了密尔论证的深度。他并不认为压制言论是有害的或侵犯了权利,而是认为压制言论是一种独特的自我破坏行为;它破坏了它赖以存在的基础。但即使我们克服了这种偏见并欣赏了密尔论证的自我破坏特征,认知证明是一项可完成的任务的偏见也使我们看不到他的论证中开放性的作用;如果看不到这一点,我们就会错误地得出结论,认为他的论证是无效的。只有当我们克服了这两种偏见,我们才能欣赏密尔关于言论自由的论证的深度和力量。
Why Censorship is Self-Undermining: John Stuart Mill’s Neglected Argument for Free Speech
Two prejudices have hampered our understanding of John Stuart Mill’s central argument for free speech. One prejudice is that arguments for free speech can only be made in terms of values or rights. This prejudice causes us to miss the depth of Mill’s argument. He does not argue that silencing speech is harmful or violates rights, but instead that silencing speech is a uniquely self-undermining act; it undermines the ground upon which it is based. But even if we overcome this prejudice and appreciate the self-undermining character of Mill’s argument, the prejudice that epistemic justification is a completable task blinds us to the role of open-mindedness in his argument; and failing to see this leads us to wrongly conclude that his argument is invalid. It is only once we have overcome both prejudices that we can appreciate the depth and power of Mill’s argument for free speech.