Members of racial and sexual minorities often live in the fear of arbitrary interference from others—rogue police officers or sexual harassers. Are they unfree by dint of believing they are unfree? I draw on the republican theory of freedom—according to which we are unfree if we are subjected to a risk of arbitrary interference—to offer a qualified positive answer. I clarify the role of probabilistic judgements about risk in republican political theory. I argue that under specific circumstances, diagnoses of republican freedom can be indexed to a certain belief about probability—what it is warranted for someone to believe in light of their distinctive epistemic perspective.
{"title":"Being Free, Feeling Free: Race, Gender, and Republican Domination","authors":"Cécile Laborde","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Members of racial and sexual minorities often live in the fear of arbitrary interference from others—rogue police officers or sexual harassers. Are they unfree by dint of believing they are unfree? I draw on the republican theory of freedom—according to which we are unfree if we are subjected to a risk of arbitrary interference—to offer a qualified positive answer. I clarify the role of probabilistic judgements about risk in republican political theory. I argue that under specific circumstances, diagnoses of republican freedom can be indexed to a certain belief about probability—what it is warranted for someone to believe in light of their distinctive epistemic perspective.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141706386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the connection between two philosophical debates concerning the nature of properties. The first, metaethical debate is about whether normative properties are ordinary natural properties or some unique kind of non-natural properties. The second, metaphysical debate is about whether properties are sets of objects, transcendent or immanent universals, or sets of tropes. I argue that nominalism, transcendent realism and immanent realism are not neutral frameworks for the metaethical debate but instead lead to either metaethical naturalism or non-naturalism. We can therefore investigate the metaethical question on its own terms only within the framework of trope theory.
{"title":"Metaethics and the Nature of Properties","authors":"Jussi Suikkanen","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper explores the connection between two philosophical debates concerning the nature of properties. The first, metaethical debate is about whether normative properties are ordinary natural properties or some unique kind of non-natural properties. The second, metaphysical debate is about whether properties are sets of objects, transcendent or immanent universals, or sets of tropes. I argue that nominalism, transcendent realism and immanent realism are not neutral frameworks for the metaethical debate but instead lead to either metaethical naturalism or non-naturalism. We can therefore investigate the metaethical question on its own terms only within the framework of trope theory.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141711742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Laborde contrasts Default Republicanism with Labordian Republicanism. The latter view ‘answers’ the Probabilistic and the Anti-Psychology Objections to Default Republicanism. The former objection holds that the mere possibility of unconstrained intervention does not matter for unfreedom, whereas the latter contends that it is by virtue of the experience-independent fact of servitude that one is unfree. I argue that people sympathetic to these objections should have reservations about Labordian Republicanism. In any case, republicans should reject the Anti-Psychology Objection. More generally, Pluralist Republicanism might be preferable to Labordian Republicanism.
{"title":"Pluralist Republicanism: Race, Gender and Domination","authors":"K. Lippert‐Rasmussen","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Laborde contrasts Default Republicanism with Labordian Republicanism. The latter view ‘answers’ the Probabilistic and the Anti-Psychology Objections to Default Republicanism. The former objection holds that the mere possibility of unconstrained intervention does not matter for unfreedom, whereas the latter contends that it is by virtue of the experience-independent fact of servitude that one is unfree. I argue that people sympathetic to these objections should have reservations about Labordian Republicanism. In any case, republicans should reject the Anti-Psychology Objection. More generally, Pluralist Republicanism might be preferable to Labordian Republicanism.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141688934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bertrand Russell abandoned the notion of acquaintance in July 1918. What changes does this force in his account of the mind? This paper focuses on one puzzle of interpretation about this. In 1913, Russell offered an account of ‘egocentric particulars’, his term for indexicals and demonstratives. He argued that the fundamental objection to neutral monism was that it could not provide an adequate theory of these terms. In 1918, Russell now embraces a form of neutral monism, but he does not return to the problem of indexicals until 1940 in his William James lectures. Is the account given in 1940 significantly different from the one given in 1913? What was the argument against neutral monism in 1913? Does Russell offer a new solution in 1940 or reject his earlier view as mistaken? The answers offered here are used to draw more general morals about the current debate concerning relational theories of sense perception.
{"title":"Illumination Fading","authors":"M. G. F. Martin","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Bertrand Russell abandoned the notion of acquaintance in July 1918. What changes does this force in his account of the mind? This paper focuses on one puzzle of interpretation about this. In 1913, Russell offered an account of ‘egocentric particulars’, his term for indexicals and demonstratives. He argued that the fundamental objection to neutral monism was that it could not provide an adequate theory of these terms. In 1918, Russell now embraces a form of neutral monism, but he does not return to the problem of indexicals until 1940 in his William James lectures. Is the account given in 1940 significantly different from the one given in 1913? What was the argument against neutral monism in 1913? Does Russell offer a new solution in 1940 or reject his earlier view as mistaken? The answers offered here are used to draw more general morals about the current debate concerning relational theories of sense perception.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"556 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141708086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reorients the problematic of political epistemology to put power at the centre of analysis, through an analysis of writings on the relationship between power and knowledge by Horkheimer, Habermas and Foucault. In their work, political epistemology was pursued analogously to the development of political economy, which explored the background conditions and assumptions of economic research. I also show that Horkheimer, Habermas and Foucault each had normative aims intended to improve both epistemology and knowing practices. Though their approaches are distinct, the shared element was a concern with redefining truth.
{"title":"Horkheimer, Habermas, Foucault as Political Epistemologists","authors":"L. Alcoff","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper reorients the problematic of political epistemology to put power at the centre of analysis, through an analysis of writings on the relationship between power and knowledge by Horkheimer, Habermas and Foucault. In their work, political epistemology was pursued analogously to the development of political economy, which explored the background conditions and assumptions of economic research. I also show that Horkheimer, Habermas and Foucault each had normative aims intended to improve both epistemology and knowing practices. Though their approaches are distinct, the shared element was a concern with redefining truth.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"42 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141690235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I ask what logical consequence is, and give an answer that is somewhat different from the usual ones. It isn’t clear why anyone would need a new approach to logical consequence, so I begin by explaining the work that I need the answer to do and why the standard conceptions aren’t adequate. Then I articulate a replacement view which is.
{"title":"Logical Consequence (Slight Return)","authors":"Gillian Russell","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper I ask what logical consequence is, and give an answer that is somewhat different from the usual ones. It isn’t clear why anyone would need a new approach to logical consequence, so I begin by explaining the work that I need the answer to do and why the standard conceptions aren’t adequate. Then I articulate a replacement view which is.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"19 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141702416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In ‘Logical Consequence (Slight Return)’, Gillian Russell asks ‘What is logical consequence?’, a question which has vexed logicians since at least the twelfth century, when people first began to wonder what it meant for one sentence (or proposition) to follow from another sentence (or proposition, or set of sentences, or set of propositions), or whether it was possible to put down rules determining when the relation of ‘follows from’ (or ‘is antecedent to’) holds. Her aim is threefold: (1) to explain what an answer to the question ‘What is logical consequence?’ would need to be able to do in order to be a satisfying answer; (2) to identify previous answers to the question; and (3) to demonstrate why these previous answers are inadequate to do what the answer needs to be able to do, and to offer a new answer. In the present paper, I respond to these aims in two ways. The first is to say something about where Russell’s central question even comes from, because this is not a topic that is often discussed by twentieth- and twenty-first-century logicians, and even historians of logic tend to not have had much to say about when—and why—this question even comes about in the first place. The second is to evaluate the accounts proposed and discussed by Russell, including her new proposal. In the end, I will argue that she has reached the right account of the nature of logical consequence, but not necessarily for the right reasons.
{"title":"What Logical Consequence Could, Could Not, Should, and Should Not Be","authors":"S. Uckelman","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In ‘Logical Consequence (Slight Return)’, Gillian Russell asks ‘What is logical consequence?’, a question which has vexed logicians since at least the twelfth century, when people first began to wonder what it meant for one sentence (or proposition) to follow from another sentence (or proposition, or set of sentences, or set of propositions), or whether it was possible to put down rules determining when the relation of ‘follows from’ (or ‘is antecedent to’) holds. Her aim is threefold: (1) to explain what an answer to the question ‘What is logical consequence?’ would need to be able to do in order to be a satisfying answer; (2) to identify previous answers to the question; and (3) to demonstrate why these previous answers are inadequate to do what the answer needs to be able to do, and to offer a new answer. In the present paper, I respond to these aims in two ways. The first is to say something about where Russell’s central question even comes from, because this is not a topic that is often discussed by twentieth- and twenty-first-century logicians, and even historians of logic tend to not have had much to say about when—and why—this question even comes about in the first place. The second is to evaluate the accounts proposed and discussed by Russell, including her new proposal. In the end, I will argue that she has reached the right account of the nature of logical consequence, but not necessarily for the right reasons.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"39 29","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141716464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Neutral monism is the view that ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are composed of, or grounded in, more basic elements of reality that are intrinsically neither mental nor material. Before adopting this view in 1918, Russell was a mind–matter dualist and a pointed critic of it. His most ‘decisive’ objection concerns whether it can provide an adequate analysis of egocentricity and our use of indexical expressions such as ‘I’, ‘this’, ‘now’, and so on. I argue that M. G. F. Martin (2024) and other recent interpreters cannot make proper sense of Russell’s shifting views about egocentricity because they misascribe to his early dualism the thesis that experience is in some sense ‘diaphanous’ or ‘transparent’. Against this, I make the case that (1) Russell rejected the diaphaneity of experience as a dualist, (2) this rejection played a key role in his early objections to neutral monism, and (3) several decades later Russell takes his neutral monism to have key resources for answering his prior objections.
中性一元论认为，"心智 "和 "物质 "是由现实中更基本的元素组成的，或以这些元素为基础，而这些元素在本质上既不是心智的，也不是物质的。在 1918 年采纳这一观点之前，罗素是心物二元论者，并对其进行了尖锐的批评。他最 "决定性 "的反对意见是，这种观点能否对自我中心和我们使用 "我"、"这"、"现在 "等索引式表达进行充分的分析。我认为马丁（M. G. F. Martin，2024）和其他新近的解释者无法正确理解罗素关于自我中心的观点的转变，因为他们错误地将经验在某种意义上是 "不透明的 "或 "透明的 "这一论点归结为罗素早期的二元论。针对这一点，我提出的理由是：(1)罗素作为二元论者拒绝接受经验的非透明性；(2)这种拒绝在他早期反对中性一元论的过程中发挥了关键作用；(3)几十年后，罗素认为他的中性一元论拥有回答他先前反对意见的关键资源。
{"title":"Russell on Experience and Egocentricity","authors":"Donovan Wishon","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Neutral monism is the view that ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are composed of, or grounded in, more basic elements of reality that are intrinsically neither mental nor material. Before adopting this view in 1918, Russell was a mind–matter dualist and a pointed critic of it. His most ‘decisive’ objection concerns whether it can provide an adequate analysis of egocentricity and our use of indexical expressions such as ‘I’, ‘this’, ‘now’, and so on. I argue that M. G. F. Martin (2024) and other recent interpreters cannot make proper sense of Russell’s shifting views about egocentricity because they misascribe to his early dualism the thesis that experience is in some sense ‘diaphanous’ or ‘transparent’. Against this, I make the case that (1) Russell rejected the diaphaneity of experience as a dualist, (2) this rejection played a key role in his early objections to neutral monism, and (3) several decades later Russell takes his neutral monism to have key resources for answering his prior objections.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"300 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141708168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The sciences aim to get at the truth about the nature of the world. Do the humanities have a similar goal—namely, to get at the truth about things like novels, paintings, and historical events? I consider a few different ways in which the humanities aim at the truth about their objects, in the process giving rise to epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding. Two works in the humanities are used as test cases: the historian Tyler Stovall’sParis Noir (1996) and the musicologist Susan McClary’s article, ‘The Blasphemy of Talking Politics During Bach Year’ (1987).
科学旨在探究世界本质的真相。人文学科是否也有类似的目标--即了解小说、绘画和历史事件等事物的真相？我将从几个不同的角度来探讨人文学科是如何探求其研究对象的真相，并在此过程中产生知识和理解等认识论产品的。我们用两部人文学科作品作为测试案例：历史学家泰勒-斯托沃尔（Tyler Stovall）的《黑巴黎》（Paris Noir，1996 年）和音乐学家苏珊-麦克拉里（Susan McClary）的文章《在巴赫年谈论政治的亵渎》（The Blasphemy of Talking Politics During Bach Year，1987 年）。
{"title":"The Epistemic Goals of the Humanities","authors":"Stephen R Grimm","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The sciences aim to get at the truth about the nature of the world. Do the humanities have a similar goal—namely, to get at the truth about things like novels, paintings, and historical events? I consider a few different ways in which the humanities aim at the truth about their objects, in the process giving rise to epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding. Two works in the humanities are used as test cases: the historian Tyler Stovall’sParis Noir (1996) and the musicologist Susan McClary’s article, ‘The Blasphemy of Talking Politics During Bach Year’ (1987).","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"179 1‐2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141708381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Liberation philosophy seeks to contribute to the liberation of the oppressed and to the creation of a more just society. A meliorative philosophy is one that improves human lives. A liberation philosophy can be regarded as meliorative only if it has a compelling theory of change. A theory of change for philosophical interventions should explain how they can contribute to social, political or economic change. The main components of such a theory are identified and shown to be present in the work of the best liberation philosophers, such as Martin Luther King Jr. A meliorative philosophy improves human lives by, among other things, providing the kind of guidance that leads to better decision-making and improved conduct. Philosophy should conceive of the guidance it offers as co-created and reflect on the conditions for effective co-creation. The distinctive virtues of meliorative philosophy, including liberation philosophy, are personal qualities that enable co-creation. These include humility, practicality, an openness to diverse perspectives, and an instinct for lived complexity. There are philosophical purists who reject the demand that philosophy should answer to practical needs. We should be sceptical about some of the claims made by philosophical purists.
{"title":"Liberation Philosophy","authors":"Quassim Cassam","doi":"10.1093/arisup/akae009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akae009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Liberation philosophy seeks to contribute to the liberation of the oppressed and to the creation of a more just society. A meliorative philosophy is one that improves human lives. A liberation philosophy can be regarded as meliorative only if it has a compelling theory of change. A theory of change for philosophical interventions should explain how they can contribute to social, political or economic change. The main components of such a theory are identified and shown to be present in the work of the best liberation philosophers, such as Martin Luther King Jr. A meliorative philosophy improves human lives by, among other things, providing the kind of guidance that leads to better decision-making and improved conduct. Philosophy should conceive of the guidance it offers as co-created and reflect on the conditions for effective co-creation. The distinctive virtues of meliorative philosophy, including liberation philosophy, are personal qualities that enable co-creation. These include humility, practicality, an openness to diverse perspectives, and an instinct for lived complexity. There are philosophical purists who reject the demand that philosophy should answer to practical needs. We should be sceptical about some of the claims made by philosophical purists.","PeriodicalId":100121,"journal":{"name":"Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume","volume":"44 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141694465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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