劳动力市场中运气对ceo的价值

M. Amore, Sebastian Schwenen
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引用次数: 4

摘要

众所周知,运气会增加ceo在当前公司的薪酬。在本文中,我们探讨运气如何影响ceo在劳动力市场的外部选择,以及雇佣幸运ceo的公司的绩效。我们的研究结果表明,CEO在当前公司的运气会让他们跳槽到一家新公司,并被任命为CEO和董事长。幸运的ceo往往会选择分析师关注较少、行业竞争力较弱的公司。此外,幸运的首席执行官能够在新公司获得更高的薪酬(无论是绝对值还是与新行业同行相比)。最后,差异中的差异结果显示,雇佣幸运的ceo会损害公司业绩,这主要是由于运营成本飙升和公司资产使用不当。
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The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOS
It is well-known that luck increases the compensation of CEOs at their current firm. In this paper, we explore how luck affects CEOs' outside options in the labor market, and the performance of firms that hire lucky CEOs. Our results show that luck at their current firm makes CEOs move to a new firm and be appointed as both CEO and chairman. Lucky CEOs tend to match with firms subject to low analyst coverage and operating in less competitive industries. Moreover, lucky CEOs are able to obtain a higher pay at the new firm (both in absolute terms and compared to new industry peers). Finally, difference-in-differences results show that hiring lucky CEOs hurts firm performance, mostly due to a surge in operating costs and a poorer usage of corporate assets.
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