Errors, fast and slow: an analysis of response times in probability judgments

Abstract Based on the Dual-Process Diffusion Model, we tested three hypotheses about response times of errors and correct responses in probability judgments. We predicted that correct responses were (1) slower than errors in the case of conflicting decision processes but (2) faster than errors in the case of alignment; and that they were (3) slower in the case of conflict than in the case of alignment. A binary-choice experiment was conducted in which three types of decision problems elicited conflict or alignment of a deliberative decision process and a heuristic decision process. Consistent with the traditional dual-process architecture, the former captured computational-normative decision strategies and the latter described intuitive-affective aspects of decision making. The hypotheses (1) and (3) were supported, while no statistically significant evidence was found for (2). Implications for the generalisability of the Dual-Process Diffusion Model to slow probability judgments are discussed.