戈尔巴乔夫、列宁和与列宁主义决裂

Q2 Social Sciences Demokratizatsiya Pub Date : 2007-03-22 DOI:10.3200/DEMO.15.2.230-244
Archie Brown
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Given the institutional power Gorbachev wielded until late in the perestroika period, his embrace of concepts radically at odds with Leninism was of critical importance, opening doors which had remained firmly closed for decades. Keywords: Bernstein, Bolshevik, command-administrative system, democratization, Gorbachev, Lenin, Leninism, perestroika, pluralism, socialism In a highly authoritarian political system, with great power vested in the office at the top of the political hierarchy, the values, policy preferences, and personality of the holder of that office are liable to make a bigger difference to major policy outcomes than the personality, values, and preferences of the head of government within a democracy. The constraints on the latter will be far greater--not only from members of his or her party, but also from opposition parties, the legislature, the judiciary, organized interests, and public opinion, to name the most obvious. That is not to say, however, that the power of the top leader in an authoritarian system is entirely unconstrained. If the authoritarian system is a) highly institutionalized and b) highly ideologized, then there are likely to be quite serious obstacles in the path of major innovation of even the topmost leader. In particular, it will be very risky for him (I do not add \"or her,\" for male leadership is ubiquitous in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes) to attempt to change the basic tenets of the system's legitimating ideology or its institutional norms. These factors all apply to the case of Mikhail Gorbachev and the transformation of the Soviet system. When Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he attained the office which commanded greater institutional resources than any other within the country. Yet this was in a thoroughly consolidated authoritarian regime--in the classification of Linz and Stepan an example of \"post-totalitarianism\" (1)--in which the top leader was accorded great authority provided he played by the rules of the game. There was an important precedent in the post-Stalin Soviet Union illustrating the potential vulnerability of even the supreme leader. Although Nikita Khrushchev did not challenge the norms of the system to anything like the extent to which Gorbachev was subsequently to do, his frequent reorganizations of the party and state structures and an unwillingness to work through the established bureaucratic channels led to his removal from the leadership in October 1964 on the instigation of the leading members of the Politburo, (2) backed up by the Central Committee as a whole. (3) Gorbachev was always conscious of the fate of Khrushchev and of his need, therefore, to persuade other members of the ruling oligarchy to embark on far-reaching reform. 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引用次数: 5

摘要

摘要:本文探讨了米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫对列宁的尊重与他对列宁主义的日益排斥之间的矛盾。当戈尔巴乔夫仍然担任苏联共产党总书记时,他所接受的思想与苏联主要设计师的思想从根本上是不一致的。西方作家关注的焦点是戈尔巴乔夫1987年出版的《改革》一书。《我们国家和世界的新思维》,作为一个主要来源,过于简单化和误导,掩盖了戈尔巴乔夫1988年以来政治思想的激进化。除其他外,作者利用以前未使用的档案文件,证明戈尔巴乔夫的观点如何更接近列宁所鄙视的民主社会主义思想家爱德华·伯恩斯坦(edward Bernstein)的观点,而不是列宁主义。考虑到戈尔巴乔夫直到改革后期还掌握着体制权力,他对与列宁主义根本相悖的概念的接受至关重要,打开了几十年来一直紧闭的大门。关键词:伯恩斯坦、布尔什维克、命令管理体制、民主化、戈尔巴乔夫、列宁、列宁主义、改革、多元主义、社会主义在一个高度专制的政治体制中,权力被赋予了政治等级的顶端,这个职位的持有者的价值观、政策偏好和个性可能比民主国家政府首脑的个性、价值观和偏好对重大政策结果产生更大的影响。对后者的限制将大得多——不仅来自其所在政党的成员,而且来自反对党、立法机构、司法机构、有组织的利益集团和公众舆论,这是最明显的。然而,这并不是说,威权体制中最高领导人的权力完全不受约束。如果威权体制a)高度制度化,b)高度意识形态化,那么即使是最高领导人的重大创新之路也可能会遇到相当严重的障碍。特别是,他(我没有加上“或她”,因为男性领导在极权主义和威权主义政权中无处不在)试图改变该体系合法化意识形态或制度规范的基本原则将是非常危险的。这些因素都适用于米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫和苏联体制的转型。当戈尔巴乔夫于1985年3月成为苏联共产党总书记时,他获得了一个比国内任何其他人都拥有更多制度资源的职位。然而,这是一个彻底巩固的专制政权——在林茨和斯捷潘的分类中,这是一个“后极权主义”的例子(1)——在这个政权中,最高领导人被赋予了很大的权力,只要他遵守游戏规则。斯大林后的苏联有一个重要的先例,说明即使是最高领导人也有潜在的脆弱性。尽管尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫没有像戈尔巴乔夫后来那样挑战体制的规范,但他频繁地重组党和国家结构,不愿通过已建立的官僚渠道工作,导致他在1964年10月在中央委员会作为一个整体的支持下,在政治局领导成员的煽动下被撤职。戈尔巴乔夫始终意识到赫鲁晓夫的命运,因此,他需要说服统治寡头的其他成员开始进行深远的改革。他不能简单地通过命令来引入激进的变革,尽管他拥有任命的权力,这使他能够逐步改变最高领导团队的组成。即使这种权力也绝不是不受约束的。晋升到体制内的最高执行委员会——政治局——是通过集体增选的过程,在这个过程中,人才库被限制在已经是中央委员会成员的人身上(每五年在党代表大会上被选中)。…
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Gorbachev, Lenin, and the Break with Leninism
Abstract: The author examines the paradox of Mikhail Gorbachev's esteem for Lenin in combination with his growing rejection of Leninism. While Gorbachev still held the office of general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, he embraced ideas fundamentally at odds with those of the Soviet Union's principal architect. The focus of Western writers on Gorbachev's 1987 book, Perestroika." New Thinking for Our Country and the World, as a major source has been simplistic and misleading, obscuring the radicalization of Gorbachev's political ideas from 1988 onward. Drawing, inter alia, on previously unused archival documents, the author demonstrates how Gorbachev's views moved closer to those of Eduard Bernstein, a democratic socialist thinker whom Lenin despised, than to Leninism. Given the institutional power Gorbachev wielded until late in the perestroika period, his embrace of concepts radically at odds with Leninism was of critical importance, opening doors which had remained firmly closed for decades. Keywords: Bernstein, Bolshevik, command-administrative system, democratization, Gorbachev, Lenin, Leninism, perestroika, pluralism, socialism In a highly authoritarian political system, with great power vested in the office at the top of the political hierarchy, the values, policy preferences, and personality of the holder of that office are liable to make a bigger difference to major policy outcomes than the personality, values, and preferences of the head of government within a democracy. The constraints on the latter will be far greater--not only from members of his or her party, but also from opposition parties, the legislature, the judiciary, organized interests, and public opinion, to name the most obvious. That is not to say, however, that the power of the top leader in an authoritarian system is entirely unconstrained. If the authoritarian system is a) highly institutionalized and b) highly ideologized, then there are likely to be quite serious obstacles in the path of major innovation of even the topmost leader. In particular, it will be very risky for him (I do not add "or her," for male leadership is ubiquitous in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes) to attempt to change the basic tenets of the system's legitimating ideology or its institutional norms. These factors all apply to the case of Mikhail Gorbachev and the transformation of the Soviet system. When Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he attained the office which commanded greater institutional resources than any other within the country. Yet this was in a thoroughly consolidated authoritarian regime--in the classification of Linz and Stepan an example of "post-totalitarianism" (1)--in which the top leader was accorded great authority provided he played by the rules of the game. There was an important precedent in the post-Stalin Soviet Union illustrating the potential vulnerability of even the supreme leader. Although Nikita Khrushchev did not challenge the norms of the system to anything like the extent to which Gorbachev was subsequently to do, his frequent reorganizations of the party and state structures and an unwillingness to work through the established bureaucratic channels led to his removal from the leadership in October 1964 on the instigation of the leading members of the Politburo, (2) backed up by the Central Committee as a whole. (3) Gorbachev was always conscious of the fate of Khrushchev and of his need, therefore, to persuade other members of the ruling oligarchy to embark on far-reaching reform. He could not simply introduce radical change by fiat, although he had a power of appointment which enabled him gradually to change the composition of the top leadership team. Even that power was by no means unconstrained. Promotion to the highest executive committee within the system, the Politburo, was by a process of collective co-option, in which the pool of talent was restricted to people who were already members of the Central Committee (chosen at five-year intervals at party congresses). …
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Demokratizatsiya
Demokratizatsiya Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
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期刊介绍: Occupying a unique niche among literary journals, ANQ is filled with short, incisive research-based articles about the literature of the English-speaking world and the language of literature. Contributors unravel obscure allusions, explain sources and analogues, and supply variant manuscript readings. Also included are Old English word studies, textual emendations, and rare correspondence from neglected archives. The journal is an essential source for professors and students, as well as archivists, bibliographers, biographers, editors, lexicographers, and textual scholars. With subjects from Chaucer and Milton to Fitzgerald and Welty, ANQ delves into the heart of literature.
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