监管与经济资本:大型银行如何管理资本比率?

Christian Tallau
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引用次数: 1

摘要

资本监管要求银行持有相对于其风险加权资产的规定数量的股本。除了这些最低要求,银行通常还持有额外资本。在本文中,我们认为这部分资本缓冲代表了银行对监管风险权重的反应,而监管风险权重可能无法充分衡量银行资产组合的实际风险。以欧洲大型银行为样本,我们发现银行资本不仅随着监管要求的增加而增加,而且随着资产风险的增加而增加。此外,相对于实际经济风险而言,风险权重低于平均水平的银行持有更多的资本作为缓冲。我们的结论是,银行追求基于市场资本“需求”的经济资本管理。
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Regulatory versus Economic Capital: How Do Large Banks Manage their Capital Ratios?
Capital regulation requires banks to hold a prescribed amount of equity relative to their risk-weighted assets. Beyond these minimum requirements, banks usually hold additional capital. In this paper, we argue that a part of this capital buffer represents banks' response to regulatory risk weights, which may not adequately measure the actual risks of banks' asset portfolios. Using a sample of large European banks, we show that bank capital not only increases with regulatory requirements, but also with increasing asset risk. Further, banks with below-average risk weights relative to their actual economic risk hold more capital as buffer. We conclude that banks pursue an economic capital management based on the market's capital "requirements".
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