绩效薪酬之争:只见树木不见森林

IF 16.4 1区 化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY Accounts of Chemical Research Pub Date : 2017-04-03 DOI:10.1080/23288604.2017.1302902
A. Soucat, E. Dale, I. Mathauer, Joseph Kutzin
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引用次数: 53

摘要

P4P对卫生系统的潜在益处围绕当前P4P辩论的关注向前推进参考文献在过去的10到15年中,基于结果的融资(RBF)在全球卫生领域日益突出。虽然RBF一词包含了各种旨在增加产出或提高服务可及性和质量的供求激励措施,但本期特刊和我们的评论的重点是针对服务提供商的激励措施。在包括英国、法国和美国在内的高收入国家,这些类型的激励通常被称为绩效薪酬(P4P),定义为对医院、医生和其他医疗保健提供者的财务激励,“旨在提高医疗保健的质量、效率和整体价值”。绩效融资(PBF)一词在低收入和中等收入国家(LMICs)得到了更广泛的使用,指的是供应方的财政激励措施,其中付款明确取决于所提供服务的数量和“根据流程和结果协议规定的服务质量得到认可的程度”。PBF可能不仅针对卫生设施,而且还包括卫生部、地方政府、省和地区医疗队以及中央医疗商店。虽然术语可能有所不同,但从本质上讲,PBF或P4P是一种提供者支付机制,它利用有关提供者活动的信息和它们所服务的人口的健康需求来推动资源分配,以最大限度地实现社会目标。出于本评论的目的,我们将使用术语P4P来指代这种机制。在这篇评论中,我们认为,至关重要的是要更多地关注“森林”,即整体卫生系统改革以及提供者支付安排如何与这些改革相互作用以影响健康结果,而不是几乎完全和更狭隘地关注“树”,即脱离基础卫生系统的P4P机制的细节和影响。P4P是一种战略采购,其有效性关键取决于它与更广泛的采购-供应商关系环境的联系。在下面的段落中,我们将揭示P4P对卫生系统的潜在好处。接下来,我们简短地收到2017年1月28日;2017年3月1日修订;2017年3月2日接受。*通讯:Elina Dale;电子邮件:dalee@who.int 2017世界卫生组织。泰勒和弗朗西斯出版。这是一篇在知识共享署名-非商业性-非衍生品3.0 IGO许可条款下发布的开放获取文章,该许可允许在任何媒体上进行非商业重用、分发和复制,前提是原始作品被正确引用,并且没有被修改、转换或以任何方式建立。不得将本文用于或复制与商业产品、服务或任何实体的推广有关。不应暗示世界卫生组织(世卫组织)赞同任何特定组织、产品或服务。不允许使用世卫组织标志。此通知应与文章的原始URL一起保存。
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Pay-for-Performance Debate: Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees
The Potential Health System Benefits of P4P Concerns Around the Current P4P Debate Moving Forward References Over the past 10 to 15 years, results-based financing (RBF) has gained increased prominence in global health. Though the term RBF encompasses a variety of demandand supplyside incentives to increase output or enhance access and quality, the focus of this special issue and our commentary is on incentives that target service providers. In high-income countries including the UK, France, and the United States these types of incentives are typically referred to as pay-for-performance (P4P), defined as financial incentives to hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers “aimed at improving the quality, efficiency, and overall value of health care.” The term performance-based financing (PBF) has acquired a wider use in lowand middle-income countries (LMICs) and refers to supply-side financial incentives where payment depends explicitly on quantity of services delivered and “on the degree to which services are of approved quality, as specified by protocols for processes and outcomes.” PBF may not only target health facilities but also include ministries of health, local governments, provincial and district health teams, and central medical stores. Though terminologies may differ, at their core, PBF or P4P is a provider payment mechanism, which uses information on provider activities and the health needs of the population they serve to drive resource allocation in order to maximize societal objectives. For purposes of this commentary, we will use the term P4P to refer to this mechanism. In this commentary, we argue that it is crucial to pay greater attention to the “forest”—that is, overall health system reforms and how provider payment arrangements interact with these to influence health outcomes, as opposed to looking almost solely and more narrowly at the “trees”—that is, the details and impact of a P4P mechanism divorced from the underlying health system. P4P is a category of strategic purchasing, the effectiveness of which depends critically on its connections with the wider environment of purchaser– provider relations. In the following paragraphs, we unpack the potential health system benefits of P4P. Next, we briefly Received 28 January 2017; revised 1 March 2017; accepted 2 March 2017. *Correspondence to: Elina Dale; Email: dalee@who.int 2017 World Health Organization. Published by Taylor & Francis. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 IGO License, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. This article shall not be used or reproduced in association with the promotion of commercial products, services or any entity. There should be no suggestion that the World Health Organization (WHO) endorses any specific organization, products or services. The use of the WHO logo is not permitted. This notice should be preserved along with the article’s original URL.
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来源期刊
Accounts of Chemical Research
Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合
CiteScore
31.40
自引率
1.10%
发文量
312
审稿时长
2 months
期刊介绍: Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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