{"title":"第七章:中东和北非","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162719","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"United Arab Emirates 63,000 Iran emerged as a key military supporter of Russia in 2022, as the latter struggled during its war in Ukraine. Iran sent Shahed 131 and 136 Direct Attack Munitions to Ukraine, and there was speculation that in response Russia would step up sales to Iran, potentially selling the Su-35 aircraft originally intended for Egypt. Russia has also sought Iranian assistance to circumvent Western sanctions. 2022 saw regional governments embrace deescalation and engage in diplomacy in ways not seen before. These developments were motivated largely by the post-pandemic recovery and the need for a greater focus on economic affairs. However, the picture was not wholly positive: violence persisted in Libya, Syria and Yemen, while Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE continued. Ties improved between Turkey and Gulf states, and between Turkey and Israel. Ankara obtained Gulf investment pledges and Gulf boycotts of Turkish goods were lifted. This occurred within a context of strengthening defence cooperation, including maritime and air exercises, between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, as well as between Greece and the UAE. To foster greater regional collective cooperation against Iran, the US has orchestrated initiatives that capitalised on warming relations between Israel and several regional states. In February, USCENTCOM launched a task force in the Gulf to conduct surveillance by using uninhabited systems and in April the US announced the creation of CTF-153, a maritime task force in the Red Sea designed to monitor the activities of Iran and its proxies. Amidst a challenging global economic context, regional real GDP growth is estimated to have increased from an average 4.1% in 2021 to an average 5.0% in 2022, excluding Lebanon, Libya and Syria. But regional trends mask sharp disparities driven by the surge in the oil price over 2022. Growth among oil importers is estimated to have reached 4.4% in 2022 compared to 5.2% for oil exporters and 6.5% for Gulf Cooperation Council member states. Fiscal conservatism still shaped spending decisions in 2022.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"22 1","pages":"302 - 363"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/04597222.2023.2162719\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"United Arab Emirates 63,000 Iran emerged as a key military supporter of Russia in 2022, as the latter struggled during its war in Ukraine. Iran sent Shahed 131 and 136 Direct Attack Munitions to Ukraine, and there was speculation that in response Russia would step up sales to Iran, potentially selling the Su-35 aircraft originally intended for Egypt. Russia has also sought Iranian assistance to circumvent Western sanctions. 2022 saw regional governments embrace deescalation and engage in diplomacy in ways not seen before. These developments were motivated largely by the post-pandemic recovery and the need for a greater focus on economic affairs. However, the picture was not wholly positive: violence persisted in Libya, Syria and Yemen, while Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE continued. Ties improved between Turkey and Gulf states, and between Turkey and Israel. Ankara obtained Gulf investment pledges and Gulf boycotts of Turkish goods were lifted. This occurred within a context of strengthening defence cooperation, including maritime and air exercises, between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, as well as between Greece and the UAE. To foster greater regional collective cooperation against Iran, the US has orchestrated initiatives that capitalised on warming relations between Israel and several regional states. In February, USCENTCOM launched a task force in the Gulf to conduct surveillance by using uninhabited systems and in April the US announced the creation of CTF-153, a maritime task force in the Red Sea designed to monitor the activities of Iran and its proxies. Amidst a challenging global economic context, regional real GDP growth is estimated to have increased from an average 4.1% in 2021 to an average 5.0% in 2022, excluding Lebanon, Libya and Syria. But regional trends mask sharp disparities driven by the surge in the oil price over 2022. Growth among oil importers is estimated to have reached 4.4% in 2022 compared to 5.2% for oil exporters and 6.5% for Gulf Cooperation Council member states. Fiscal conservatism still shaped spending decisions in 2022.\",\"PeriodicalId\":35165,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Military Balance\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"302 - 363\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-02-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Military Balance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162719\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Military Balance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2023.2162719","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
United Arab Emirates 63,000 Iran emerged as a key military supporter of Russia in 2022, as the latter struggled during its war in Ukraine. Iran sent Shahed 131 and 136 Direct Attack Munitions to Ukraine, and there was speculation that in response Russia would step up sales to Iran, potentially selling the Su-35 aircraft originally intended for Egypt. Russia has also sought Iranian assistance to circumvent Western sanctions. 2022 saw regional governments embrace deescalation and engage in diplomacy in ways not seen before. These developments were motivated largely by the post-pandemic recovery and the need for a greater focus on economic affairs. However, the picture was not wholly positive: violence persisted in Libya, Syria and Yemen, while Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE continued. Ties improved between Turkey and Gulf states, and between Turkey and Israel. Ankara obtained Gulf investment pledges and Gulf boycotts of Turkish goods were lifted. This occurred within a context of strengthening defence cooperation, including maritime and air exercises, between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, as well as between Greece and the UAE. To foster greater regional collective cooperation against Iran, the US has orchestrated initiatives that capitalised on warming relations between Israel and several regional states. In February, USCENTCOM launched a task force in the Gulf to conduct surveillance by using uninhabited systems and in April the US announced the creation of CTF-153, a maritime task force in the Red Sea designed to monitor the activities of Iran and its proxies. Amidst a challenging global economic context, regional real GDP growth is estimated to have increased from an average 4.1% in 2021 to an average 5.0% in 2022, excluding Lebanon, Libya and Syria. But regional trends mask sharp disparities driven by the surge in the oil price over 2022. Growth among oil importers is estimated to have reached 4.4% in 2022 compared to 5.2% for oil exporters and 6.5% for Gulf Cooperation Council member states. Fiscal conservatism still shaped spending decisions in 2022.