基于非对称博弈的建筑节能市场分析

Zhang Qi, Liu Yingzong
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文采用非对称博弈的方法对建筑节能市场进行了全面的实证分析,并对政府提出了一些建议。在过去十年中,中国对提供能源服务的兴趣日益浓厚,这也受到电力和天然气结构调整的推动。1997年,三家试点能源服务公司在中国成立。基于参与者的有限理性,讨论了建筑节能领域中建筑业主与能源服务公司之间的非对称博弈。利用模仿者动态模型的特点建立博弈模型,得出最终结果基本取决于初始条件的结论。在回顾和分析的基础上,建议政府在制定政策时考虑其特点。
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Analysis of the building energy efficiency market based on asymmetric game
This comprehensive empirical analysis of the building energy efficiency market employs an approach of asymmetric game, from which some suggestions to the Government are put forward. In the last decade China has been increased interest in the provision of energy services that has also been driven by electricity and gas restructuring. In the year 1997, three pilot energy service companies (ESCOs) established in China. Based on the bounded rationality of players, an asymmetric game between the building owners and the energy service companies (ESCOs) is discussed in the domain of energy efficiency in buildings. The game model is built with the characteristics of imitator dynamic model, which comes to the conclusion that the final results basically depend on the initial conditions. Based on the review and analysis, we suggest the government to consider the characteristics in policy making.
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