{"title":"基于KL发散理论的多传感器系统虚假数据注入攻击设计","authors":"Dan Ye, Jiyan Wang","doi":"10.1109/DDCLS.2019.8908983","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, a security issue for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is considered. We analyse a multi-sensor system equipped with a remote state estimation and a set of detectors. From the perspective of a malicious attacker, one intends to modify the innovation sequence by injecting a Gaussian noise and further destroys the system performance. The state estimation error covariance recursion are derived to quantify the effect of an attack. Furthermore, we study the worst-case false data injection (FDI) attack scenario, where the maximal attack probability is limited by the threshold of Kullback-Leibler divergence detector. Finally, a numerical example is shown to demonstrate the effectiveness of the worst-case FDI attack.","PeriodicalId":6699,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE 8th Data Driven Control and Learning Systems Conference (DDCLS)","volume":"10 1","pages":"333-337"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"False Data Injection Attack Design in Multi-sensor Systems Based on KL Divergence Theory\",\"authors\":\"Dan Ye, Jiyan Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/DDCLS.2019.8908983\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, a security issue for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is considered. We analyse a multi-sensor system equipped with a remote state estimation and a set of detectors. From the perspective of a malicious attacker, one intends to modify the innovation sequence by injecting a Gaussian noise and further destroys the system performance. The state estimation error covariance recursion are derived to quantify the effect of an attack. Furthermore, we study the worst-case false data injection (FDI) attack scenario, where the maximal attack probability is limited by the threshold of Kullback-Leibler divergence detector. Finally, a numerical example is shown to demonstrate the effectiveness of the worst-case FDI attack.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6699,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 IEEE 8th Data Driven Control and Learning Systems Conference (DDCLS)\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"333-337\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 IEEE 8th Data Driven Control and Learning Systems Conference (DDCLS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/DDCLS.2019.8908983\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE 8th Data Driven Control and Learning Systems Conference (DDCLS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DDCLS.2019.8908983","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
False Data Injection Attack Design in Multi-sensor Systems Based on KL Divergence Theory
In this paper, a security issue for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is considered. We analyse a multi-sensor system equipped with a remote state estimation and a set of detectors. From the perspective of a malicious attacker, one intends to modify the innovation sequence by injecting a Gaussian noise and further destroys the system performance. The state estimation error covariance recursion are derived to quantify the effect of an attack. Furthermore, we study the worst-case false data injection (FDI) attack scenario, where the maximal attack probability is limited by the threshold of Kullback-Leibler divergence detector. Finally, a numerical example is shown to demonstrate the effectiveness of the worst-case FDI attack.