回归基础:挑战董事会的复杂性和问责制

Q3 Social Sciences Innovar Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI:10.15446/innovar.v31n82.98419
Y. Gendron, B. Malsch, Marie-Soleil Tremblay
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了薪酬委员会(ccs)背景下复杂性和专业知识的动态。通过半结构化访谈(主要是与cc成员和顾问),我们揭示了影响公司治理参与者心态的两种从属关系,并可能最终削弱董事对股东的问责程度。第一个轴涉及cc成员对顾问专业知识的服从,这往往被认为是适当处理复杂网络的不可或缺的盟友,据称这是高管薪酬的特征。在第一个轴心的部分滋养下,第二个轴心意味着服从于这些复杂的网络,这些网络被cc成员和他们雇佣的咨询专家广泛地假设和归化。我们的主要贡献之一是质疑复杂性在董事会中的优势地位,对当代公司治理机构的实践和专业知识赖以建立和推广的关键假设之一提出质疑。我们还质疑了许多薪酬委员会中知识依赖的程度,在这些委员会中,正确操作实践所需的许多知识(被认为是解决高管薪酬决定问题所必需的)主要不是掌握在委员会成员手中,而是掌握在顾问手中。
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Getting Back to Basics: Challenging Complexity and Accountability in the Boardroom
This paper investigates the dynamics of complexity and expertise in the context of compensation committees (ccs). Drawing on semi-structured interviews, mostly with cc members and consultants, we bring to light two axes of subordination that impact the mindset of corporate governance participants, and may ultimately undermine directors’ degree of accountability to shareholders. The first axis involves cc members’ subordination to consultant expertise, which tends to be considered as an indispensable ally in dealing appropriately with the webs of complexity that allegedly characterize executive compensation. Nourished partially by the first axis, the second implies subservience to these webs of complexity, which are widely presumed and naturalized by cc members and the consulting experts they employ. One of our main contributory statements is to question the ascendancy of complexity in the boardroom, casting doubt on one of the key assumptions upon which practices and expertise in contemporary corporate governance institutions are built and promoted. We also question the extent of epistemic dependency in many compensation committees, where much of the knowledge necessary to properly operate the repertoire of practices (deemed necessary to address the problem of executive compensation determination) is not primarily in the hands of cc members, but rather in those of consultants.
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来源期刊
Innovar
Innovar Social Sciences-Sociology and Political Science
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
审稿时长
53 weeks
期刊介绍: INNOVAR is a journal that publishes top research in organizations from social sciences and other fields. Its target is composed by professionals and scholars. INNOVAR is indexed in recognized international databases as Scopus. In light of its quality and visibility, in Colombia INNOVAR have the highest category in the National Bibliographic Index of Colombian scientific and technological publications (A1). INNOVAR publishes original works, result of rigorous research, from different approaches in social and management sciences, without biases to certain methodological perspectives.
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