{"title":"带延期补货的团购拍卖的最优阈值","authors":"Li Du, Jiejian Feng","doi":"10.1109/ICIEEM.2009.5344609","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The group-buying auction is often used in the B2C market. The seller here is offered a quantity-discount-price contract and implements a replenishment postponement policy. We show that when customer's valuation follows a uniform distribution, the group-buying auction does not always outperform the fixed pricing. The optimal group-buying threshold is shown to depend on only purchasing costs, prices and the upper bound of customer's valuation.","PeriodicalId":6326,"journal":{"name":"2009 16th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal threshold in the group-buying auction with replenishment postponement\",\"authors\":\"Li Du, Jiejian Feng\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICIEEM.2009.5344609\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The group-buying auction is often used in the B2C market. The seller here is offered a quantity-discount-price contract and implements a replenishment postponement policy. We show that when customer's valuation follows a uniform distribution, the group-buying auction does not always outperform the fixed pricing. The optimal group-buying threshold is shown to depend on only purchasing costs, prices and the upper bound of customer's valuation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6326,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2009 16th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-12-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2009 16th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIEEM.2009.5344609\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2009 16th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIEEM.2009.5344609","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Optimal threshold in the group-buying auction with replenishment postponement
The group-buying auction is often used in the B2C market. The seller here is offered a quantity-discount-price contract and implements a replenishment postponement policy. We show that when customer's valuation follows a uniform distribution, the group-buying auction does not always outperform the fixed pricing. The optimal group-buying threshold is shown to depend on only purchasing costs, prices and the upper bound of customer's valuation.
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