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I won’t pay as much for an iPod if I think there is a chance it is a cheap knock-off masquerading as an iPod. The law of false advertising operates as an adjunct to trademark law. While trademark law prevents competitors from misrepresenting the source of their products by mimicking another’s brand name, the law of false advertising prevents false or misleading statements about the quality of one’s own or a competitor’s products. Like trademark law, false advertising law is designed to protect the integrity of markets by allowing consumers to rely on statements made by sellers. Unfortunately, trademark law has taken the concept of confusion too far. Between 1930 and 1980, courts expanded the concept of confusion beyond confusion as to the source of a product to include the possibility that consumers are confused as to whether the trademark owner sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant’s goods. This expansion began for plausible reasons: consumers might be confused to their detriment in a variety of circumstances in which the plaintiff and the defendant do not actually compete directly. But sponsorship and affiliation confusion has taken on a life of its own, resulting in a large number of cases in which companies or individuals are prevented from doing things that might conceivably confuse consumers, but do not confuse consumers in any way that harms their decision-making process or that the law should care about. In Part I, we offer a number of examples of “confusion�? that courts have found actionable even in circumstances in which that confusion was unlikely to matter to the operation of the market. Part II explains how we arrived at this unfortunate pass. We suggest in Part III that trademark law should focus its attention on confusion that is actually relevant to purchasing decisions. We would make the source of the goods the central element of confusion analysis. 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引用次数: 6

摘要

商标法分析的中心是消费者混淆。除了一些重要的例外,商标法的基本规则是,被告使用商标是非法的,如果它混淆了大量的消费者,而不是其他。一般来说,这是正确的规则。商标法的目的是促进现代市场的运作,允许生产商准确地向买家传达有关其产品质量的信息,从而鼓励他们在质量不明显的情况下投资生产高质量的产品。如果竞争对手可以虚假地模仿这些信息,他们会让消费者感到困惑,他们不知道他们是否实际上得到了高质量的产品,因此不愿意为这种质量支付同样的费用。如果我认为它有可能是一个伪装成iPod的廉价仿冒品,我就不会花那么多钱买iPod。虚假广告法作为商标法的附属物而起作用。商标法防止竞争对手通过模仿他人的品牌名称来歪曲其产品的来源,而虚假广告法则防止对自己或竞争对手的产品质量做出虚假或误导性的陈述。与《商标法》一样,《虚假广告法》旨在保护市场的完整性,允许消费者信赖销售者的声明。不幸的是,商标法把混淆的概念带得太远了。在1930年至1980年间,法院将混淆的概念扩展到产品来源的混淆之外,包括消费者对商标所有人是否赞助被告的商品或与被告的商品有关联的混淆的可能性。这种扩张的开始有合理的理由:在原告和被告实际上并不直接竞争的各种情况下,消费者可能会感到困惑,从而损害他们的利益。但是,赞助和从属关系的混淆已经有了自己的生命,导致了大量的案例,在这些案例中,公司或个人被阻止做一些可能会混淆消费者的事情,但不会以任何方式混淆消费者,损害他们的决策过程或法律应该关心的事情。在第一部分中,我们将提供一些关于“混淆”的例子。即使在这种混淆不太可能影响市场运作的情况下,法院也认为这是可起诉的。第二部分解释了我们是如何到达这个不幸的关口的。在第三部分中,我们建议商标法应将注意力集中在与购买决策实际相关的混淆上。我们将把货物的来源作为混淆分析的中心要素。对于来源的混淆最明显地与商标法背后的目的相关。然而,这并不意味着对原告和被告之间关系的混淆永远不能提起诉讼。当消费者很可能相信商标所有人支持或保证被告销售的商品的质量时,关于从属关系的混淆应该是可起诉的。即使消费者明白,实际生产汉堡的是个别的特许经营商,而不是麦当劳公司,他们也很可能认为,无论该品牌所代表的质量是什么,麦当劳都是背后的靠把。最后,关于赞助或从属关系的混淆通常不应构成商标侵权,这一事实并不意味着它永远不会被提起诉讼。一些对赞助或从属关系造成混淆的声明将作为虚假广告的一种形式提起诉讼。我们在第四部分讨论了虚假广告的范围。值得注意的是,虚假广告索赔的证据要求原告证明虚假陈述是实质性的-它可能会影响产品购买决策。事实上,该法规明确规定了被禁止的各种虚假陈述。我们将在第五部分继续讨论,其中探讨了将一些案件转移到虚假广告框架中的一些含义,并讨论了如何处理一些接近的案件。
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Irrelevant Confusion
Trademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion. With some significant exceptions, the basic rule of trademark law is that a defendant’s use of a mark is illegal if it confuses a substantial number of consumers and not otherwise. As a general matter, this is the right rule. Trademark law is designed to facilitate the workings of modern markets by permitting producers to accurately communicate information about the quality of their products to buyers, and therefore to encourage them to invest in making quality products in circumstances in which that quality wouldn’t otherwise be apparent. If competitors can falsely mimic that information, they will confuse consumers, who won’t know whether they are in fact getting a high quality product and therefore won’t be willing to pay as much for that quality. I won’t pay as much for an iPod if I think there is a chance it is a cheap knock-off masquerading as an iPod. The law of false advertising operates as an adjunct to trademark law. While trademark law prevents competitors from misrepresenting the source of their products by mimicking another’s brand name, the law of false advertising prevents false or misleading statements about the quality of one’s own or a competitor’s products. Like trademark law, false advertising law is designed to protect the integrity of markets by allowing consumers to rely on statements made by sellers. Unfortunately, trademark law has taken the concept of confusion too far. Between 1930 and 1980, courts expanded the concept of confusion beyond confusion as to the source of a product to include the possibility that consumers are confused as to whether the trademark owner sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant’s goods. This expansion began for plausible reasons: consumers might be confused to their detriment in a variety of circumstances in which the plaintiff and the defendant do not actually compete directly. But sponsorship and affiliation confusion has taken on a life of its own, resulting in a large number of cases in which companies or individuals are prevented from doing things that might conceivably confuse consumers, but do not confuse consumers in any way that harms their decision-making process or that the law should care about. In Part I, we offer a number of examples of “confusion�? that courts have found actionable even in circumstances in which that confusion was unlikely to matter to the operation of the market. Part II explains how we arrived at this unfortunate pass. We suggest in Part III that trademark law should focus its attention on confusion that is actually relevant to purchasing decisions. We would make the source of the goods the central element of confusion analysis. It is confusion as to source that is most obviously relevant to the purposes behind trademark law. That does not mean, however, that confusion as to the relationship between plaintiff and defendant can never be actionable. Confusion as to affiliation should be actionable when consumers are likely to believe that the trademark owner stands behind or guarantees the quality of the goods the defendant sells. Even if consumers understand that individual franchisees, rather than the McDonald’s Corporation, actually make their hamburgers, they are likely to expect that McDonald’s stands behind whatever quality that brand represents. Finally, the fact that confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation should not generally be trademark infringement does not mean that it will never be actionable. Some statements that create confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation will be actionable as a form of false advertising. We address the scope of false advertising in Part IV. Notably, proof of a false advertising claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the misrepresentation is material – that it is likely to affect a product purchasing decision. Indeed, the statute specifies the sorts of misrepresentations that are forbidden. We continue the discussion in Part V, which explores some of the implications of shunting some cases into the false advertising framework, and discusses how to handle some close cases.
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