A well regulated financial sector is essential in globalize economy. Financial innovation has contributed in the economic development. A financial institution is an institution that provides financial services for its clients or members. Probably the most important financial service provided by financial institutions is acting as financial intermediaries. Most financial institutions are highly regulated by government. The definition of money for money market purposes is not confined to bank notes but includes a range of assets that can be turned into cash at short notice, such as short-term government securities, bills of exchange, and bankers’ acceptances This paper analyses the real effects of financial markets subsequent to financial liberalization in an economy with risk averse savers and learning by lending. Transition from full financial repression to full financial liberalization might initially slow down the growth process or even induce a recession, whenever the initial level of valuable investments known by the financial intuitions is sufficiently scanty. However, lending activity leads to accumulation of information (learning by lending) regarding valuable investments. The purpose of this paper is to advocate and encourage financial markets in the overall development of the economy.
{"title":"Money Market: A Study with Reference to India","authors":"A. Pandey, S. Singh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3667832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3667832","url":null,"abstract":"A well regulated financial sector is essential in globalize economy. Financial innovation has contributed in the economic development. A financial institution is an institution that provides financial services for its clients or members. Probably the most important financial service provided by financial institutions is acting as financial intermediaries. Most financial institutions are highly regulated by government. The definition of money for money market purposes is not confined to bank notes but includes a range of assets that can be turned into cash at short notice, such as short-term government securities, bills of exchange, and bankers’ acceptances This paper analyses the real effects of financial markets subsequent to financial liberalization in an economy with risk averse savers and learning by lending. Transition from full financial repression to full financial liberalization might initially slow down the growth process or even induce a recession, whenever the initial level of valuable investments known by the financial intuitions is sufficiently scanty. However, lending activity leads to accumulation of information (learning by lending) regarding valuable investments. The purpose of this paper is to advocate and encourage financial markets in the overall development of the economy.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78899096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Whilst the magnitude and consequences of the outbreak can certainly not be compensated – at least for many, or even quantified, it is hoped that greater cooperation between global economies, will be fostered in the ongoing efforts to find a solution to address the outbreak. This paper is aimed at contributing to the literature on a topic on which previous literature, at least prior to December 12 2019, practically and literally, in respect of COVID-19, did not exist. Many major economies and global economies have extended shut downs from excluding essential workers, to 80-90% of its citizens being ordered to stay at home Whilst it is certainly crucial to ensure that the outbreak is contained, it appears that certain economies, given uncertainties associated with the nature, scope of recent developments, are willing to take risks at salvaging their economies. At what stage does a government decide that prevailing restrictive social distancing measures should be relaxed? What are possible mental, long term consequences associated with, and attributable to a protracted economic shut down? What options exist for monetary policy and central banks in particular, given less options available amidst historically low interest rate levels? These constitute some of the questions which this paper aims to address.
{"title":"Monetary Policy Implications of the COVID-19 Outbreak, The Social Pandemic","authors":"Marianne Ojo D Delaney PhD, Geneviève Dupont","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3604172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3604172","url":null,"abstract":"Whilst the magnitude and consequences of the outbreak can certainly not be compensated – at least for many, or even quantified, it is hoped that greater cooperation between global economies, will be fostered in the ongoing efforts to find a solution to address the outbreak. \u0000 \u0000This paper is aimed at contributing to the literature on a topic on which previous literature, at least prior to December 12 2019, practically and literally, in respect of COVID-19, did not exist. \u0000Many major economies and global economies have extended shut downs from excluding essential workers, to 80-90% of its citizens being ordered to stay at home \u0000Whilst it is certainly crucial to ensure that the outbreak is contained, it appears that certain economies, given uncertainties associated with the nature, scope of recent developments, are willing to take risks at salvaging their economies. At what stage does a government decide that prevailing restrictive social distancing measures should be relaxed? What are possible mental, long term consequences associated with, and attributable to a protracted economic shut down? \u0000What options exist for monetary policy and central banks in particular, given less options available amidst historically low interest rate levels? \u0000These constitute some of the questions which this paper aims to address.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87974534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Undral Byambadalai, Ching-to Albert Ma, Daniel Wiesen
This paper studies how altruistic preferences are changed by markets and incentives. We conduct a laboratory experiment in a within-subject design. Subjects are asked to choose health care qualities for hypothetical patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Prices, costs, and patient benefits are experimental incentive parameters. In monopoly, subjects choose quality to tradeoff between profits and altruistic patient benefits. In duopoly and quadropoly, we model subjects playing a simultaneous-move game. Each subject is uncertain about an opponentI s altruism, and competes for patients by choosing qualities. Bayes-Nash equilibria describe subjects' quality decisions as functions of altruism. Using a nonparametric method, we estimate the population altruism distributions from Bayes-Nash equilibrium qualities in di§erent markets and incentive conOIˆgurations. Markets tend to reduce altruism, although duopoly and quadropoly equilibrium qualities are much higher than those in monopoly. Although markets crowd out altruism, the disciplinary powers of market competition are stronger. Counterfactuals confirm markets change preferences.
{"title":"Changing Preferences: An Experiment and Estimation of Market-Incentive Effects on Altruism","authors":"Undral Byambadalai, Ching-to Albert Ma, Daniel Wiesen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3431002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3431002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how altruistic preferences are changed by markets and incentives. We conduct a laboratory experiment in a within-subject design. Subjects are asked to choose health care qualities for hypothetical patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Prices, costs, and patient benefits are experimental incentive parameters. In monopoly, subjects choose quality to tradeoff between profits and altruistic patient benefits. In duopoly and quadropoly, we model subjects playing a simultaneous-move game. Each subject is uncertain about an opponentI s altruism, and competes for patients by choosing qualities. Bayes-Nash equilibria describe subjects' quality decisions as functions of altruism. Using a nonparametric method, we estimate the population altruism distributions from Bayes-Nash equilibrium qualities in di§erent markets and incentive conOIˆgurations. Markets tend to reduce altruism, although duopoly and quadropoly equilibrium qualities are much higher than those in monopoly. Although markets crowd out altruism, the disciplinary powers of market competition are stronger. Counterfactuals confirm markets change preferences.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81099193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Incomplete take-up of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a source of persistent policy concern, with an estimated one-fifth of eligible households failing to claim the credit. To promote take-up, a growing number of jurisdictions require employers to provide EITC information to employees. We study the effect of these requirements, linking state and time variation in the adoption of the notification laws to administrative tax data. Our preferred specification yields precise null effects on EITC take-up, filing behavior, and labor force participation. The results cast doubt on the effectiveness of the notice requirements as implemented and suggest further research into other avenues for increasing tax benefit take-up.
{"title":"Does Informing Employees About Tax Benefits Increase Take-Up?: Evidence From EITC Notification Laws","authors":"Taylor Cranor, Jacob Goldin, Sarah Kotb","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3318077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3318077","url":null,"abstract":"Incomplete take-up of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a source of persistent policy concern, with an estimated one-fifth of eligible households failing to claim the credit. To promote take-up, a growing number of jurisdictions require employers to provide EITC information to employees. We study the effect of these requirements, linking state and time variation in the adoption of the notification laws to administrative tax data. Our preferred specification yields precise null effects on EITC take-up, filing behavior, and labor force participation. The results cast doubt on the effectiveness of the notice requirements as implemented and suggest further research into other avenues for increasing tax benefit take-up.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"134 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80028802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
No one ever argues for copyright on the grounds that superstar artists and authors need more money, but what if that is all, or mostly all, that copyright does? This article presents newly available data on the distribution of players across the PC videogame market. This data reveals an L-shaped distribution of demand. A relative handful of games are extremely popular. The vast majority are not. In the face of an L curve, copyright overpays superstars, but does very little for the average author and for works at the margins of profitability. This makes copyright difficult to justify on either efficiency or fairness grounds. To remedy this, I propose two approaches. First, we should incorporate cost recoupment into the fourth fair use factor. Once a work has recouped its costs, any further use, whether for follow-on creativity or mere duplication, would be fair and non-infringing. Through such an interpretation of fair use, copyright would ensure every socially valuable work a reasonable opportunity to recoup its costs without lavishing socially costly excess incentives on the most popular. Second and alternatively, Congress can make copyright short, narrow, and relatively ineffective at preventing unauthorized copying. If we refuse to use fair use or other doctrines to tailor copyright’s protection on a work-by-work basis and insist that copyright provide generally uniform protection, then efficiency and fairness both require that that uniform protection be far shorter, much narrower, and generally less effective than it presently is.
{"title":"Copyright and the 1%","authors":"Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3338060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3338060","url":null,"abstract":"No one ever argues for copyright on the grounds that superstar artists and authors need more money, but what if that is all, or mostly all, that copyright does? This article presents newly available data on the distribution of players across the PC videogame market. This data reveals an L-shaped distribution of demand. A relative handful of games are extremely popular. The vast majority are not. In the face of an L curve, copyright overpays superstars, but does very little for the average author and for works at the margins of profitability. This makes copyright difficult to justify on either efficiency or fairness grounds. To remedy this, I propose two approaches. First, we should incorporate cost recoupment into the fourth fair use factor. Once a work has recouped its costs, any further use, whether for follow-on creativity or mere duplication, would be fair and non-infringing. Through such an interpretation of fair use, copyright would ensure every socially valuable work a reasonable opportunity to recoup its costs without lavishing socially costly excess incentives on the most popular. Second and alternatively, Congress can make copyright short, narrow, and relatively ineffective at preventing unauthorized copying. If we refuse to use fair use or other doctrines to tailor copyright’s protection on a work-by-work basis and insist that copyright provide generally uniform protection, then efficiency and fairness both require that that uniform protection be far shorter, much narrower, and generally less effective than it presently is.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68586109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Not atypically, the Supreme Court in Horne interprets the canonical Nollan narrowly as a case about developer exactions. Viewed that way, Nollan does not speak to the issue in Horne: the raisins that the government took from the owners were not surrendered in exchange for explicit permission to engage in an activity the government either did or could forbid.
But Nollan stands for a far broader principle: the government should not be induced to reject a policy instrument that necessitates taking steps that would otherwise constitute a compensable taking in favor of an alternative policy instrument that does not give rise to a compensation obligation if (a) it meets the same purpose as the non-compensable action would have met and (b) the owner is neutral toward, or prefers, the policy instrument that includes a traditional taking.
In Nollan itself, the Court is clear that the state should not be discouraged from using its preferred policy instrument to protect public view of the ocean (allowing development of a bigger, view-blocking structure and seizing a viewing easement on the landowner’s property) rather than an inferior instrument (refusing to permit development) by being forced to compensate when it seizes the easement. If an owner accepts the state’s offer to surrender the easement–rather than merely refusing to develop–we know that the deal is Pareto superior.
In Horne, the federal government should not be induced to use an inferior policy instrument that does not give rise to a duty to compensate (ex ante production quotas or ex post restrictions on raisin sale) rather than a superior one (seizing raisins once market conditions are known) by being forced to compensate only if it uses the instrument that involves a traditionally compensable physical seizure.
Though it is generally easiest to tell in exaction cases that the owner prefers the state’s favored policy choice when the owner surrenders property in exchange for a permit, it is simple to tell in Horne as well because the owners retain a contingent interest in the profits earned on the sale of seized raisins, and any rational grower would prefer that to a simple sale restriction.
{"title":"Untangling Horne; Resuscitating Nollan","authors":"M. Kelman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3312466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3312466","url":null,"abstract":"Not atypically, the Supreme Court in Horne interprets the canonical Nollan narrowly as a case about developer exactions. Viewed that way, Nollan does not speak to the issue in Horne: the raisins that the government took from the owners were not surrendered in exchange for explicit permission to engage in an activity the government either did or could forbid.<br><br>But Nollan stands for a far broader principle: the government should not be induced to reject a policy instrument that necessitates taking steps that would otherwise constitute a compensable taking in favor of an alternative policy instrument that does not give rise to a compensation obligation if (a) it meets the same purpose as the non-compensable action would have met and (b) the owner is neutral toward, or prefers, the policy instrument that includes a traditional taking.<br><br>In Nollan itself, the Court is clear that the state should not be discouraged from using its preferred policy instrument to protect public view of the ocean (allowing development of a bigger, view-blocking structure and seizing a viewing easement on the landowner’s property) rather than an inferior instrument (refusing to permit development) by being forced to compensate when it seizes the easement. If an owner accepts the state’s offer to surrender the easement–rather than merely refusing to develop–we know that the deal is Pareto superior.<br><br>In Horne, the federal government should not be induced to use an inferior policy instrument that does not give rise to a duty to compensate (ex ante production quotas or ex post restrictions on raisin sale) rather than a superior one (seizing raisins once market conditions are known) by being forced to compensate only if it uses the instrument that involves a traditionally compensable physical seizure.<br><br>Though it is generally easiest to tell in exaction cases that the owner prefers the state’s favored policy choice when the owner surrenders property in exchange for a permit, it is simple to tell in Horne as well because the owners retain a contingent interest in the profits earned on the sale of seized raisins, and any rational grower would prefer that to a simple sale restriction.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89268318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By investigating the 32 investor-state arbitration cases where corruption was an issue, this paper illustrates the evidentiary problems in proving corruption in investor-state arbitration. These evidentiary challenges have led investor-state arbitration to become a safe harbour that countenances investments procured by corrupt conduct. To dismantle this safe harbour, the paper raises three evidentiary propositions, which hopefully, can assist future tribunals in assessing corruption allegations in a more principled manner. This paper was submitted to the Young Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) Writing Competition in 2019, and was selected as one of the top three runner-up papers.
本文通过对涉及腐败问题的32起投资者与国家仲裁案件的调查，阐述了投资者与国家仲裁中证明腐败的证据问题。这些证据方面的挑战导致投资者与国家之间的仲裁成为支持通过腐败行为获得投资的避风港。为了消除这个安全港，本文提出了三个证据命题，希望能帮助未来的法庭以更有原则的方式评估腐败指控。该论文参加了2019年杨格国际仲裁学院(Young Institute for Transnational Arbitration, ITA)写作大赛，并入选亚军前三名。
{"title":"Dismantling the Safe Harbour: Solving the Evidentiary Problems in Corruption Allegations in Investor-State Arbitration","authors":"Shaw Shiuan Ong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3708186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3708186","url":null,"abstract":"By investigating the 32 investor-state arbitration cases where corruption was an issue, this paper illustrates the evidentiary problems in proving corruption in investor-state arbitration. These evidentiary challenges have led investor-state arbitration to become a safe harbour that countenances investments procured by corrupt conduct. To dismantle this safe harbour, the paper raises three evidentiary propositions, which hopefully, can assist future tribunals in assessing corruption allegations in a more principled manner. This paper was submitted to the Young Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) Writing Competition in 2019, and was selected as one of the top three runner-up papers.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80289129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we use game theory to study crisis dynamics at derivatives clearinghouses (CCPs). The mandate to clear standardized derivatives through CCPs has been a pillar of post-crisis reforms. Since the resilience of CCPs is now crucial to financial stability, regulators, academics and practitioners are at work designing an adequate framework for CCP recovery and resolution. So far, however, few have studied the behavior of a CCP’s clearing members during crisis. Doing so requires both a formal economic model and an understanding of the legal and institutional features of CCP default auctions – the latter traditionally the domain of practitioners. Our paper is the first to unite these fields, providing a model that is rigorous and institutionally grounded. We analyze clearing members’ behavior at the auction that follows a clearing member default. We find that the auction works as a “stag hunt” game with two equilibria: a cooperative equilibrium, where clearing members bid boldly and avert crisis, and an uncooperative equilibrium where they bid timidly and the auction fails. The potential for a CCP to reach the uncooperative equilibrium suggests that a key goal of recovery planning should be to tilt clearing members’ incentives towards the socially optimal cooperative equilibrium.
{"title":"The CCP Recovery Game: The Default Auction as a Stag Hunt","authors":"Nadav Orian Peer, Rebecca Lewis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3228436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3228436","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we use game theory to study crisis dynamics at derivatives clearinghouses (CCPs). The mandate to clear standardized derivatives through CCPs has been a pillar of post-crisis reforms. Since the resilience of CCPs is now crucial to financial stability, regulators, academics and practitioners are at work designing an adequate framework for CCP recovery and resolution. So far, however, few have studied the behavior of a CCP’s clearing members during crisis. Doing so requires both a formal economic model and an understanding of the legal and institutional features of CCP default auctions – the latter traditionally the domain of practitioners. Our paper is the first to unite these fields, providing a model that is rigorous and institutionally grounded. We analyze clearing members’ behavior at the auction that follows a clearing member default. We find that the auction works as a “stag hunt” game with two equilibria: a cooperative equilibrium, where clearing members bid boldly and avert crisis, and an uncooperative equilibrium where they bid timidly and the auction fails. The potential for a CCP to reach the uncooperative equilibrium suggests that a key goal of recovery planning should be to tilt clearing members’ incentives towards the socially optimal cooperative equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79946558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court has taken up the question of whether victims of human rights abuses can sue corporations and other legal entities for violations of the law of nations under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit ruled that they cannot because — by its analysis — international law does not affirmatively provide for corporate tort liability. By contrast, all the other circuits to consider the issue have ruled or assumed that such cases can go forward in U.S. courts, yielding a decidedly lopsided circuit split. Inherent to the dispute at hand is an a priori choice-of-law issue: Should courts look to international law or federal common law to resolve the question presented? While the Supreme Court established that international law provides the elements of plaintiffs’ substantive cause of action in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court did not specify which body of law governs ancillary rules of decision. As such, some judges have looked to federal common law (or to U.S. choice of law rules) to answer these questions that go beyond the strict contours of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Although contentious, this choice-of-law debate proves to be inconsequential when it comes to the availability of corporate tort liability, given that both bodies of law point in the same direction and hand victory, at least in this round, to the plaintiffs. In other words, regardless of whether courts look to U.S. law or to international law, the ATS supports corporate tort liability.
{"title":"The Inconsequential Choice of Law Question Posed by Jesner v. Arab Bank","authors":"Beth van Schaack","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3112786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3112786","url":null,"abstract":"In Jesner v. Arab Bank, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court has taken up the question of whether victims of human rights abuses can sue corporations and other legal entities for violations of the law of nations under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit ruled that they cannot because — by its analysis — international law does not affirmatively provide for corporate tort liability. By contrast, all the other circuits to consider the issue have ruled or assumed that such cases can go forward in U.S. courts, yielding a decidedly lopsided circuit split. Inherent to the dispute at hand is an a priori choice-of-law issue: Should courts look to international law or federal common law to resolve the question presented? While the Supreme Court established that international law provides the elements of plaintiffs’ substantive cause of action in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court did not specify which body of law governs ancillary rules of decision. As such, some judges have looked to federal common law (or to U.S. choice of law rules) to answer these questions that go beyond the strict contours of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Although contentious, this choice-of-law debate proves to be inconsequential when it comes to the availability of corporate tort liability, given that both bodies of law point in the same direction and hand victory, at least in this round, to the plaintiffs. In other words, regardless of whether courts look to U.S. law or to international law, the ATS supports corporate tort liability.","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89131476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-03DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_730
Ugo Pagano, Massimiliano Vatiero
{"title":"Positional Goods and Legal Orderings","authors":"Ugo Pagano, Massimiliano Vatiero","doi":"10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_730","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":90732,"journal":{"name":"Stanford technology law review : STLR : an online high-technology law journal from Stanford Law School","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85137757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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