谁允许邪恶?普兰廷加的自由意志辩护与克尔凯郭尔的自由精神进攻:寻找邪恶问题的连贯有神论解决方案

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Pub Date : 2022-07-14 DOI:10.1515/kierke-2022-0018
A. Słowikowski
{"title":"谁允许邪恶?普兰廷加的自由意志辩护与克尔凯郭尔的自由精神进攻:寻找邪恶问题的连贯有神论解决方案","authors":"A. Słowikowski","doi":"10.1515/kierke-2022-0018","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this essay is to create a coherent theistic model of a solution to the problem of evil. To this end, it is shown that the differences in Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s accounts of the problem of evil can be reconciled if looked at from a broader theistic perspective. This requires, on the one hand, that Plantinga’s immanent and logical vision be extended to include Kierkegaard’s spiritual and existential view of evil, and, on the other hand, that a correction be made to Kierkegaard’s view thereof, as a result of the way in which Plantinga presents the relationship between good and moral evil in the world. Consequently, in Plantinga’s Free Will Defense the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil, not because God has a reason to permit evil in the world, but because evil as a real element of the temporal world does not come from God. In Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense, in turn, the interpretative model applied demonstrates that the existence of moral good must be independent of the existence of spiritual evil, for otherwise the moral evil of immanence would not be able to be forgiven by the spiritual good of transcendence.","PeriodicalId":53174,"journal":{"name":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","volume":"49 1","pages":"369 - 402"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Who Permits Evil? Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense: In Search of a Coherent Theistic Solution to the Problem of Evil\",\"authors\":\"A. Słowikowski\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/kierke-2022-0018\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract The aim of this essay is to create a coherent theistic model of a solution to the problem of evil. To this end, it is shown that the differences in Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s accounts of the problem of evil can be reconciled if looked at from a broader theistic perspective. This requires, on the one hand, that Plantinga’s immanent and logical vision be extended to include Kierkegaard’s spiritual and existential view of evil, and, on the other hand, that a correction be made to Kierkegaard’s view thereof, as a result of the way in which Plantinga presents the relationship between good and moral evil in the world. Consequently, in Plantinga’s Free Will Defense the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil, not because God has a reason to permit evil in the world, but because evil as a real element of the temporal world does not come from God. In Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense, in turn, the interpretative model applied demonstrates that the existence of moral good must be independent of the existence of spiritual evil, for otherwise the moral evil of immanence would not be able to be forgiven by the spiritual good of transcendence.\",\"PeriodicalId\":53174,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook\",\"volume\":\"49 1\",\"pages\":\"369 - 402\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-07-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0018\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0018","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文的目的是建立一个连贯的有神论模型来解决邪恶的问题。为此,本书表明,如果从更广泛的有神论的角度来看,克尔凯郭尔和普兰丁加对恶问题的不同解释是可以调和的。这要求,一方面,Plantinga的内在的和逻辑的视野被扩展到包括Kierkegaard关于恶的精神和存在的观点,另一方面,对Kierkegaard的观点进行纠正,作为Plantinga呈现世界上善与道德恶之间关系的方式的结果。因此,在Plantinga的自由意志辩护中,上帝的存在与邪恶的存在是一致的,不是因为上帝有理由允许邪恶在世界上存在,而是因为邪恶作为世俗世界的一个真实元素不是来自上帝。反过来,在克尔凯郭尔的《自由精神的冒犯》中,所应用的解释模型表明,道德善的存在必须独立于精神恶的存在,否则,内在性的道德恶将无法被超越性的精神善所宽恕。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Who Permits Evil? Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense: In Search of a Coherent Theistic Solution to the Problem of Evil
Abstract The aim of this essay is to create a coherent theistic model of a solution to the problem of evil. To this end, it is shown that the differences in Kierkegaard’s and Plantinga’s accounts of the problem of evil can be reconciled if looked at from a broader theistic perspective. This requires, on the one hand, that Plantinga’s immanent and logical vision be extended to include Kierkegaard’s spiritual and existential view of evil, and, on the other hand, that a correction be made to Kierkegaard’s view thereof, as a result of the way in which Plantinga presents the relationship between good and moral evil in the world. Consequently, in Plantinga’s Free Will Defense the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil, not because God has a reason to permit evil in the world, but because evil as a real element of the temporal world does not come from God. In Kierkegaard’s Free Spirit Offense, in turn, the interpretative model applied demonstrates that the existence of moral good must be independent of the existence of spiritual evil, for otherwise the moral evil of immanence would not be able to be forgiven by the spiritual good of transcendence.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
“My Dear Reader—but to Whom Am I Speaking?” Kierkegaard Read with the Rhetorical Theory of Narrative “Forgiveness is forgiveness:” Kierkegaard’s Spiritual Acoustics Kierkegaard and Religionswissenschaft: A Source- and Reception-Historical Survey (Part 2) Section 2:   Concepts and Problems in Kierkegaard The Kantian Sublime Reflected in the Kierkegaardian Sublime
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1