{"title":"我们如何确定我们是否有自由意志?","authors":"A. Mele","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter performs two main tasks. First, it sets the stage for an answer to the question of how we can determine whether or not we have free will by articulating two competing proposals about what would suffice for freely making a decision to do something. Second, it identifies what we would have to learn in order to know that the conditions set out in those proposals are satisfied and what we would have to learn in order to know that these conditions are not satisfied. Both proposals appeal to consciousness, reasonableness, being well-informed, and the absence of undue pressure. They differ in that one of the proposals can be satisfied even if determinism is true, but the other one cannot.","PeriodicalId":11169,"journal":{"name":"Determinism and Free Will","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How can we determine whether or not we have free will?\",\"authors\":\"A. Mele\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter performs two main tasks. First, it sets the stage for an answer to the question of how we can determine whether or not we have free will by articulating two competing proposals about what would suffice for freely making a decision to do something. Second, it identifies what we would have to learn in order to know that the conditions set out in those proposals are satisfied and what we would have to learn in order to know that these conditions are not satisfied. Both proposals appeal to consciousness, reasonableness, being well-informed, and the absence of undue pressure. They differ in that one of the proposals can be satisfied even if determinism is true, but the other one cannot.\",\"PeriodicalId\":11169,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Determinism and Free Will\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Determinism and Free Will\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0008\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Determinism and Free Will","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
How can we determine whether or not we have free will?
This chapter performs two main tasks. First, it sets the stage for an answer to the question of how we can determine whether or not we have free will by articulating two competing proposals about what would suffice for freely making a decision to do something. Second, it identifies what we would have to learn in order to know that the conditions set out in those proposals are satisfied and what we would have to learn in order to know that these conditions are not satisfied. Both proposals appeal to consciousness, reasonableness, being well-informed, and the absence of undue pressure. They differ in that one of the proposals can be satisfied even if determinism is true, but the other one cannot.