Pub Date : 2022-01-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0018
A. I. Triggiani, M. Hallett
An awake person moves all the time. All these movements are characterized by different temporal and spatial patterns, often complex and influenced by both internal drive and external stimuli. This chapter reviews a series of classic neurophysiological experiments aimed at disentangling the neural activity underpinning the specific features of simple movements: when, what, and how. Neural activity can be assessed with fMRI or EEG. In “when” experiments, the subject can freely decide when to perform a specified movement. In “what” experiments, the subject must choose between different simple movements at a specific time. In “how” experiments, the subject must decide how to execute a complex action.
{"title":"How are the neural processes for deciding when to move similar to and different from those for deciding what or how to move?","authors":"A. I. Triggiani, M. Hallett","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0018","url":null,"abstract":"An awake person moves all the time. All these movements are characterized by different temporal and spatial patterns, often complex and influenced by both internal drive and external stimuli. This chapter reviews a series of classic neurophysiological experiments aimed at disentangling the neural activity underpinning the specific features of simple movements: when, what, and how. Neural activity can be assessed with fMRI or EEG. In “when” experiments, the subject can freely decide when to perform a specified movement. In “what” experiments, the subject must choose between different simple movements at a specific time. In “how” experiments, the subject must decide how to execute a complex action.","PeriodicalId":11169,"journal":{"name":"Determinism and Free Will","volume":"22 9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82923094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0008
A. Mele
This chapter performs two main tasks. First, it sets the stage for an answer to the question of how we can determine whether or not we have free will by articulating two competing proposals about what would suffice for freely making a decision to do something. Second, it identifies what we would have to learn in order to know that the conditions set out in those proposals are satisfied and what we would have to learn in order to know that these conditions are not satisfied. Both proposals appeal to consciousness, reasonableness, being well-informed, and the absence of undue pressure. They differ in that one of the proposals can be satisfied even if determinism is true, but the other one cannot.
{"title":"How can we determine whether or not we have free will?","authors":"A. Mele","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter performs two main tasks. First, it sets the stage for an answer to the question of how we can determine whether or not we have free will by articulating two competing proposals about what would suffice for freely making a decision to do something. Second, it identifies what we would have to learn in order to know that the conditions set out in those proposals are satisfied and what we would have to learn in order to know that these conditions are not satisfied. Both proposals appeal to consciousness, reasonableness, being well-informed, and the absence of undue pressure. They differ in that one of the proposals can be satisfied even if determinism is true, but the other one cannot.","PeriodicalId":11169,"journal":{"name":"Determinism and Free Will","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91193545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0027
M. Hallett, Aaron Schurger
Recording the precise timing of brain events related to action requires recording techniques that can keep pace with neuronal activity that plays out on the time scale of milliseconds. This chapter discusses available techniques, the pros and cons of each, and the relevant considerations involved in the study of action initiation. Non-invasive techniques with high time resolution are available, but these are limited to detecting relatively large-scale neuronal events. Invasive techniques can pick up even very localized and small-scale neuronal events, but their spatial coverage can be limited and ethical considerations greatly limit their use. Determining the precise timing of the brain events related to action also hinges on whether the brain activity in question happens at a precise time or is extended in time.
{"title":"How can we determine the precise timing of brain events related to action?","authors":"M. Hallett, Aaron Schurger","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0027","url":null,"abstract":"Recording the precise timing of brain events related to action requires recording techniques that can keep pace with neuronal activity that plays out on the time scale of milliseconds. This chapter discusses available techniques, the pros and cons of each, and the relevant considerations involved in the study of action initiation. Non-invasive techniques with high time resolution are available, but these are limited to detecting relatively large-scale neuronal events. Invasive techniques can pick up even very localized and small-scale neuronal events, but their spatial coverage can be limited and ethical considerations greatly limit their use. Determining the precise timing of the brain events related to action also hinges on whether the brain activity in question happens at a precise time or is extended in time.","PeriodicalId":11169,"journal":{"name":"Determinism and Free Will","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90259005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0012
N. Block
Experiments suggest that conscious decisions to act may be initiated by unconscious neural events that precede the decision. Some have concluded that unconscious neural events are sufficient to cause both the decision to act and the action, so consciousness has no causal efficacy in producing the action. Here, I explain why this reasoning is fallacious in terms that apply to all mental events, using a variety of examples in which the conscious aspect of a mental event has a different and even an “opposite” effect on behavior from the unconscious aspect. These cases provide vivid illustrations of the distinct causal contributions of conscious and unconscious aspects of a mental event to behavior. One conclusion is that the neuroscience of decision has been overly focused on binary “go/no go” contents, obscuring the ways in which conscious and unconscious contents can make distinct contributions to decision and to action.
{"title":"Do conscious decisions cause physical actions?","authors":"N. Block","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"Experiments suggest that conscious decisions to act may be initiated by unconscious neural events that precede the decision. Some have concluded that unconscious neural events are sufficient to cause both the decision to act and the action, so consciousness has no causal efficacy in producing the action. Here, I explain why this reasoning is fallacious in terms that apply to all mental events, using a variety of examples in which the conscious aspect of a mental event has a different and even an “opposite” effect on behavior from the unconscious aspect. These cases provide vivid illustrations of the distinct causal contributions of conscious and unconscious aspects of a mental event to behavior. One conclusion is that the neuroscience of decision has been overly focused on binary “go/no go” contents, obscuring the ways in which conscious and unconscious contents can make distinct contributions to decision and to action.","PeriodicalId":11169,"journal":{"name":"Determinism and Free Will","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90462654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0024
L. Mudrik, Aaron Schurger
Determining whether or not an agent is conscious of a bit of information relevant to action requires first that we can determine if an agent is conscious of a given bit of information, which by itself is challenging. In addition, we have to be able to tag that bit of information as being “relevant to action.” This chapter reviews some of the neuroscience and philosophy behind perceptual “content consciousness” and some of the key considerations involved in measuring neural information and determining its subjective status. One of those key considerations is determining (or deciding) what qualifies a bit of information as relevant to action. The chapter proposes a hypothetical empirical approach to the question posed which remains an open and active research question.
{"title":"How can we determine whether or not an agent is conscious of a bit of information relevant to an action?","authors":"L. Mudrik, Aaron Schurger","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0024","url":null,"abstract":"Determining whether or not an agent is conscious of a bit of information relevant to action requires first that we can determine if an agent is conscious of a given bit of information, which by itself is challenging. In addition, we have to be able to tag that bit of information as being “relevant to action.” This chapter reviews some of the neuroscience and philosophy behind perceptual “content consciousness” and some of the key considerations involved in measuring neural information and determining its subjective status. One of those key considerations is determining (or deciding) what qualifies a bit of information as relevant to action. The chapter proposes a hypothetical empirical approach to the question posed which remains an open and active research question.","PeriodicalId":11169,"journal":{"name":"Determinism and Free Will","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74020186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0026
Amber R. Hopkins, L. Mudrik, U. Maoz
This chapter introduces the neuroscientific study of consciousness, volition, and conscious volition, discussing the lack of consensus and other obstacles neuroscientists face in identifying their neural bases. It describes how theoretical frameworks and philosophical work come into play toward this end. The chapter also discusses the importance of collaboration between neuroscientists and philosophers, zooming out and reflecting on differences between progress in philosophy and progress in neuroscience.
{"title":"How does the absence of a consensus about the neural basis of consciousness and volition affect theorizing about conscious volition?","authors":"Amber R. Hopkins, L. Mudrik, U. Maoz","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197572153.003.0026","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the neuroscientific study of consciousness, volition, and conscious volition, discussing the lack of consensus and other obstacles neuroscientists face in identifying their neural bases. It describes how theoretical frameworks and philosophical work come into play toward this end. The chapter also discusses the importance of collaboration between neuroscientists and philosophers, zooming out and reflecting on differences between progress in philosophy and progress in neuroscience.","PeriodicalId":11169,"journal":{"name":"Determinism and Free Will","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84921763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Where Does This Leave Us?","authors":"M. Griffith","doi":"10.4324/9780429027482-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429027482-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11169,"journal":{"name":"Determinism and Free Will","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76332616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities","authors":"M. Griffith","doi":"10.4324/9780429027482-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429027482-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11169,"journal":{"name":"Determinism and Free Will","volume":"1160 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78415054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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