Banks’ Reactions to Basel-III

Abstract

We use a dynamic general equilibrium model of the euro area to study banksi?½ possible responses to the stricter capital requirements called for by the Basel III reform package. We show that the effects on output depend, inter alia, on the strategy banks adopt in response to the reform, and that banks tend to prefer some strategies over others. Specifically, an increase in loan spreads minimizes banksi?½ costs and induces the sharpest contraction in real activity and investment, in the immediate as well as long term. A recapitalization, or restrictions on dividends, have more modest effects on output, but are less likely to be preferred by banks. We also find that the undesired macroeconomic effects of the reform during the transition phase are significantly mitigated if the reform is announced well ahead of its actual implementation i?½ as was done for the Basel III package.