type="main"> In 2002 and 2003, many Chinese banks implemented reforms that delegated authority to individual loan officers. The change followed China's entrance into the WTO and offers a plausibly exogenous shock to loan officer incentives to produce information. We find that the bank's internal risk rating becomes a stronger predictor of loan interest rates and ex post outcomes after reform. When the loan officer and the branch president who approves the loan work together longer, the rating also becomes more strongly related to loan prices and outcomes. Our results highlight how incentives and communication costs affect information production and use.
{"title":"The Impact of Incentives and Communication Costs on Information Production and Use: Evidence from Bank Lending","authors":"Jun Qian, Philip E. Strahan, Zhishu Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2137708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2137708","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\"> In 2002 and 2003, many Chinese banks implemented reforms that delegated authority to individual loan officers. The change followed China's entrance into the WTO and offers a plausibly exogenous shock to loan officer incentives to produce information. We find that the bank's internal risk rating becomes a stronger predictor of loan interest rates and ex post outcomes after reform. When the loan officer and the branch president who approves the loan work together longer, the rating also becomes more strongly related to loan prices and outcomes. Our results highlight how incentives and communication costs affect information production and use.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"259 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123078502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The financial crisis and its aftermath has stimulated a vigorous debate on the use of macro-prudential instruments for both regulating the banking system and for providing additional tools for monetary policy makers. The widespread adoption of non-conventional monetary policies has provided some evidence on the efficacy of liquidity and asset purchases for offsetting the lower zero bound. Central banks have thus been reminded as to the effectiveness of extended open market operations as a supplementary tool of monetary policy. These tools are essentially fiscal instruments, as they issue central bank liabilities backed by fiscal transfers. And so having written these tools into the fiscal budget constraint, we can examine the consequences of these operations within the context of a micro-founded macroeconomic model of banking and money. We can mimic the responses of the Federal Reserve balance sheet to the crisis. Specifically, we examine the role of reserves for bond and capital swaps in stabilising the economy and also the impact of changing the composition of the central bank balance sheet. We find that such policies can significantly enhance the ability of the central bank to stabilise the economy. This is because balance sheet operations supply (remove) liquidity to a financial market that is otherwise short (long) of liquidity and hence allows other .nancial spreads to move less violently over the cycle to compensate.
{"title":"Reserves, Liquidity and Money: An Assessment of Balance Sheet Policies","authors":"J. Chadha, L. Corrado, Jack Meaning","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2044824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2044824","url":null,"abstract":"The financial crisis and its aftermath has stimulated a vigorous debate on the use of macro-prudential instruments for both regulating the banking system and for providing additional tools for monetary policy makers. The widespread adoption of non-conventional monetary policies has provided some evidence on the efficacy of liquidity and asset purchases for offsetting the lower zero bound. Central banks have thus been reminded as to the effectiveness of extended open market operations as a supplementary tool of monetary policy. These tools are essentially fiscal instruments, as they issue central bank liabilities backed by fiscal transfers. And so having written these tools into the fiscal budget constraint, we can examine the consequences of these operations within the context of a micro-founded macroeconomic model of banking and money. We can mimic the responses of the Federal Reserve balance sheet to the crisis. Specifically, we examine the role of reserves for bond and capital swaps in stabilising the economy and also the impact of changing the composition of the central bank balance sheet. We find that such policies can significantly enhance the ability of the central bank to stabilise the economy. This is because balance sheet operations supply (remove) liquidity to a financial market that is otherwise short (long) of liquidity and hence allows other .nancial spreads to move less violently over the cycle to compensate.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116114824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Making use of an original dataset we empirically investigate the determinants of state aid to the car industry in the European Union. The EU regulatory system on state aids and the long history of governments grants to this industry make this an interesting case study. Our ndings show that in the period 1992-2008 -controlling for a number of variables subsidies to the car sector have shown a decreasing trend, mainly because of the reduction in the aid aimed at increasing the productive capacity of rms. We nd a pattern of a dynamic strategic game among EU countries, whereby aiding a rm induces other member states to grant more subsidies; this seems to be mainly driven by rescue and resctruring aid. Overall, economic and political variables (industrys value added, countrys income per capita, election year, governments political orientation) are found to signi cantly a¤ect aid to the car industry.
{"title":"State Aid to Business in the European Union: A Focus on the Car Sector","authors":"M. Nicolini, C. Scarpa, P. Valbonesi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2143458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2143458","url":null,"abstract":"Making use of an original dataset we empirically investigate the determinants of state aid to the car industry in the European Union. The EU regulatory system on state aids and the long history of governments grants to this industry make this an interesting case study. Our \u0085ndings show that in the period 1992-2008 -controlling for a number of variables subsidies to the car sector have shown a decreasing trend, mainly because of the reduction in the aid aimed at increasing the productive capacity of \u0085rms. We \u0085nd a pattern of a dynamic strategic game among EU countries, whereby aiding a \u0085rm induces other member states to grant more subsidies; this seems to be mainly driven by rescue and resctruring aid. Overall, economic and political variables (industrys value added, countrys income per capita, election year, governments political orientation) are found to signi\u0085cantly a¤ect aid to the car industry.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115421974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A number of countries impose counter-obligations on parties desirous of obtaining government contracts and regulatory licenses, generally on account of a strong desire and need to obtain reciprocal benefits for specific constituencies for the contracts so awarded or the privileges so accorded. These counter-obligations are usually applied in inefficient procurement markets; and could also serve as useful political instruments for mollifying domestic or local constituencies. An interesting feature, in most cases, is that the license or the contract is required to be granted or entered into upfront, whereas the counter-obligations are usually required to be discharged over much longer periods of time. Effective design of a counter-obligations framework is therefore a matter of critical concern for policy-makers and other stakeholders; and this short paper attempts a comprehensive review of various important aspects that need to be taken note of while designing policies and regulations, in order that the counter-obligations mechanism is able to effectively deliver expected public benefits.
{"title":"A Conceptual Framework for Efficient Design of Counter-Obligations in Government Contracts and Licenses","authors":"Sandeep Verma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2151084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2151084","url":null,"abstract":"A number of countries impose counter-obligations on parties desirous of obtaining government contracts and regulatory licenses, generally on account of a strong desire and need to obtain reciprocal benefits for specific constituencies for the contracts so awarded or the privileges so accorded. These counter-obligations are usually applied in inefficient procurement markets; and could also serve as useful political instruments for mollifying domestic or local constituencies. An interesting feature, in most cases, is that the license or the contract is required to be granted or entered into upfront, whereas the counter-obligations are usually required to be discharged over much longer periods of time. Effective design of a counter-obligations framework is therefore a matter of critical concern for policy-makers and other stakeholders; and this short paper attempts a comprehensive review of various important aspects that need to be taken note of while designing policies and regulations, in order that the counter-obligations mechanism is able to effectively deliver expected public benefits.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125881619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use a dynamic general equilibrium model of the euro area to study banksi?½ possible responses to the stricter capital requirements called for by the Basel III reform package. We show that the effects on output depend, inter alia, on the strategy banks adopt in response to the reform, and that banks tend to prefer some strategies over others. Specifically, an increase in loan spreads minimizes banksi?½ costs and induces the sharpest contraction in real activity and investment, in the immediate as well as long term. A recapitalization, or restrictions on dividends, have more modest effects on output, but are less likely to be preferred by banks. We also find that the undesired macroeconomic effects of the reform during the transition phase are significantly mitigated if the reform is announced well ahead of its actual implementation i?½ as was done for the Basel III package.
{"title":"Banks’ Reactions to Basel-III","authors":"P. Angelini, A. Gerali","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2118496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2118496","url":null,"abstract":"We use a dynamic general equilibrium model of the euro area to study banksi?½ possible responses to the stricter capital requirements called for by the Basel III reform package. We show that the effects on output depend, inter alia, on the strategy banks adopt in response to the reform, and that banks tend to prefer some strategies over others. Specifically, an increase in loan spreads minimizes banksi?½ costs and induces the sharpest contraction in real activity and investment, in the immediate as well as long term. A recapitalization, or restrictions on dividends, have more modest effects on output, but are less likely to be preferred by banks. We also find that the undesired macroeconomic effects of the reform during the transition phase are significantly mitigated if the reform is announced well ahead of its actual implementation i?½ as was done for the Basel III package.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"157 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114360966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses an original dataset for 206 workplaces in Thessaly (Greece), to study consequences of Greece's employment protection law (EPL) and national wage minimum for temporary employment. We find higher temporary employment rates especially among a "grey" market group of workplaces that pay low wages and avoid the national wage minimum. A similar factor boosts family employment. We also find that EPL "matters", in particular, managers who prefer temporary contracts because temps are less protected definitely employ more temps. We discuss whether temporary and family work is a form of escape from regulation for less prosperous firms.
{"title":"The Impact of Greek Labour Market Regulation on Temporary and Family Employment: Evidence from a New Survey","authors":"A. Anagnostopoulos, S. Siebert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2047290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2047290","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses an original dataset for 206 workplaces in Thessaly (Greece), to study consequences of Greece's employment protection law (EPL) and national wage minimum for temporary employment. We find higher temporary employment rates especially among a \"grey\" market group of workplaces that pay low wages and avoid the national wage minimum. A similar factor boosts family employment. We also find that EPL \"matters\", in particular, managers who prefer temporary contracts because temps are less protected definitely employ more temps. We discuss whether temporary and family work is a form of escape from regulation for less prosperous firms.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128439420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pravin Saxena, Dr. Nitin Kishore Saxena, Sanil Kumar
Clause 41 of the listing agreement as issued by Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) directs the India Inc to comply with the provisions laid down by the board in respect of financial reporting. The board has made special requirement in respect of Interim Financial Reporting (IFR) to prepare and publish interim financial results and limited reviews of interim results by the auditor etc. In this paper an attempt has been made to verify the compliance of guidelines issued by SEBI as regard to interim financial result and put it on a scorecard to measure the level of compliance.
{"title":"Compliance of Interim Financial Reporting as Per Regulatory Requirement in India (With Special Reference to Nationalized Bank)","authors":"Pravin Saxena, Dr. Nitin Kishore Saxena, Sanil Kumar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2018183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2018183","url":null,"abstract":"Clause 41 of the listing agreement as issued by Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) directs the India Inc to comply with the provisions laid down by the board in respect of financial reporting. The board has made special requirement in respect of Interim Financial Reporting (IFR) to prepare and publish interim financial results and limited reviews of interim results by the auditor etc. In this paper an attempt has been made to verify the compliance of guidelines issued by SEBI as regard to interim financial result and put it on a scorecard to measure the level of compliance.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124706426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reviews the statutory and regulatory duty of financial regulators to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing. The paper analyzes existing statutory and regulatory tools available to assist the regulators in meeting their duty to affirmatively further fair housing purposes. The paper recommends affirmative steps to affirmatively further fair housing utilizing specific provisions of Regulations A, B and BB. Finally, the paper concludes that financial regulators have sufficient authority to carry out their duty to affirmatively further the purposes of the Fair Housing Act.
{"title":"Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing -- The Role of Financial Regulators","authors":"Stella J. Adams","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1993305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1993305","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the statutory and regulatory duty of financial regulators to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing. The paper analyzes existing statutory and regulatory tools available to assist the regulators in meeting their duty to affirmatively further fair housing purposes. The paper recommends affirmative steps to affirmatively further fair housing utilizing specific provisions of Regulations A, B and BB. Finally, the paper concludes that financial regulators have sufficient authority to carry out their duty to affirmatively further the purposes of the Fair Housing Act.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115340083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AbstractThe following sections are included:Misconceptions about Crises and Crisis ResponseCentral Bank and Government Rescue ProgramsRethinking Systemic RiskUsefulness of Capital Requirements has been OversoldUndone by the Regulatory DialecticRecommendations for ReformTraditional Reporting and Incentive Frameworks are InadequateReferences
{"title":"Bankers and Brokers First: Loose Ends in the Theory of Central-Bank Policymaking","authors":"E. Kane","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1960163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1960163","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe following sections are included:Misconceptions about Crises and Crisis ResponseCentral Bank and Government Rescue ProgramsRethinking Systemic RiskUsefulness of Capital Requirements has been OversoldUndone by the Regulatory DialecticRecommendations for ReformTraditional Reporting and Incentive Frameworks are InadequateReferences","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134020712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
O. Fritsch, C. Radaelli, Lorna Schrefler, A. Renda
This paper examines the quality of impact assessments in the European Commission and the United Kingdom for the period 2005-2010. We coded 477 impact assessments for the UK and 251 for the European Commission, using a detailed scorecard - adjusted to reduce the bias evidenced by previous usages of this instrument. The findings suggest that impact assessment is not merely a perfunctory activity in the European Union and the UK. Quality has improved steadily over the years, arguably as a result of learning and regulatory oversight. The UK and the European Commission are strikingly similar on a number of impact assessment dimensions (such as economic analysis and identification of costs and benefits). The impact assessments of the European Commission seem to pay more attention to social and environmental aspects, however. The conclusions reflect on the implications of our findings for current policy discussions on regulatory quality and the role of regulatory oversight bodies.
{"title":"Regulatory Quality in the European Commission and the UK: Old Questions and New Findings","authors":"O. Fritsch, C. Radaelli, Lorna Schrefler, A. Renda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1996489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1996489","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the quality of impact assessments in the European Commission and the United Kingdom for the period 2005-2010. We coded 477 impact assessments for the UK and 251 for the European Commission, using a detailed scorecard - adjusted to reduce the bias evidenced by previous usages of this instrument. The findings suggest that impact assessment is not merely a perfunctory activity in the European Union and the UK. Quality has improved steadily over the years, arguably as a result of learning and regulatory oversight. The UK and the European Commission are strikingly similar on a number of impact assessment dimensions (such as economic analysis \u0000and identification of costs and benefits). The impact assessments of the European Commission seem to pay more attention to social and environmental aspects, however. The \u0000conclusions reflect on the implications of our findings for current policy discussions on regulatory quality and the role of regulatory oversight bodies.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115370817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：