Morally Embedded Selves and Embedded Compatibilism

Abstract

The principal argument suggested here is that we are all morally embedded selves: We have no control over the abilities that make us moral agents nor can we control the degree to which we have these abilities; in other words, we are not responsible for our good or bad qualities as moral agents. This, I believe, calls for the adoption of embedded compatibilism (EC). According to EC, people have  I would like to thank Saul Smilansky for long periods of generous guidance; Shaun Gallagher for hosting me in UCF (where I was able to finish writing this article); Josef Horowitz, Arnon Cahen, David Kaplan, Roy Sorenson and Shaun Gallagher for reviewing various drafts of this paper; Mason Cash for his comments; Marion Lupu for linguistic editing; Tom Claes, Tim De Mey, Marijke de Pous and two anonymous reviewers for final revisions; Maureen Sie, Arno Wouters and Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours for inviting me to give a lecture based on a draft of this paper; Annemarie Kallis for her helpful commentary on this lecture. I would also like to thank the participants of the workshop on Strawsonian and consequentialist views on personal responsibility which took place the 15 and 16 of October 2010 at Erasmus University, Rotterdam (where the debate between Derek Pereboom and Manuel Vargas concerning basic desert was an inspiration for me).