Pub Date : 2012-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82152
A. Szigeti
Peter Strawson defends the thesis that determinism is irrelevant to the justifiability of responsibility-attributions. In this paper, I want to examine various arguments advanced by Strawson in support of this thesis. These arguments all draw on the thought that the practice of responsibility is inescapable. My main focus is not so much the metaphysical details of Strawsonian compatibilism, but rather the more fundamental idea that x being inescapable may be reason for us to regard x as justified. I divide Strawsonian inescapability arguments into two basic types. According to arguments of the first type we cannot give up the practice. According to arguments of the second type we should not give up the practice. My reasons for revisiting these Strawsonian inescapability arguments are, first, to establish that these are different and to some extent conflicting arguments. Second, I hope to show that none of Strawson’s inescapability arguments are convincing. Third, I discuss the possibility that the practice of responsibility is inescapable in a different, more pessimistic sense than envisaged by Strawson. What may be inescapable under conceivable scenarios is the conflict of theoretical and practical considerations in the justification of the practice. (Less)
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Pub Date : 2012-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82150
K. Delapp
In this paper, I argue for the ethical importance of the retributive emotion of ‗tragic-guilt,‘ namely, the feeling of self-recrimination for doing harm even if it could not be prevented. Drawing on empirical evidence concerning the phenomenology of such guilt, as well as thought-experiments concerning moral responsibility for inherited privilege, I distinguish tragic-guilt from the closelyrelated retributive emotions of regret, remorse, shame, and non-tragic guilt. I attempt to understand the emotion of tragic-guilt in light of an ethics of virtue, and I argue that sensitivity to tragic-guilt has significant theoretical, ethical, and motivational benefits. The reality of such tragic-responsibility reveals an uncomfortable, but undeniable messiness in the moral domain. The virtuous person is characterized by a deep emotional responsiveness to this messiness. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Ghent University and to the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees and for the editorial and organizational expertise of Tom Claes, Tim De Mey, and Marijke de Pous.
在这篇论文中，我论证了“悲剧性内疚”的报复性情感的伦理重要性，即，即使无法阻止，也会对伤害进行自我指责的感觉。根据关于这种罪责现象学的经验证据，以及关于继承特权的道德责任的思想实验，我将悲剧性罪责与悔恨、悔恨、羞耻和非悲剧性罪责等密切相关的报复性情绪区分开来。我试图从道德伦理的角度来理解悲剧性罪恶感的情感，我认为对悲剧性罪恶感的敏感具有重要的理论、伦理和动机上的好处。这种悲剧性责任的现实揭示了道德领域中一种令人不安但不可否认的混乱。善良的人的特点是对这种混乱有深刻的情感反应。这篇论文的早期版本曾在根特大学和南方哲学与心理学学会发表。作者非常感谢两位匿名审稿人的评论和建议，以及Tom Claes、Tim De Mey和Marijke De Pous的编辑和组织专业知识。
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Pub Date : 2012-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82149
S. Cuypers
Derk Pereboom defends a successor view to hard determinism in the debate on free will and moral responsibility. Pereboom‘s hard incompatibilism challenges libertarians and compatibilists alike to address the problem of origination. In the present article, I discharge this task on behalf of compatibilism.
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Pub Date : 2012-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82151
Guy Pinku
The principal argument suggested here is that we are all morally embedded selves: We have no control over the abilities that make us moral agents nor can we control the degree to which we have these abilities; in other words, we are not responsible for our good or bad qualities as moral agents. This, I believe, calls for the adoption of embedded compatibilism (EC). According to EC, people have I would like to thank Saul Smilansky for long periods of generous guidance; Shaun Gallagher for hosting me in UCF (where I was able to finish writing this article); Josef Horowitz, Arnon Cahen, David Kaplan, Roy Sorenson and Shaun Gallagher for reviewing various drafts of this paper; Mason Cash for his comments; Marion Lupu for linguistic editing; Tom Claes, Tim De Mey, Marijke de Pous and two anonymous reviewers for final revisions; Maureen Sie, Arno Wouters and Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours for inviting me to give a lecture based on a draft of this paper; Annemarie Kallis for her helpful commentary on this lecture. I would also like to thank the participants of the workshop on Strawsonian and consequentialist views on personal responsibility which took place the 15 and 16 of October 2010 at Erasmus University, Rotterdam (where the debate between Derek Pereboom and Manuel Vargas concerning basic desert was an inspiration for me).
这里提出的主要论点是，我们都是道德嵌入的自我:我们无法控制使我们成为道德行为人的能力，也无法控制我们拥有这些能力的程度;换句话说，作为道德行为者，我们不必为自己的好或坏品质负责。我认为，这需要采用嵌入式兼容性(EC)。根据EC的说法，我要感谢索尔·斯米兰斯基长期以来的慷慨指导;Shaun Gallagher在UCF接待了我(在那里我完成了这篇文章);Josef Horowitz, Arnon Cahen, David Kaplan, Roy Sorenson和Shaun Gallagher审阅了本文的各种草稿;梅森·卡什的评论;语言编辑Marion Lupu;Tom Claes, Tim De Mey, Marijke De Pous和两位匿名审稿人负责最终版本;Maureen Sie, Arno Wouters和Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours邀请我来演讲基于这篇论文的草稿;感谢Annemarie Kallis对这堂课的评论。我还要感谢2010年10月15日和16日在鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大学举行的关于个人责任的斯特劳森主义和结果主义观点研讨会的与会者(Derek Pereboom和Manuel Vargas关于基本沙漠的辩论对我有启发)。
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