Multi-stage Expansion Planning of Onshore Power Grid under Multiple Investment Agents Considering Construction Sequence of Offshore Wind Farms

Abstract

Contiguous and large-scale development of offshore wind power clusters is an important way for the industry to reduce costs and increase efficiency and promote offshore wind power to parity. To solve the coordination planning problem of onshore power grid expansion under the uncertain access time sequence of offshore wind farms, this paper proposes the Stackelberg game model of onshore power grid expansion planning considering slight altruistic balance of late return from the perspective of multiple investors in offshore wind farm integration system. First, the game relationship between different investment entities of offshore wind power access projects is analyzed, and a slightly altruistic Stackelberg game model is established that considers later returns. Then, aiming at the value evaluation of investment entities under the influence of uncertain factors, considering the uncertainty of offshore wind power prices and grid transmission prices, a value evaluation model for offshore wind power and onshore power grid expansion projects based on real options is constructed. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is verified by numerical example simulation. The method proposed in this paper improves the adaptability of multi-stage expansion planning of onshore power grids under the influence of uncertain factors in the connection of offshore wind farms, and also provides a reference for flexible access planning of offshore wind farms under multi-agent investment and operation.