Wittgenstein’s Pursuit of Authenticity in Philosophy

Abstract

An important difference between Wittgenstein and Heidegger is their use of metaphors of covering and discovery. Heidegger characterizes his phenomenological method as uncovering a concealed ontological framework whereas Wittgenstein insists that ‘nothing is hidden’ and that the only thing to be uncovered is covert nonsense. Wittgenstein’s method is marked by a resolute rejection of a hermeneutics of suspicion and relies instead on using pictures or objects of comparison to dislodge recalcitrant prejudices. The difference from Heidegger on these counts is manifest in Wittgenstein’s treatment of the problematic of realism and idealism. Wittgenstein’s method makes heavy use of questions and dialogue, inviting his readers into a mimetic engagement with the problems he addresses, which contrasts with the diegetic form of Heidegger’s investigation.