A case of early Wittgensteinian dialogism: Stances on the impossibility of “Red and green in the same place”

Abstract

The contention of this paper is to show the dialogical character (in a Bakhtiniansense) of Wittgenstein’s Dictation on “Red and green in the sameplace...” (ca. 1931) in which several “voices” are speaking, each one defendinga point of view on the kind of “impossibility” this phrase deals with.The plurality of voices indicates the plurality of “aspects” under which the“cannot” expressing this impossibility could be understood. Each voice thuselicits a standpoint with its own grammar and vocabulary, that is somethinglike a “style of thought”. The dissonant effect dominates, leaving the grammaticalvoice un-assignable to a person who would endorse the correspondingpoint of view. The question whether the latter voice is Wittgenstein’s,Schlick’s or nobody’s is raised. The interpretation here presented stresses featuresof the problem of voice differently from Cavell.