Pub Date : 2013-11-22DOI: 10.1515/9783110330496.275
Sybille Krämer
Between ‘reality’ and the ‘imaginary’ there is the intermediary world of graphical artifacts like writing, notations, diagrams, graphs and maps. What are the epistemological functions of these diagrammatical inscriptions, situated between language and the pictorial? The guiding hypothesis here is that the ‘diagrammatical’ provides a link between the perceptible and the rational, insofar as it not only bridges the gap between these two realms but also gives rise to the very possibility of differentiating between the ‘aisthetic’ and the ‘noethic’. Starting from a reflection on exemplary forms of diagrammatical reasoning in philosophy (Platon, Descartes, Wittgenstein) first steps in the direction of an ‘ epistemology of the line’ will be sketched: (i) Surface, lines, and points are the building elements of diagrammatic graphism. (ii) The diagrammatic space is not an ‘illustrative’ but an operative space within which eye, hand and mind work together: thus the ‘mind’s eye’ is born. (iii) Diagrammatical spatiality has a dual character: it is both a perceptible concrete surface and a rational abstract space. This duality is the dodge of the diagrammatical. (iv) In this dual character it functions as a means for visualizing the non visual and for ‘spatializing’ the non-spatial. Thus bringing theoretical entities to intuition. Placing the theme within a cultural perspective: Could the invention of inscribed surface perhaps have meant for the mobility and productivity of the mind what the invention of the wheel meant for the mobility and productivity of the human body?
{"title":"'The Mind's Eye': Visualizing the Non-visual and the 'Epistemology of the Line'","authors":"Sybille Krämer","doi":"10.1515/9783110330496.275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330496.275","url":null,"abstract":"Between ‘reality’ and the ‘imaginary’ there is the intermediary world of graphical artifacts like writing, notations, diagrams, graphs and maps. What are the epistemological functions of these diagrammatical inscriptions, situated between language and the pictorial? The guiding hypothesis here is that the ‘diagrammatical’ provides a link between the perceptible and the rational, insofar as it not only bridges the gap between these two realms but also gives rise to the very possibility of differentiating between the ‘aisthetic’ and the ‘noethic’. Starting from a reflection on exemplary forms of diagrammatical reasoning in philosophy (Platon, Descartes, Wittgenstein) first steps in the direction of an ‘ epistemology of the line’ will be sketched: (i) Surface, lines, and points are the building elements of diagrammatic graphism. (ii) The diagrammatic space is not an ‘illustrative’ but an operative space within which eye, hand and mind work together: thus the ‘mind’s eye’ is born. (iii) Diagrammatical spatiality has a dual character: it is both a perceptible concrete surface and a rational abstract space. This duality is the dodge of the diagrammatical. (iv) In this dual character it functions as a means for visualizing the non visual and for ‘spatializing’ the non-spatial. Thus bringing theoretical entities to intuition. Placing the theme within a cultural perspective: Could the invention of inscribed surface perhaps have meant for the mobility and productivity of the mind what the invention of the wheel meant for the mobility and productivity of the human body?","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124913640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-11-21DOI: 10.1515/9783110328974.193
Ali Abidi Shahrudi
The discussion at hand involves the connected ideas of motion (harakat),origination (huduth), and perpetual creation (khalq jadid). These are subjects that hold a privileged place in the religious sciences and that have instigated human thinking to further inquiry from time immemorial.The present discussion is an investigation into the theory of “perpetual creation” as found in philosophy and mysticism. Hence, the substance of this work in its overall structure and particulars is not tantamount to astatement of the personal opinions of the author. What does indeed perta into this humble writer is: firstly, the methodology employed; secondly, the determination of the details and the points of convergence and divergence in the theory of perpetual creation from the two perspectives of philosophy and mysticism; thirdly, the exposition of some of the corollaries of the theory in question based on precepts that are in part and from a certain perspective to be attributed to this present author; and fourthly, some additional details and their consequences that can be called the “theory of the fifth dimension.”
{"title":"Substantial Motion and Perpetual Creation","authors":"Ali Abidi Shahrudi","doi":"10.1515/9783110328974.193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328974.193","url":null,"abstract":"The discussion at hand involves the connected ideas of motion (harakat),origination (huduth), and perpetual creation (khalq jadid). These are subjects that hold a privileged place in the religious sciences and that have instigated human thinking to further inquiry from time immemorial.The present discussion is an investigation into the theory of “perpetual creation” as found in philosophy and mysticism. Hence, the substance of this work in its overall structure and particulars is not tantamount to astatement of the personal opinions of the author. What does indeed perta into this humble writer is: firstly, the methodology employed; secondly, the determination of the details and the points of convergence and divergence in the theory of perpetual creation from the two perspectives of philosophy and mysticism; thirdly, the exposition of some of the corollaries of the theory in question based on precepts that are in part and from a certain perspective to be attributed to this present author; and fourthly, some additional details and their consequences that can be called the “theory of the fifth dimension.”","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131090634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-11-19DOI: 10.1515/9783110328936.67
P. Hacker
Wittgenstein dominated analytic philosophy from the 1920s until the1970s. His followers were numerous, his influence was extensive and eventhose who were not attracted by his thought were forced to orient themselvesby reference to the landmarks he had established. After the 1970s,his influence progressively waned, first in philosophy of logic and language,where Fregean and Tarskian influences came to predominate, andlater in philosophy of mind, which engaged in speculative debates concerningbrain/mind relationships, on the one hand, and the ‘mysteries of consciousness’, on the other. It is striking that this turn against Wittgenstein’s philosophy was not accompanied by a firm understanding, let alone by anargued refutation, of his grammatical overviews. Rather, these developmentsin the last decades of the twentieth century exemplified the philosophical scientism of our times.
{"title":"Human Beings – The Mind and the Body: Wittgensteinian-Aristotelian Reflections","authors":"P. Hacker","doi":"10.1515/9783110328936.67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328936.67","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein dominated analytic philosophy from the 1920s until the1970s. His followers were numerous, his influence was extensive and eventhose who were not attracted by his thought were forced to orient themselvesby reference to the landmarks he had established. After the 1970s,his influence progressively waned, first in philosophy of logic and language,where Fregean and Tarskian influences came to predominate, andlater in philosophy of mind, which engaged in speculative debates concerningbrain/mind relationships, on the one hand, and the ‘mysteries of consciousness’, on the other. It is striking that this turn against Wittgenstein’s philosophy was not accompanied by a firm understanding, let alone by anargued refutation, of his grammatical overviews. Rather, these developmentsin the last decades of the twentieth century exemplified the philosophical scientism of our times.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133600590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-11-19DOI: 10.1515/9783110328936.329
F. Wimmer
Since this is a conference of philosophers about philosophy and mattersrelevant to philosophy, I shall not talk about intercultural dialogues in general,nor will I speak about dialogues in the fields of religion or culture (fields which have to be distinguished, by the way), dialogues betweenpoliticians, etc. My statement will try to concentrate on intercultural dialoguesin philosophy. This means, according to my understanding of "philosophy", that I have in mind essentially dialogues on ontological, on epistemological, or on normative questions.
{"title":"Intercultural Polylogues in Philosophy","authors":"F. Wimmer","doi":"10.1515/9783110328936.329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328936.329","url":null,"abstract":"Since this is a conference of philosophers about philosophy and mattersrelevant to philosophy, I shall not talk about intercultural dialogues in general,nor will I speak about dialogues in the fields of religion or culture (fields which have to be distinguished, by the way), dialogues betweenpoliticians, etc. My statement will try to concentrate on intercultural dialoguesin philosophy. This means, according to my understanding of \"philosophy\", that I have in mind essentially dialogues on ontological, on epistemological, or on normative questions.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116446927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aristotle introduced the concept of substance in philosophy. Thus, we find reflections on substance in different works of Aristotle. In the Categories, he introduces the so-called ontological square, containing individual substances, universal or second substances, individual accidents and universal accidents. Individual substances are characterized by the fact that they are the final point (end-point) both of inherence and predication, i.e. they are neither contained (in subiecto esse) in another entity nor can they be said or predicated (de subiecto dici) of another entity. Another well-known characterization of substance, also from Aristotle in the Categories, is the fact that substances are able to receive contrary accidents, i.e. a white substance can become red and vice versa. Concerning the inherence of an individual accident in an individual substance the Scholastics formulated the so-called non-migration principle: an individual can inhere in only one individual substance, and it cannot migrate from one substance to another. Leibniz formulates this principle in different texts, and he uses it even in his Monadology, where he says in §7 that accidents can neither be detached from substances, nor wander around outside of substances. And so, neither substances nor accidents can enter a monad from without.
{"title":"Substances, Attributes, and Modes – Substantial Structures in Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz","authors":"H. Burkhardt","doi":"10.1515/9783110328974.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328974.7","url":null,"abstract":"Aristotle introduced the concept of substance in philosophy. Thus, we find reflections on substance in different works of Aristotle. In the Categories, he introduces the so-called ontological square, containing individual substances, universal or second substances, individual accidents and universal accidents. Individual substances are characterized by the fact that they are the final point (end-point) both of inherence and predication, i.e. they are neither contained (in subiecto esse) in another entity nor can they be said or predicated (de subiecto dici) of another entity. Another well-known characterization of substance, also from Aristotle in the Categories, is the fact that substances are able to receive contrary accidents, i.e. a white substance can become red and vice versa. Concerning the inherence of an individual accident in an individual substance the Scholastics formulated the so-called non-migration principle: an individual can inhere in only one individual substance, and it cannot migrate from one substance to another. Leibniz formulates this principle in different texts, and he uses it even in his Monadology, where he says in §7 that accidents can neither be detached from substances, nor wander around outside of substances. And so, neither substances nor accidents can enter a monad from without.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128416250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-11-19DOI: 10.1515/9783110328936.315
F. Wimmer
Es gibt Philosophie in nicht-europaischen Traditionen, wie es Philosophiein der europaischen Tradition gibt, im strengen Sinn des Wortes "Philosophie"– als explizite Reflexion ontologischer oder epistemologischer oderethischer Probleme.Diese erste Annahme ist zwar notwendig, wenn von 'ausereuropaischerPhilosophie' uberhaupt gesprochen wird, sie gibt aber keinen Hinweis darauf,wie viele und welche Traditionen hier in Frage kommen. Es durftesehr schwer fallen, darauf eine einfache und uberzeugende Antwort zu geben.Bereits die formulierte Bedingung, es handle sich um "explizite Reflexionontologischer oder epistemologischer oder ethischer Probleme"steht unter dem Verdacht, im Ausgang von einem bestimmten, namlicheinem okzidentalen Philosophiebegriff allzu viel von vornherein auszuschliesenund damit Dialoge – oder Polyloge – eher zu behindern als zufordern. Und doch kommt niemand darum herum, irgendeinen derartigenVorbegriff zu formulieren, wann immer eine bestimmte Denktradition als"philosophische" dargestellt werden soll.
{"title":"Anlass, Begriff und Aufgabe interkultureller Philosophie","authors":"F. Wimmer","doi":"10.1515/9783110328936.315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328936.315","url":null,"abstract":"Es gibt Philosophie in nicht-europaischen Traditionen, wie es Philosophiein der europaischen Tradition gibt, im strengen Sinn des Wortes \"Philosophie\"– als explizite Reflexion ontologischer oder epistemologischer oderethischer Probleme.Diese erste Annahme ist zwar notwendig, wenn von 'ausereuropaischerPhilosophie' uberhaupt gesprochen wird, sie gibt aber keinen Hinweis darauf,wie viele und welche Traditionen hier in Frage kommen. Es durftesehr schwer fallen, darauf eine einfache und uberzeugende Antwort zu geben.Bereits die formulierte Bedingung, es handle sich um \"explizite Reflexionontologischer oder epistemologischer oder ethischer Probleme\"steht unter dem Verdacht, im Ausgang von einem bestimmten, namlicheinem okzidentalen Philosophiebegriff allzu viel von vornherein auszuschliesenund damit Dialoge – oder Polyloge – eher zu behindern als zufordern. Und doch kommt niemand darum herum, irgendeinen derartigenVorbegriff zu formulieren, wann immer eine bestimmte Denktradition als\"philosophische\" dargestellt werden soll.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"387 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115221878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-11-19DOI: 10.1515/9783110328912.431
A. Pichler, Simo Säätelä
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Pub Date : 2013-11-18DOI: 10.1515/9783110328912.304
A. Janik
It is less that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy offers us a new paradigm ofrationality than that it helps us to recover an old, unjustly neglected one.The central notion in his later philosophy is the idea of following a rule,where there are no formal rules to which we can appeal, but examples to beimitated. This view of rule-following ultimately entails the primacy of practiceover theory in epistemology. The primacy of practice, the assertion thatin traditional terms belief is groundless, in turn, implies that practice musttake care of itself. That, further, entails that rationality is practice-immanent.Theory can neither capture nor justify the character of practice. Moreover,the practice-immanent character of rationality determines that the rationalityof our actions and beliefs must be reconstructed ex post facto on the basisof reflection upon what we do in the normal case of events. Such a claimand such reflection is the basis of the Common Law, which is in fact interalia rooted in the Aristotelian notion of phronesis.
{"title":"Impure reason vindicated","authors":"A. Janik","doi":"10.1515/9783110328912.304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328912.304","url":null,"abstract":"It is less that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy offers us a new paradigm ofrationality than that it helps us to recover an old, unjustly neglected one.The central notion in his later philosophy is the idea of following a rule,where there are no formal rules to which we can appeal, but examples to beimitated. This view of rule-following ultimately entails the primacy of practiceover theory in epistemology. The primacy of practice, the assertion thatin traditional terms belief is groundless, in turn, implies that practice musttake care of itself. That, further, entails that rationality is practice-immanent.Theory can neither capture nor justify the character of practice. Moreover,the practice-immanent character of rationality determines that the rationalityof our actions and beliefs must be reconstructed ex post facto on the basisof reflection upon what we do in the normal case of events. Such a claimand such reflection is the basis of the Common Law, which is in fact interalia rooted in the Aristotelian notion of phronesis.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129602826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-11-18DOI: 10.1515/9783110328912.277
H. Glock
Wittgenstein’s place in the history of Western thought has been widely discussedby scholars. But Wittgenstein’s own attitude to history has so farescaped the notice of scholars. In this essay the author attempts to exploitthe meagre primary resources in order to discuss and assess Wittgenstein’sown thinking about history – both the history of philosophy and history ingeneral – and about historical modes of thought. In section 2, he introducesthe historicist challenge to analytic philosophy, and distinguishes differentvarieties of historicism. In section 3, he critically discusses Wittgenstein’sattitude to the history of philosophy, and its relation to the positions ofthinkers such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the logical positivists, Ryle andQuine. While Wittgenstein himself was indifferent or hostile to historicalscholarship, he has inspired several historicists. For this reason section 4briefly considers the question of whether Wittgenstein’s reflections on othertopics such as language or the nature of philosophy willy-nilly support historicism,either directly or indirectly. The final section turns from the historyof philosophy to history in general. It compares and contrastsWittgenstein’s account of conceptual investigations with the genetic methodderived from Nietzsche and recently promoted by Bernard Williams,according to which proper philosophy needs to take account of the historicaldevelopment of our conceptual scheme.
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Pub Date : 2013-11-18DOI: 10.1515/9783110328912.354
Antonia Soulez
The contention of this paper is to show the dialogical character (in a Bakhtiniansense) of Wittgenstein’s Dictation on “Red and green in the sameplace...” (ca. 1931) in which several “voices” are speaking, each one defendinga point of view on the kind of “impossibility” this phrase deals with.The plurality of voices indicates the plurality of “aspects” under which the“cannot” expressing this impossibility could be understood. Each voice thuselicits a standpoint with its own grammar and vocabulary, that is somethinglike a “style of thought”. The dissonant effect dominates, leaving the grammaticalvoice un-assignable to a person who would endorse the correspondingpoint of view. The question whether the latter voice is Wittgenstein’s,Schlick’s or nobody’s is raised. The interpretation here presented stresses featuresof the problem of voice differently from Cavell.
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