Paying People to Lie: The Truth About the Budgeting Process

M. C. Jensen
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引用次数: 371

Abstract

This paper analyzes the counterproductive effects associated with using budgets or targets in an organisation's performance measurement and compensation systems. Paying people on the basis of how their performance relates to a budget or target causes people to game the system and in doing so to destroy value in two main ways: (a) both superiors and subordinates lie in the formulation of budgets and, therefore, gut the budgeting process of the critical unbiased information that is required to coordinate the activities of disparate parts of an organisation, and (b) they game the realisation of the budgets or targets and in doing so destroy value for their organisations. Although most managers and analysts understand that budget gaming is widespread, few understand the huge costs it imposes on organisations and how to lower them. My purpose in this paper is to explain exactly how this happens and how managers and firms can stop this counter-productive cycle. The key lies not in destroying the budgeting systems, but in changing the way organisations pay people. In particular to stop this highly counter-productive behaviour we must stop using budgets or targets in the compensation formulas and promotion systems for employees and managers. This means taking all kinks, discontinuities and non-linearities out of the pay-for-performance profile of each employee and manager. Such purely linear compensation formulas provide no incentives to lie, or to withhold and distort information, or to game the system. While the evidence on the costs of these systems is not extensive, I believe that solving the problems could easily result in large productivity and value increases - sometimes as much as 50-100% improvements in productivity. I believe the less intensive reliance on such budget/target systems is an important cause of the increased productivity of entrepreneurial and LBO firms. Moreover, eliminating budget/target-induced gaming from the management system will eliminate one of the major forces leading to the general loss of integrity in organisations. People are taught to lie in these pervasive budgeting systems because if they tell the truth they often get punished and if they lie they get rewarded. Once taught to lie in this system people generally cannot help but extend that behaviour to all sorts of other relationships in the organisation.
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花钱让人撒谎:关于预算过程的真相
本文分析了在组织绩效评估和薪酬体系中使用预算或目标所产生的反生产效应。根据员工的表现与预算或目标的关系来支付薪酬,会导致人们在系统中进行博弈,从而从两个主要方面破坏价值:(a)上级和下属都参与预算的制定,因此,破坏了协调组织不同部分活动所需的关键公正信息的预算编制过程;(b)他们操纵预算或目标的实现,并在这样做时破坏了组织的价值。尽管大多数管理者和分析师都明白,预算博弈很普遍,但很少有人了解它给组织带来的巨大成本,以及如何降低成本。我在本文中的目的是解释这种情况是如何发生的,以及管理者和企业如何阻止这种适得其反的循环。关键不在于摧毁预算系统,而在于改变组织支付员工薪酬的方式。特别是为了制止这种高度适得其反的行为,我们必须停止在雇员和管理人员的薪酬公式和晋升制度中使用预算或目标。这意味着从每位员工和经理的绩效薪酬档案中剔除所有的纠结、不连续和非线性因素。这种纯粹线性的薪酬公式没有提供说谎、隐瞒和扭曲信息或玩弄制度的动机。虽然关于这些系统成本的证据并不广泛,但我相信解决这些问题可以很容易地提高生产率和价值——有时生产率可以提高50-100%。我认为,对这种预算/目标系统的依赖程度较低,是创业型和杠杆收购公司生产率提高的一个重要原因。此外,从管理系统中消除预算/目标诱导的博弈将消除导致组织普遍丧失诚信的主要力量之一。在这些普遍存在的预算系统中,人们被教导要撒谎,因为如果他们说实话,他们通常会受到惩罚,如果他们撒谎,他们会得到奖励。一旦在这个体系中学会撒谎,人们通常会情不自禁地将这种行为扩展到组织中的其他各种关系中。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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