We investigate the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow-sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment-cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non-monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.
{"title":"Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK","authors":"G. Pawlina, L. Renneboog","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.664981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.664981","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow-sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment-cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non-monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131772385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"A quarter-century ago, Miles and Ezzell l1980r solved the valuation problem of a firm that follows a constant leverage ratio L e D/S. However, to this day, the proper discounting of free cash flows and the computation of WACC are often misunderstood by scholars and practitioners alike. For example, it is common for textbooks and fairness opinions to discount free cash flows at WACC with beta input β" S e [1 p l1 - "τ"r"L"]"β" "u" , "although the latter is not consistent with the assumption of constant leverage. This confusion extends to the valuation of tax shields and the proper implementation of adjusted present value procedures. In this paper, we derive a general result on the value of tax shields, obtain the correct value of tax shields for perpetuities, and state the correct valuation formulas for arbitrary cash flows under a constant leverage financial policy." Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005.
25年前，Miles和Ezzell在1980年解决了一家公司的估值问题，该公司遵循恒定的杠杆比率(L / D/S)。然而，直到今天，自由现金流的适当折现和WACC的计算经常被学者和从业者所误解。例如，教科书和公平意见通常用β输入β“S”e [1 p l1 -“τ”r“L”]“β”“u”来贴现WACC的自由现金流，尽管后者与恒定杠杆的假设不一致。这种混淆延伸到税盾的估值和调整后现值程序的适当实施。在本文中，我们得到了关于税盾价值的一般结果，得到了永续投资税盾的正确价值，并给出了恒定杠杆金融政策下任意现金流量的正确估值公式。版权所有布莱克威尔出版有限公司，2005。
{"title":"A Reconsideration of Tax Shield Valuation","authors":"E. R. Arzac, L. Glosten","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.492603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.492603","url":null,"abstract":"\"A quarter-century ago, Miles and Ezzell l1980r solved the valuation problem of a firm that follows a constant leverage ratio L e D/S. However, to this day, the proper discounting of free cash flows and the computation of WACC are often misunderstood by scholars and practitioners alike. For example, it is common for textbooks and fairness opinions to discount free cash flows at WACC with beta input β\" S e [1 p l1 - \"τ\"r\"L\"]\"β\" \"u\" , \"although the latter is not consistent with the assumption of constant leverage. This confusion extends to the valuation of tax shields and the proper implementation of adjusted present value procedures. In this paper, we derive a general result on the value of tax shields, obtain the correct value of tax shields for perpetuities, and state the correct valuation formulas for arbitrary cash flows under a constant leverage financial policy.\" Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133031583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the counterproductive effects associated with using budgets or targets in an organisation's performance measurement and compensation systems. Paying people on the basis of how their performance relates to a budget or target causes people to game the system and in doing so to destroy value in two main ways: (a) both superiors and subordinates lie in the formulation of budgets and, therefore, gut the budgeting process of the critical unbiased information that is required to coordinate the activities of disparate parts of an organisation, and (b) they game the realisation of the budgets or targets and in doing so destroy value for their organisations. Although most managers and analysts understand that budget gaming is widespread, few understand the huge costs it imposes on organisations and how to lower them. My purpose in this paper is to explain exactly how this happens and how managers and firms can stop this counter-productive cycle. The key lies not in destroying the budgeting systems, but in changing the way organisations pay people. In particular to stop this highly counter-productive behaviour we must stop using budgets or targets in the compensation formulas and promotion systems for employees and managers. This means taking all kinks, discontinuities and non-linearities out of the pay-for-performance profile of each employee and manager. Such purely linear compensation formulas provide no incentives to lie, or to withhold and distort information, or to game the system. While the evidence on the costs of these systems is not extensive, I believe that solving the problems could easily result in large productivity and value increases - sometimes as much as 50-100% improvements in productivity. I believe the less intensive reliance on such budget/target systems is an important cause of the increased productivity of entrepreneurial and LBO firms. Moreover, eliminating budget/target-induced gaming from the management system will eliminate one of the major forces leading to the general loss of integrity in organisations. People are taught to lie in these pervasive budgeting systems because if they tell the truth they often get punished and if they lie they get rewarded. Once taught to lie in this system people generally cannot help but extend that behaviour to all sorts of other relationships in the organisation.
{"title":"Paying People to Lie: The Truth About the Budgeting Process","authors":"M. C. Jensen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.267651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267651","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the counterproductive effects associated with using budgets or targets in an organisation's performance measurement and compensation systems. Paying people on the basis of how their performance relates to a budget or target causes people to game the system and in doing so to destroy value in two main ways: (a) both superiors and subordinates lie in the formulation of budgets and, therefore, gut the budgeting process of the critical unbiased information that is required to coordinate the activities of disparate parts of an organisation, and (b) they game the realisation of the budgets or targets and in doing so destroy value for their organisations. Although most managers and analysts understand that budget gaming is widespread, few understand the huge costs it imposes on organisations and how to lower them. My purpose in this paper is to explain exactly how this happens and how managers and firms can stop this counter-productive cycle. The key lies not in destroying the budgeting systems, but in changing the way organisations pay people. In particular to stop this highly counter-productive behaviour we must stop using budgets or targets in the compensation formulas and promotion systems for employees and managers. This means taking all kinks, discontinuities and non-linearities out of the pay-for-performance profile of each employee and manager. Such purely linear compensation formulas provide no incentives to lie, or to withhold and distort information, or to game the system. While the evidence on the costs of these systems is not extensive, I believe that solving the problems could easily result in large productivity and value increases - sometimes as much as 50-100% improvements in productivity. I believe the less intensive reliance on such budget/target systems is an important cause of the increased productivity of entrepreneurial and LBO firms. Moreover, eliminating budget/target-induced gaming from the management system will eliminate one of the major forces leading to the general loss of integrity in organisations. People are taught to lie in these pervasive budgeting systems because if they tell the truth they often get punished and if they lie they get rewarded. Once taught to lie in this system people generally cannot help but extend that behaviour to all sorts of other relationships in the organisation.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122887374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses a bivariate GARCH framework to examine the lead-lag relations and the conditional correlations between 10-year US government bond returns and their counterparts from the UK, Germany, and Japan. We find that while mean and volatility spillovers exist between the major international bond markets, they are much weaker than those between equity markets. The results also indicate that the correlations between the US and other major bond market returns are time varying and are driven by changing macroeconomic and market conditions. However, in contrast to the finding that the benefits of international diversification in equity markets evaporate during high-stress periods, we find that the benefits of diversification across major government bond markets do not decrease during periods of extremely high bond market volatility or following extremely negative US and foreign bond returns.
{"title":"A Conditional Assessment of the Relationships between the Major World Bond Markets","authors":"Delroy M. Hunter, David P. Simon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.586562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.586562","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a bivariate GARCH framework to examine the lead-lag relations and the conditional correlations between 10-year US government bond returns and their counterparts from the UK, Germany, and Japan. We find that while mean and volatility spillovers exist between the major international bond markets, they are much weaker than those between equity markets. The results also indicate that the correlations between the US and other major bond market returns are time varying and are driven by changing macroeconomic and market conditions. However, in contrast to the finding that the benefits of international diversification in equity markets evaporate during high-stress periods, we find that the benefits of diversification across major government bond markets do not decrease during periods of extremely high bond market volatility or following extremely negative US and foreign bond returns.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"170 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117276999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Berle and Means asserted that US corporations typically have dispersed shareholders; their evidence did not support this conclusion. Today, 59.74% of US corporations have ‘controlling shareholders’ who hold at least 10% of the shares; 24.57% are controlled and managed by a family; 16.33% are controlled by a widely‐held financial institution; 13.55% are controlled through family trusts. In all size ranges, the USA has more corporations controlled by families than by financial institutions. In almost all size ranges, it has a higher percentage of family‐controlled corporations than any of next four largest economies.
{"title":"Who Controls Us?","authors":"Yoser Gadhoum, Larry H. P. Lang, L. Young","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.399801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.399801","url":null,"abstract":"Berle and Means asserted that US corporations typically have dispersed shareholders; their evidence did not support this conclusion. Today, 59.74% of US corporations have ‘controlling shareholders’ who hold at least 10% of the shares; 24.57% are controlled and managed by a family; 16.33% are controlled by a widely‐held financial institution; 13.55% are controlled through family trusts. In all size ranges, the USA has more corporations controlled by families than by financial institutions. In almost all size ranges, it has a higher percentage of family‐controlled corporations than any of next four largest economies.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129275520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we examine the proposition that small investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount/premium on closed-end funds, is an important factor in stock returns. We conduct an out-of-sample test of the investor sentiment hypothesis in a market environment that is more likely to be prone to investor sentiment than the USA. We fail to provide supporting evidence for the claim of Lee et al. (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Consistent with Elton et al. (1998), who show that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process, our tests do not detect investor sentiment in a capital market that is more susceptible to small investor sentiment. Our results provide additional support against the claim that investor sentiment represents an independent and systematic asset pricing risk.
在本文中，我们研究了一个命题，即小投资者的情绪，由封闭式基金的折扣/溢价的变化来衡量，是股票收益的一个重要因素。我们在一个比美国更容易受到投资者情绪影响的市场环境中对投资者情绪假设进行了样本外检验。对于Lee et al.(1991)认为投资者情绪影响普通股风险的观点，我们没有提供支持性的证据。与Elton等人(1998)一致，他们表明投资者情绪不进入回报产生过程，我们的测试没有检测到资本市场中更容易受到小投资者情绪影响的投资者情绪。我们的研究结果为投资者情绪代表独立和系统的资产定价风险的说法提供了额外的支持。
{"title":"Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle: Out-of-Sample Evidence","authors":"John A. Doukas, Nikolaos T. Milonas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.394960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.394960","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we examine the proposition that small investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount/premium on closed-end funds, is an important factor in stock returns. We conduct an out-of-sample test of the investor sentiment hypothesis in a market environment that is more likely to be prone to investor sentiment than the USA. We fail to provide supporting evidence for the claim of Lee et al. (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Consistent with Elton et al. (1998), who show that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process, our tests do not detect investor sentiment in a capital market that is more susceptible to small investor sentiment. Our results provide additional support against the claim that investor sentiment represents an independent and systematic asset pricing risk.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129147736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the short- and long-term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra-group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra-group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder’s investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra-conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.
{"title":"Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish Corporations","authors":"John A. Doukas, N. Travlos, M. Holmén","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.291572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.291572","url":null,"abstract":"We study the short- and long-term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra-group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra-group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder’s investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra-conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116465249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By calculating an estimated measure of undetected insider trading, this paper shows that profits made by informed corporate insiders prior to tender offer announcements increase after the first enforcement of insider trading laws. I analyze the effects of Insider Trading regulation on a sample of 5,099 acquisitions in 56 different countries, and estimate the profits due to insider trading from the abnormal volume in the weeks prior to the announcement, under the assumption that insiders purchase those shares at the prevailing price and hold them until the public announcement. I find that laws that prosecute insider trading fail to eliminate profits made by insiders, and make acquisitions more expensive. Therefore, by increasing the market reaction to an acquisition, insider trading laws make it profitable to violate them.
{"title":"Do Insider Trading Laws Work?","authors":"Arturo Bris","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.248417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.248417","url":null,"abstract":"By calculating an estimated measure of undetected insider trading, this paper shows that profits made by informed corporate insiders prior to tender offer announcements increase after the first enforcement of insider trading laws. I analyze the effects of Insider Trading regulation on a sample of 5,099 acquisitions in 56 different countries, and estimate the profits due to insider trading from the abnormal volume in the weeks prior to the announcement, under the assumption that insiders purchase those shares at the prevailing price and hold them until the public announcement. I find that laws that prosecute insider trading fail to eliminate profits made by insiders, and make acquisitions more expensive. Therefore, by increasing the market reaction to an acquisition, insider trading laws make it profitable to violate them.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128414248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a GARCH approach, we estimate a time-varying two-factor international asset pricing model for the weekly equity index returns of 16 OECD countries. We find significant time-variation in the exposure (beta) of country equity index returns to the world market index and in the risk-adjusted excess returns (alpha). We then explain these world market betas and alphas using a number of country-specific macroeconomic and financial variables with a panel approach. We find that several variables including imports, exports, inflation, market capitalisation, dividend yields and price-to-book ratios significantly affect a country’s exposure to world market risk. Similar conclusions are obtained by using lagged explanatory variables, and thus these variables may be useful as predictors of world market risks. Several variables also significantly impact the risk-adjusted excess returns over this time period. Our results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. We further discuss some economic hypotheses that may explain these relationships.
{"title":"The Impact of Macroeconomic and Financial Variables on Market Risk: Evidence from International Equity Returns","authors":"Dilip K. Patro, Yangru Wu, John K. Wald","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.249330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.249330","url":null,"abstract":"Using a GARCH approach, we estimate a time-varying two-factor international asset pricing model for the weekly equity index returns of 16 OECD countries. We find significant time-variation in the exposure (beta) of country equity index returns to the world market index and in the risk-adjusted excess returns (alpha). We then explain these world market betas and alphas using a number of country-specific macroeconomic and financial variables with a panel approach. We find that several variables including imports, exports, inflation, market capitalisation, dividend yields and price-to-book ratios significantly affect a country’s exposure to world market risk. Similar conclusions are obtained by using lagged explanatory variables, and thus these variables may be useful as predictors of world market risks. Several variables also significantly impact the risk-adjusted excess returns over this time period. Our results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. We further discuss some economic hypotheses that may explain these relationships.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123156552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The deterring role of the medium of payment in a takeover contest is analyzed from the point of view of the bidder. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative mediums of payment, and the bidder equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium requirements for a signaling game. The model predicts notably that cash offers signal a high-valuing bidder, strongly determined to acquire the target firm.
{"title":"The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the U.K.","authors":"Dušan Isakov, P. Cornu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.231839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.231839","url":null,"abstract":"The deterring role of the medium of payment in a takeover contest is analyzed from the point of view of the bidder. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative mediums of payment, and the bidder equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium requirements for a signaling game. The model predicts notably that cash offers signal a high-valuing bidder, strongly determined to acquire the target firm.","PeriodicalId":275816,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: European Financial Management Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132431670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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