{"title":"Conversational Silence","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues for a distinctive kind of conversational pressure bearing distinctly on audiences to a mutually observed statement or assertion: the normative pressure to signal when one disagrees. The argument for this conclusion appeals to two main claims: first, that conversational participants are entitled to expect cooperation from other participants; and second, that silent rejection of a public statement is marked as uncooperative. The result is that conversational participants are (presumptively but defeasibly) entitled to expect no silent rejection of a mutually observed statement, and this expectation gives participants a (practical) reason to indicate any disagreement or doubts when they observe such a statement. This argument avoids objections levelled against Pettit’s account of the significance of conversational silence. The chapter concludes by addressing the variety of contexts in which the entitlement to expect no silent rejection is itself defeated (including but not limited to conditions of oppression or ‘silencing’).","PeriodicalId":179550,"journal":{"name":"Conversational Pressure","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Conversational Pressure","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter argues for a distinctive kind of conversational pressure bearing distinctly on audiences to a mutually observed statement or assertion: the normative pressure to signal when one disagrees. The argument for this conclusion appeals to two main claims: first, that conversational participants are entitled to expect cooperation from other participants; and second, that silent rejection of a public statement is marked as uncooperative. The result is that conversational participants are (presumptively but defeasibly) entitled to expect no silent rejection of a mutually observed statement, and this expectation gives participants a (practical) reason to indicate any disagreement or doubts when they observe such a statement. This argument avoids objections levelled against Pettit’s account of the significance of conversational silence. The chapter concludes by addressing the variety of contexts in which the entitlement to expect no silent rejection is itself defeated (including but not limited to conditions of oppression or ‘silencing’).