Pub Date : 2020-07-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0006
Sanford C. Goldberg
This chapter addresses the prospects of using anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony to establish that speakers are entitled to expect to be presumed trustworthy when they testify. If it exists, such a connection between the epistemology of testimony and the interpersonal normativity of (epistemic) trust would be of great interest. In addition, such a connection would suggest that the interpersonal and epistemic dimensions of conversational pressure are more intimately linked than the author has so far acknowledged. After proposing what he regards as the best attempt at arguing from the epistemological claim to the interpersonal claim, the author concludes that its prospects for success depend on an epistemological assumption that has not yet been discussed in this connection. The guess is that this will come as an unpleasant surprise to those who find themselves sympathetic to the idea of arguing from the one to the other.
{"title":"Anti-Reductionism and Expected Trust","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses the prospects of using anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony to establish that speakers are entitled to expect to be presumed trustworthy when they testify. If it exists, such a connection between the epistemology of testimony and the interpersonal normativity of (epistemic) trust would be of great interest. In addition, such a connection would suggest that the interpersonal and epistemic dimensions of conversational pressure are more intimately linked than the author has so far acknowledged. After proposing what he regards as the best attempt at arguing from the epistemological claim to the interpersonal claim, the author concludes that its prospects for success depend on an epistemological assumption that has not yet been discussed in this connection. The guess is that this will come as an unpleasant surprise to those who find themselves sympathetic to the idea of arguing from the one to the other.","PeriodicalId":179550,"journal":{"name":"Conversational Pressure","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131454462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0008
Sanford C. Goldberg
This chapter argues for a distinctive kind of conversational pressure bearing distinctly on audiences to a mutually observed statement or assertion: the normative pressure to signal when one disagrees. The argument for this conclusion appeals to two main claims: first, that conversational participants are entitled to expect cooperation from other participants; and second, that silent rejection of a public statement is marked as uncooperative. The result is that conversational participants are (presumptively but defeasibly) entitled to expect no silent rejection of a mutually observed statement, and this expectation gives participants a (practical) reason to indicate any disagreement or doubts when they observe such a statement. This argument avoids objections levelled against Pettit’s account of the significance of conversational silence. The chapter concludes by addressing the variety of contexts in which the entitlement to expect no silent rejection is itself defeated (including but not limited to conditions of oppression or ‘silencing’).
{"title":"Conversational Silence","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues for a distinctive kind of conversational pressure bearing distinctly on audiences to a mutually observed statement or assertion: the normative pressure to signal when one disagrees. The argument for this conclusion appeals to two main claims: first, that conversational participants are entitled to expect cooperation from other participants; and second, that silent rejection of a public statement is marked as uncooperative. The result is that conversational participants are (presumptively but defeasibly) entitled to expect no silent rejection of a mutually observed statement, and this expectation gives participants a (practical) reason to indicate any disagreement or doubts when they observe such a statement. This argument avoids objections levelled against Pettit’s account of the significance of conversational silence. The chapter concludes by addressing the variety of contexts in which the entitlement to expect no silent rejection is itself defeated (including but not limited to conditions of oppression or ‘silencing’).","PeriodicalId":179550,"journal":{"name":"Conversational Pressure","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127659503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0012
Sanford C. Goldberg
This chapter draws together the various lessons in the previous chapters. It concludes that speech exchanges exhibit two fundamental sorts of normativity—epistemic and interpersonal—and that the relationship between them is more complicated than has heretofore been appreciated.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198856436.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter draws together the various lessons in the previous chapters. It concludes that speech exchanges exhibit two fundamental sorts of normativity—epistemic and interpersonal—and that the relationship between them is more complicated than has heretofore been appreciated.","PeriodicalId":179550,"journal":{"name":"Conversational Pressure","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123906383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：