Anti-Reductionism and Expected Trust

Abstract

This chapter addresses the prospects of using anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony to establish that speakers are entitled to expect to be presumed trustworthy when they testify. If it exists, such a connection between the epistemology of testimony and the interpersonal normativity of (epistemic) trust would be of great interest. In addition, such a connection would suggest that the interpersonal and epistemic dimensions of conversational pressure are more intimately linked than the author has so far acknowledged. After proposing what he regards as the best attempt at arguing from the epistemological claim to the interpersonal claim, the author concludes that its prospects for success depend on an epistemological assumption that has not yet been discussed in this connection. The guess is that this will come as an unpleasant surprise to those who find themselves sympathetic to the idea of arguing from the one to the other.