{"title":"How could he try to whistle it","authors":"Éric Lemaire","doi":"10.1515/9783110328998.159","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"At the end of the Tractatus Wittgenstein says that anyone who understands him should see that the propositions of the book are nonsensical. Furthermore, he asks us to reject them if we want to see the world aright. There is no consensus about this concluding remark. Should we take it at face value? Should we reject it? What is its real meaning? Why does he say such a thing? It is an important issue to understand the book itself. But it is important to understand the second Wittgenstein too since the Tractatus is the principal target of the Investigations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein apparently tries to avoid such a situation. The questions related to remark 6.54 are related to a more general problem about the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, its place in the history of philosophy, and its inheritance. This problem can be expressed in the following ways: Did he really show that we could not produce a scientific metaphysics? Did he really show that metaphysical propositions are nonsensical? First, I will briefly present three facts. Second, from these facts I will raise the problem. The three facts are the following: 1) The Tractatus is an attempt to construct and apply a method of analysis of ordinary language in order to distinguish between sensical and nonsensical propositions and to pass over silence what is nonsensical. 2) The analysis of ordinary language does not work and cannot work. 3) Even though the analysis of ordinary language is impossible, Wittgenstein applies the concept of nonsense to different areas such as mathematics, ethic, aesthetic, natural sciences, religion, and philosophy.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328998.159","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract

At the end of the Tractatus Wittgenstein says that anyone who understands him should see that the propositions of the book are nonsensical. Furthermore, he asks us to reject them if we want to see the world aright. There is no consensus about this concluding remark. Should we take it at face value? Should we reject it? What is its real meaning? Why does he say such a thing? It is an important issue to understand the book itself. But it is important to understand the second Wittgenstein too since the Tractatus is the principal target of the Investigations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein apparently tries to avoid such a situation. The questions related to remark 6.54 are related to a more general problem about the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, its place in the history of philosophy, and its inheritance. This problem can be expressed in the following ways: Did he really show that we could not produce a scientific metaphysics? Did he really show that metaphysical propositions are nonsensical? First, I will briefly present three facts. Second, from these facts I will raise the problem. The three facts are the following: 1) The Tractatus is an attempt to construct and apply a method of analysis of ordinary language in order to distinguish between sensical and nonsensical propositions and to pass over silence what is nonsensical. 2) The analysis of ordinary language does not work and cannot work. 3) Even though the analysis of ordinary language is impossible, Wittgenstein applies the concept of nonsense to different areas such as mathematics, ethic, aesthetic, natural sciences, religion, and philosophy.
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他怎么能吹口哨呢
维特根斯坦在《哲学简论》的最后说,任何理解他的人都应该明白,这本书的命题是荒谬的。此外,如果我们想正确地看待世界,他要求我们拒绝它们。对这句结束语没有达成一致意见。我们应该相信它的表面价值吗?我们应该拒绝它吗?它的真正含义是什么?他为什么要说这样的话?理解这本书本身是一个重要的问题。但是理解第二个维特根斯坦也是很重要的,因为《论》是《研究》的主要目标。在《调查》中,维特根斯坦显然试图避免这种情况。与备注6.54有关的问题与维特根斯坦哲学的本质、它在哲学史上的地位以及它的继承性等更为普遍的问题有关。这个问题可以用以下几种方式来表达:他真的表明我们不能产生科学的形而上学吗?他真的证明了形而上学命题是荒谬的吗?首先,我将简要介绍三个事实。其次,根据这些事实,我将提出问题。这三个事实如下:1)《论》试图构建和应用一种分析日常语言的方法,以区分有意义和无意义的命题,并通过沉默来传递无意义的东西。2)对日常语言的分析不起作用,也不能起作用。3)尽管日常语言的分析是不可能的,但维特根斯坦将无意义的概念应用于数学、伦理、美学、自然科学、宗教和哲学等不同领域。
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