Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices

W. Bratton
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引用次数: 13

Abstract

This Article interrogates the possibility that pari passu clauses in sovereign debt contracts legitimately can be read broadly so as to require pro rata payments to foreign creditors by sovereigns in default and forbid payments to favored classes of creditors. Many subscribe to a narrow interpretation, under which the clauses cover only contractual and legal priorities and do not regulate payments. The narrow interpretation makes sovereign debt compositions easier to conclude by depriving holdout creditors of a disruptive enforcement tool, arguably benefiting the bondholders as a group. This Article highlights benefits for the bondholders as a group under the broad reading, shifting to an ex ante time perspective and situating the clause in the economic context of sovereign lending. Debt contracts benefit sovereign bondholders in three ways when they create frictions that retard later compositions. First, the contracts diminish the likelihood of default by opportunistic sovereigns seeking to externalize the effects of economic reverses. Second, assuming severe financial distress, they make it less likely that the defaulting sovereign will attempt to impose the burden of restructuring on the particular class of bonds. Third, assuming a restructuring, they improve the bondholders' bargaining position. More generally, the pari passu clause, read broadly, constrains the distressed sovereign's range of choices, enhancing the enforcement power of the bonds, and arguably lowering the long run cost of sovereign debt capital. The Article depicts sovereign debt as a world of tradeoffs and contradictions, where a contract that makes the bondholders better off means one thing on the day it is executed and delivered and another thing in the event of severe distress later on. With private debt, such contradictions are surmounted through the intervention of the bankruptcy regime. With sovereign debt there is no bankruptcy, forcing the parties to paper over the tensions between ex ante and ex post by drafting vaguely. Intractable questions of interpretation arise in consequence. From this perspective, judicial attachment of the broad reading can be justified without being dictated and without the narrow reading being rendered implausible or illegitimate. The interpreting court must choose between the readings under uncertainty.
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同等权益与陷入困境的主权国家的理性选择
本文质疑主权债务合同中的同等权益条款是否可以合法地广泛解读,以便要求违约的主权按比例向外国债权人付款,并禁止向受青睐的债权人支付款项。许多人赞同狭隘的解释,根据这种解释,条款只涵盖合同和法律优先事项,而不规范付款。这种狭义的解释使主权债务构成更容易得出结论,因为它剥夺了顽固的债权人一种破坏性的执行工具,可以说是对整体债券持有人有利。本文强调了债券持有人作为一个群体在广泛阅读下的利益,转向事前的时间视角,并将该条款置于主权贷款的经济背景下。债务合约通过三种方式使主权债券持有人受益,它们制造的摩擦阻碍了后来的组合。首先,这些合约降低了机会主义主权国家寻求将经济逆转的影响外部化的违约可能性。其次,假设出现严重的金融困境,它们会降低违约主权国家试图将重组负担强加给特定类别债券的可能性。第三,假设进行重组,它们提高了债券持有人的议价地位。更普遍的是,从广义上看,同等权益条款限制了陷入困境的主权国家的选择范围,增强了债券的执行力,可以说降低了主权债务资本的长期成本。这篇文章将主权债务描述为一个权衡和矛盾的世界,一份使债券持有人受益的合同在执行和交付之日意味着一件事,而在随后的严重困境中意味着另一件事。对于私人债务,这种矛盾通过破产制度的干预得以克服。主权债务没有破产,迫使各方通过模糊的起草来掩盖事前和事后之间的紧张关系。难以解决的解释问题由此产生。从这个角度来看,广义解读的司法依恋可以在不被口授的情况下得到证明,也不会使狭义解读变得不合理或不合法。解释法院必须在不确定的解读中作出选择。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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