Balancing traffic in networks: redundancy, learning, and the effect of stochastic fluctuations

P. Mertikopoulos, A. L. Moustakas
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Abstract

We study the distribution of traffic in networks whose users try to minimise their delays by adhering to a simple learning scheme inspired by the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. The stable steady states of these dynamics coincide with the network's Wardrop equilibria and form a convex polytope whose dimension is determined by the network's redundancy (an important concept which measures the "linear dependence" of the users' paths). Despite this abundance of stationary points, we show that the long-term behaviour of the replicator dynamics is remarkably simple: every solution orbit converges to a Wardrop equilibrium. On the other hand, a major challenge occurs when the users' delays fluctuate unpredictably due to random external factors. In that case, interior equilibria are no longer stationary, but strict equilibria remain stochastically stable irrespective of the fluctuations' magnitude. In fact, if the network has no redundancy and the users are patient enough, we show that the long-term average of the users' traffic flows converges to the vicinity of an equilibrium, and we also estimate the corresponding invariant distribution.
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平衡网络中的流量:冗余、学习和随机波动的影响
我们研究网络中流量的分布,其用户试图通过遵循受进化博弈论的复制因子动力学启发的简单学习方案来最小化延迟。这些动态的稳定状态与网络的Wardrop平衡点一致,并形成一个凸多角形,其维度由网络的冗余度决定(这是衡量用户路径“线性依赖”的一个重要概念)。尽管有这么多的稳定点,但我们表明复制子动力学的长期行为非常简单:每个解轨道收敛于Wardrop平衡。另一方面,当用户的延迟由于随机的外部因素而不可预测地波动时,就会出现重大挑战。在这种情况下,内部均衡不再是平稳的,但严格均衡保持随机稳定,与波动的大小无关。事实上,如果网络没有冗余且用户足够耐心,我们证明了用户流量的长期平均值收敛到平衡点附近,并估计了相应的不变分布。
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