Social networks analysis: a game experiment

T. Ben-Zvi
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This study examines how early business relationships in company networks may predict later performance and centrality. We define a way of classifying centrality trajectories in social networks, providing a method that can be used more generally to predict network change over time. Employing a game simulation, we show that there are strategies that correlate with eventual centrality and profit, and other strategies that correlate with poor performance.
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社交网络分析:游戏实验
本研究探讨了公司网络中的早期业务关系如何预测后来的绩效和中心性。我们定义了一种在社交网络中对中心性轨迹进行分类的方法,提供了一种可以更广泛地用于预测网络随时间变化的方法。通过游戏模拟,我们发现有些策略与最终的中心性和利润相关,而有些策略与糟糕的表现相关。
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