Standard Examples

Abstract

Standard examples in biological game theory are introduced. The degree of cooperation at evolutionary stability is analysed in models that deal with situations such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Tragedy of the Commons and the conflict of interest between parents over care of their common young. Several models of aggressive interactions are treated in this book. In this chapter the Hawk–Dove game, which is the simplest of these models, is analysed. Further models in the chapter deal with the situation in which individuals vary in their fighting ability and the situation in which information about the opponent is available before an individual decides whether to be aggressive. The problem of the allocation of resources to sons versus daughters has played a central role in biological game theory. This chapter introduces the basic theory, as well as a model in which the environmental temperature affects the development of the sexes differentially, so that at evolutionary stability the sex of offspring is determined by this temperature. Coordination games, alternative mating tactics, dispersal to avoid kin competition, and the idea that signals can evolve from cues are also introduced.