Pub Date : 2020-09-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0003
J. McNamara, O. Leimar
Standard examples in biological game theory are introduced. The degree of cooperation at evolutionary stability is analysed in models that deal with situations such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Tragedy of the Commons and the conflict of interest between parents over care of their common young. Several models of aggressive interactions are treated in this book. In this chapter the Hawk–Dove game, which is the simplest of these models, is analysed. Further models in the chapter deal with the situation in which individuals vary in their fighting ability and the situation in which information about the opponent is available before an individual decides whether to be aggressive. The problem of the allocation of resources to sons versus daughters has played a central role in biological game theory. This chapter introduces the basic theory, as well as a model in which the environmental temperature affects the development of the sexes differentially, so that at evolutionary stability the sex of offspring is determined by this temperature. Coordination games, alternative mating tactics, dispersal to avoid kin competition, and the idea that signals can evolve from cues are also introduced.
{"title":"Standard Examples","authors":"J. McNamara, O. Leimar","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Standard examples in biological game theory are introduced. The degree of cooperation at evolutionary stability is analysed in models that deal with situations such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Tragedy of the Commons and the conflict of interest between parents over care of their common young. Several models of aggressive interactions are treated in this book. In this chapter the Hawk–Dove game, which is the simplest of these models, is analysed. Further models in the chapter deal with the situation in which individuals vary in their fighting ability and the situation in which information about the opponent is available before an individual decides whether to be aggressive. The problem of the allocation of resources to sons versus daughters has played a central role in biological game theory. This chapter introduces the basic theory, as well as a model in which the environmental temperature affects the development of the sexes differentially, so that at evolutionary stability the sex of offspring is determined by this temperature. Coordination games, alternative mating tactics, dispersal to avoid kin competition, and the idea that signals can evolve from cues are also introduced.","PeriodicalId":180272,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory in Biology","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133746775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0001
J. McNamara, O. Leimar
The chapter starts with an introduction to game theory in biology, describing its overall aims. The basic concept of frequency dependence is then presented, together with a number of illustrative biological examples. Next, the modelling approach is outlined, emphasizing that the theory aims to predict phenomena by seeking stable evolutionary endpoints. The scope and challenges of the field are described in the setting of the history of ideas that have been important for the theory, summarizing past successes as well as long-standing questions that are likely to require further development of the theory. The chapter ends with an overview of the main issues dealt with in the book, including the challenges that are taken up. These include taking into account the co-evolution of traits, exploring the consequences of variation, and the modelling social interactions as games over time. In particular for the latter, models that include behavioural mechanisms are likely to be essential for the success of game theory in biology.
{"title":"Setting the Scene","authors":"J. McNamara, O. Leimar","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter starts with an introduction to game theory in biology, describing its overall aims. The basic concept of frequency dependence is then presented, together with a number of illustrative biological examples. Next, the modelling approach is outlined, emphasizing that the theory aims to predict phenomena by seeking stable evolutionary endpoints. The scope and challenges of the field are described in the setting of the history of ideas that have been important for the theory, summarizing past successes as well as long-standing questions that are likely to require further development of the theory. The chapter ends with an overview of the main issues dealt with in the book, including the challenges that are taken up. These include taking into account the co-evolution of traits, exploring the consequences of variation, and the modelling social interactions as games over time. In particular for the latter, models that include behavioural mechanisms are likely to be essential for the success of game theory in biology.","PeriodicalId":180272,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory in Biology","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125612573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0002
J. McNamara, O. Leimar
The chapter defines and discusses some of the central concepts in biological game theory. Strategies, which are rules for choosing actions as a function of state, play a pivotal role. It is explained how the theory operates at the level of strategies rather than attempting to follow the details of the underlying genetics that code for them. This is referred to as 'the phenotypic gambit', which is discussed and illustrated. The concept of the invasion fitness of a mutant strategy in a population that adopts another resident strategy is also central. This performance measure is used to give a necessary condition for evolutionary stability, formulated as the Nash equilibrium condition. It is explained how this stability condition can be reformulated in terms of simpler fitness proxies such as the mean lifetime number of offspring or the net rate of energy gain.
{"title":"Central Concepts","authors":"J. McNamara, O. Leimar","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter defines and discusses some of the central concepts in biological game theory. Strategies, which are rules for choosing actions as a function of state, play a pivotal role. It is explained how the theory operates at the level of strategies rather than attempting to follow the details of the underlying genetics that code for them. This is referred to as 'the phenotypic gambit', which is discussed and illustrated. The concept of the invasion fitness of a mutant strategy in a population that adopts another resident strategy is also central. This performance measure is used to give a necessary condition for evolutionary stability, formulated as the Nash equilibrium condition. It is explained how this stability condition can be reformulated in terms of simpler fitness proxies such as the mean lifetime number of offspring or the net rate of energy gain.","PeriodicalId":180272,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory in Biology","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123485616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-24DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0011
J. McNamara, O. Leimar
Important areas for future developments of game theory in biology are put forward. These include several issues that are dealt with in the book, such as trait co-evolution, the consequences of variation, time structure, and the embedding of games into an ecological context and into the lives of individuals. New areas are also suggested, with Tinbergen’s four questions about the study of animal behaviour serving as a starting point. Game theory could be combined with phylogenetic analysis by examining how Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) might change over evolutionary time, including major shifts between different ESSs, which might correspond to different species over evolutionary time. Concerning behavioural mechanisms in large worlds, the question of which mechanism parameters that are tuned by evolution is addressed, with a brief summary of the current knowledge about comparative cognition. The possible importance of limited flexibility in mechanisms is illustrated by outlining a model of a trust game. Finally, the potential for game theory to contribute to the study of cognitive development is discussed, using mutualism between cleaner fish and their client fish as an illustration.
{"title":"Future Perspectives","authors":"J. McNamara, O. Leimar","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815778.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Important areas for future developments of game theory in biology are put forward. These include several issues that are dealt with in the book, such as trait co-evolution, the consequences of variation, time structure, and the embedding of games into an ecological context and into the lives of individuals. New areas are also suggested, with Tinbergen’s four questions about the study of animal behaviour serving as a starting point. Game theory could be combined with phylogenetic analysis by examining how Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) might change over evolutionary time, including major shifts between different ESSs, which might correspond to different species over evolutionary time. Concerning behavioural mechanisms in large worlds, the question of which mechanism parameters that are tuned by evolution is addressed, with a brief summary of the current knowledge about comparative cognition. The possible importance of limited flexibility in mechanisms is illustrated by outlining a model of a trust game. Finally, the potential for game theory to contribute to the study of cognitive development is discussed, using mutualism between cleaner fish and their client fish as an illustration.","PeriodicalId":180272,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory in Biology","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129926141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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