{"title":"Bankers and Brokers First: Loose Ends in the Theory of Central-Bank Policymaking","authors":"E. Kane","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1960163","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe following sections are included:Misconceptions about Crises and Crisis ResponseCentral Bank and Government Rescue ProgramsRethinking Systemic RiskUsefulness of Capital Requirements has been OversoldUndone by the Regulatory DialecticRecommendations for ReformTraditional Reporting and Incentive Frameworks are InadequateReferences","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1960163","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
AbstractThe following sections are included:Misconceptions about Crises and Crisis ResponseCentral Bank and Government Rescue ProgramsRethinking Systemic RiskUsefulness of Capital Requirements has been OversoldUndone by the Regulatory DialecticRecommendations for ReformTraditional Reporting and Incentive Frameworks are InadequateReferences