Presidential hawkishness, domestic popularity, and diplomatic normalization

Abstract

When does the United States normalize its diplomatic relations with its adversaries? This article introduces a theory of diplomatic normalization, focusing on the interaction between the hawkishness of presidents and their domestic popularity. I argue that dovish presidents are more likely to pursue normalization when their domestic approval ratings plummet, as this makes them shift their priorities toward policies they find themselves more comfortable and confident handling. Doves are less likely to pursue normalization when they enjoy high popularity, so as not to jeopardize favorable public support. In contrast, hawkish presidents typically do not support normalization, regardless of their domestic standing, as it does not align with their top policy priorities. The exception arises in the rare instance of a president with an exceptionally high degree of hawkishness who is able to pursue reconciliation without losing his support. I test my theoretical expectations using data on U.S. presidents' latent hawkishness and their diplomatic normalization decisions from 1950 to 2005. The empirical evidence supports all hypotheses, underscoring the importance of understanding the interaction between a leader's personal attributes and the domestic political climate when studying foreign policy decisions.