When scholars address presidential agenda setting, they focus on how presidents go about getting what they want. We know far less about the prior step: how presidents decide what they want (agenda construction). Moreover, prior work that has dealt with this topic has focused on the external constraints imposed on presidential choice by Congress and public opinion. I contend, by contrast, that presidents have considerable agency in determining their domestic policy priorities. They rely on it to establish who they are and where they want to take the nation, putting forward their own “political projects.” I situate this agency in the selection of agenda items and the manner and sequence in which presidents pursue them. Failing to account for this “power of initiative and origination” leaves us with an underspecified understanding of presidential decision making that obscures the consequentiality of leadership in driving important policy outcomes. I develop this argument by exploring three presidential administrations that pose a hard test for my agency thesis: Richard Nixon, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush. These case studies draw from archival records obtained at the associated presidential libraries and interviews with senior administration personnel.
当学者们讨论总统议程设置时，他们关注的是总统如何获得他们想要的东西。我们对前一步的了解要少得多：总统如何决定他们想要什么（议程构建）。此外，之前涉及这一主题的研究主要集中在国会和公众舆论对总统选择的外部限制。相比之下，我认为总统在决定其国内政策优先事项时有相当大的自主权。他们依靠这个来确立自己的身份和国家发展方向，提出自己的 "政治计划"。我将这种能动性体现在议程项目的选择以及总统推行这些项目的方式和顺序上。如果不考虑这种 "主动性和原创性的力量"，我们对总统决策的理解就会不够具体，从而掩盖了领导力在推动重要政策成果方面的影响。我将通过探讨三届总统政府来阐述这一论点，这三届总统政府对我的代理论提出了严峻的考验：理查德-尼克松（Richard Nixon）、乔治-H-W-布什（George H. W. Bush）和乔治-W-布什（George W. Bush）。这些案例研究利用了从相关总统图书馆获得的档案记录以及对高级政府人员的访谈。
{"title":"The case for agency: Three dimensions of discretion in presidential agenda construction","authors":"Jack B. Greenberg","doi":"10.1111/psq.12881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12881","url":null,"abstract":"When scholars address presidential agenda setting, they focus on how presidents go about getting what they want. We know far less about the prior step: how presidents decide what they want (agenda construction). Moreover, prior work that has dealt with this topic has focused on the external constraints imposed on presidential choice by Congress and public opinion. I contend, by contrast, that presidents have considerable agency in determining their domestic policy priorities. They rely on it to establish who they are and where they want to take the nation, putting forward their own “political projects.” I situate this agency in the selection of agenda items and the manner and sequence in which presidents pursue them. Failing to account for this “power of initiative and origination” leaves us with an underspecified understanding of presidential decision making that obscures the consequentiality of leadership in driving important policy outcomes. I develop this argument by exploring three presidential administrations that pose a hard test for my agency thesis: Richard Nixon, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush. These case studies draw from archival records obtained at the associated presidential libraries and interviews with senior administration personnel.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141669820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Relational and emotional practices intensive in emotional labor play an essential role for high‐level decision making, even though this labor is often devalued or unseen. United States presidents can often present themselves as rational and emotionally detached because they delegate emotional work to other members of their team. The burden of such work is unequally distributed along gender and racial lines. It involves expressing empathic concern, repairing relations, anticipating others' emotional responses, protecting marginalized colleagues, speaking hard truths, and providing emotional support to help others regulate their emotions. This article contributes to research on emotions in decision making, public administration, and presidency studies. Case studies of Nancy Reagan and Valerie Jarrett—who played important roles in the Reagan and Obama administrations, respectively—illustrate the article's main argument.
{"title":"Emotional labor in decision making: Gender, race, and relational practices in the White House","authors":"Philippe Beauregard","doi":"10.1111/psq.12884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12884","url":null,"abstract":"Relational and emotional practices intensive in emotional labor play an essential role for high‐level decision making, even though this labor is often devalued or unseen. United States presidents can often present themselves as rational and emotionally detached because they delegate emotional work to other members of their team. The burden of such work is unequally distributed along gender and racial lines. It involves expressing empathic concern, repairing relations, anticipating others' emotional responses, protecting marginalized colleagues, speaking hard truths, and providing emotional support to help others regulate their emotions. This article contributes to research on emotions in decision making, public administration, and presidency studies. Case studies of Nancy Reagan and Valerie Jarrett—who played important roles in the Reagan and Obama administrations, respectively—illustrate the article's main argument.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141666913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates and critiques the view that Lockean prerogative power is or should be incorporated, legally or extralegally, into the American constitutional system. Some scholars argue that extraconstitutional prerogative represents a safer alternative to a broad legal reading of presidential power, as it creates fewer precedents. Others suggest that the Framers “constitutionalized prerogative.” Both of these views have difficulties because ultimately, prerogative can create more dangerous precedents than legal uses of presidential power.
{"title":"The problematic but seductive call of prerogative power","authors":"Caleb Verbois","doi":"10.1111/psq.12883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12883","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates and critiques the view that Lockean prerogative power is or should be incorporated, legally or extralegally, into the American constitutional system. Some scholars argue that extraconstitutional prerogative represents a safer alternative to a broad legal reading of presidential power, as it creates fewer precedents. Others suggest that the Framers “constitutionalized prerogative.” Both of these views have difficulties because ultimately, prerogative can create more dangerous precedents than legal uses of presidential power.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141681207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A prominent scholarship contends that presidential norms are particularly vital to a well‐functioning democracy. However, scant empirical research exists on the topic. I investigate public attitudes toward a novel battery of what many scholars and journalists consider presidential norms and examine the extent to which partisan and policy concerns affect attitudes toward them. Original survey data show that Americans strongly support presidential norms. I argue that there are two salient dimensions of presidential norms—what I call structural norms and presentation norms. Structural norms promote and support constitutional government. Presentation norms concern expectations about when and how presidents should present themselves before the public. Partisans evaluate the two types of presidential norms differentially, with Republicans notably expressing lower support for structural norms. I then present experimental evidence that the public's support for presidential norms is malleable to partisan framing. These results suggest that the public supports presidential norms in the abstract, but compelling rhetoric can facilitate presidential norm violations.
{"title":"Partisanship and public support for presidential norms","authors":"Chandler James","doi":"10.1111/psq.12882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12882","url":null,"abstract":"A prominent scholarship contends that presidential norms are particularly vital to a well‐functioning democracy. However, scant empirical research exists on the topic. I investigate public attitudes toward a novel battery of what many scholars and journalists consider presidential norms and examine the extent to which partisan and policy concerns affect attitudes toward them. Original survey data show that Americans strongly support presidential norms. I argue that there are two salient dimensions of presidential norms—what I call structural norms and presentation norms. Structural norms promote and support constitutional government. Presentation norms concern expectations about when and how presidents should present themselves before the public. Partisans evaluate the two types of presidential norms differentially, with Republicans notably expressing lower support for structural norms. I then present experimental evidence that the public's support for presidential norms is malleable to partisan framing. These results suggest that the public supports presidential norms in the abstract, but compelling rhetoric can facilitate presidential norm violations.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141705233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The first televised presidential campaign commercials ran in the 1952 electoral contest between Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson, specifically as part of the effort to draft and then elect General Eisenhower. These first spot ads were developed not by political parties or the candidates but by an independent citizens group, Citizens for Eisenhower. The group developed two distinct styles of television advertising. The best known of these stemmed from the hard‐sell Madison Avenue tradition of public relations and its advertising innovator, Rosser Reeves, who produced the “Eisenhower Answers America” campaign. Less well known is an ad created by volunteer workers from the Disney Corporation, who produced an animated, musical rendition promising that “We'll Take Ike to Washington.” Unlike Reeves's more substantive ads that focused on issues, the Disney ads emphasized the image and character of the candidate. Using archival sources, this article shows that the televised marketing of the presidency stemmed not only from the public relations experts and Madison Avenue advertisers like Reeves but also from those connected to the entertainment industry who sought to manipulate the public through character appeals.
{"title":"I like Ike: The origins of broadcast presidential campaign advertising","authors":"James W. Endersby","doi":"10.1111/psq.12880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12880","url":null,"abstract":"The first televised presidential campaign commercials ran in the 1952 electoral contest between Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson, specifically as part of the effort to draft and then elect General Eisenhower. These first spot ads were developed not by political parties or the candidates but by an independent citizens group, Citizens for Eisenhower. The group developed two distinct styles of television advertising. The best known of these stemmed from the hard‐sell Madison Avenue tradition of public relations and its advertising innovator, Rosser Reeves, who produced the “Eisenhower Answers America” campaign. Less well known is an ad created by volunteer workers from the Disney Corporation, who produced an animated, musical rendition promising that “We'll Take Ike to Washington.” Unlike Reeves's more substantive ads that focused on issues, the Disney ads emphasized the image and character of the candidate. Using archival sources, this article shows that the televised marketing of the presidency stemmed not only from the public relations experts and Madison Avenue advertisers like Reeves but also from those connected to the entertainment industry who sought to manipulate the public through character appeals.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141710098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why, and under what conditions, do international crises make the president's national security agenda? I argue that international crises are opportunities for presidents to seek domestic political gains, but that presidents are likely to weigh anticipated political benefits against anticipated risk of political opposition. I analyze presidential National Security Council (NSC) meeting agendas from 1947 to 1993 to find that the War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973 reduced the likelihood of presidential crisis attentiveness, that low approval ratings are associated with increased crisis attentiveness, and that post‐WPR presidents under unified government are likely to be more crisis attentive. This article provides fresh analysis of the WPR by connecting presidential national security behavior with American domestic politics.
{"title":"Presidential attentiveness to international crises","authors":"Neil Snyder","doi":"10.1111/psq.12875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12875","url":null,"abstract":"Why, and under what conditions, do international crises make the president's national security agenda? I argue that international crises are opportunities for presidents to seek domestic political gains, but that presidents are likely to weigh anticipated political benefits against anticipated risk of political opposition. I analyze presidential National Security Council (NSC) meeting agendas from 1947 to 1993 to find that the War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973 reduced the likelihood of presidential crisis attentiveness, that low approval ratings are associated with increased crisis attentiveness, and that post‐WPR presidents under unified government are likely to be more crisis attentive. This article provides fresh analysis of the WPR by connecting presidential national security behavior with American domestic politics.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141122889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While acting officials in federal agencies have become more common in recent years, presidents still utilize the traditional nomination process, which constrains presidents' choices, for most executive branch appointments. Recent work emphasizes presidents' incentives for using acting officials, but few scholars have considered what keeps presidents from using them even more often. We argue presidents' use of acting officials, like other forms of unilateral action, is constrained by public opinion; while actings may be expeditious policy tools for presidents, the public perceives them to undermine the executive branch's legitimacy and competence and punishes presidents accordingly. Through three survey experiments leveraging real‐world instances of President Joe Biden's usage of acting officials, we find little evidence the public reacts negatively to acting officials in agency leadership. While some institutional forces must encourage presidents to seek senatorial advice and consent for their nominees, our evidence does not indicate public opinion provides that constraint.
{"title":"Acting(s) without consequence: The (lack of) public costs for vacancies and acting officials","authors":"David R. Miller, Chris Piper","doi":"10.1111/psq.12874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12874","url":null,"abstract":"While acting officials in federal agencies have become more common in recent years, presidents still utilize the traditional nomination process, which constrains presidents' choices, for most executive branch appointments. Recent work emphasizes presidents' incentives for using acting officials, but few scholars have considered what keeps presidents from using them even more often. We argue presidents' use of acting officials, like other forms of unilateral action, is constrained by public opinion; while actings may be expeditious policy tools for presidents, the public perceives them to undermine the executive branch's legitimacy and competence and punishes presidents accordingly. Through three survey experiments leveraging real‐world instances of President Joe Biden's usage of acting officials, we find little evidence the public reacts negatively to acting officials in agency leadership. While some institutional forces must encourage presidents to seek senatorial advice and consent for their nominees, our evidence does not indicate public opinion provides that constraint.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141019031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The White House Chief of Staff (COS) has become the modern presidency's organizational lynchpin, the position tasked with helping presidents “faithfully execute the Office of President.” Extending a rich literature about how chiefs manage White House staffers, we consider the other side of the coin: can a COS manage the president? We begin theoretically, sketching three mechanisms—offloading, streamlining, and steering—by which a COS could shape presidents' basic workways. We test resulting hypotheses against original data on presidents' daily work behaviors from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush—a total spanning 48 years, nine presidencies, and 21 Chiefs of Staff (plus one sustained vacancy). Surprisingly, we find little evidence that Chiefs of Staff affected the duration, density, or composition of their president's workday. When it comes to the basic contours of presidential workways, it appears Chiefs of Staff do less “managing up” and more “managing around.”
白宫办公厅主任（COS）已成为现代总统职位的组织关键，其任务是帮助总统 "忠实地执行总统职务"。在扩展有关幕僚长如何管理白宫幕僚的丰富文献的基础上，我们考虑了硬币的另一面：幕僚长能否管理总统？我们从理论入手，勾勒了首席行政官可以塑造总统基本工作方式的三种机制--卸载、精简和引导。我们根据从约翰-肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）到乔治-W-布什（George W. Bush）的总统日常工作行为的原始数据检验了由此得出的假设--总共跨越了 48 年、9 任总统和 21 位参谋长（加上一个持续空缺的职位）。令人惊讶的是，我们发现几乎没有证据表明参谋长影响了总统工作日的持续时间、密度或构成。就总统工作日的基本轮廓而言，幕僚长似乎很少 "向上管理"，而更多是 "向下管理"。
{"title":"Do White House Chiefs of Staff “manage up”?","authors":"Matthew N. Beckmann","doi":"10.1111/psq.12873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12873","url":null,"abstract":"The White House Chief of Staff (COS) has become the modern presidency's organizational lynchpin, the position tasked with helping presidents “faithfully execute the Office of President.” Extending a rich literature about how chiefs manage White House staffers, we consider the other side of the coin: can a COS manage the president? We begin theoretically, sketching three mechanisms—offloading, streamlining, and steering—by which a COS could shape presidents' basic workways. We test resulting hypotheses against original data on presidents' daily work behaviors from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush—a total spanning 48 years, nine presidencies, and 21 Chiefs of Staff (plus one sustained vacancy). Surprisingly, we find little evidence that Chiefs of Staff affected the duration, density, or composition of their president's workday. When it comes to the basic contours of presidential workways, it appears Chiefs of Staff do less “managing up” and more “managing around.”","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140378364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Within the context of eliciting partner country cooperation and interests alignment, U.S. presidents and their administrations have a wide array of policy tools at their disposal to mitigate terrorist threats emanating from other countries. Yet, the factors that account for variation in American presidents' and their administrations' specific counterterrorism policy choices to influence target states' behavior remain underexplored. To understand the underlying factors that influence the adoption of different U.S. counterterrorism tools within a given country, and their variation across administrations in the post‐9/11 era, we examine the case of Pakistan—a challenging yet enduring partner in the U.S.‐led Global War on Terror. Categorizing the counterterrorism policies and tools adopted by Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump as punitive or nonpunitive policy decisions, we explore the extent to which each president's policy choices during the Global War on Terror were largely a continuation of predecessors or responded to specific shifting patterns of terrorism within Pakistan. Our study yields important insights regarding the extent to which path dependency or evolving security environments shape choices of counterterrorism tools.
{"title":"Carrot or stick, or both? Examining U.S. presidents' use of counterterrorism tools in Pakistan, 2001–2020","authors":"Amira Jadoon, Richard M. Yon, Dennis J. Rice","doi":"10.1111/psq.12870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12870","url":null,"abstract":"Within the context of eliciting partner country cooperation and interests alignment, U.S. presidents and their administrations have a wide array of policy tools at their disposal to mitigate terrorist threats emanating from other countries. Yet, the factors that account for variation in American presidents' and their administrations' specific counterterrorism policy choices to influence target states' behavior remain underexplored. To understand the underlying factors that influence the adoption of different U.S. counterterrorism tools within a given country, and their variation across administrations in the post‐9/11 era, we examine the case of Pakistan—a challenging yet enduring partner in the U.S.‐led Global War on Terror. Categorizing the counterterrorism policies and tools adopted by Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump as punitive or nonpunitive policy decisions, we explore the extent to which each president's policy choices during the Global War on Terror were largely a continuation of predecessors or responded to specific shifting patterns of terrorism within Pakistan. Our study yields important insights regarding the extent to which path dependency or evolving security environments shape choices of counterterrorism tools.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140248534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
From a historical perspective, presidents have frequently directed the use of military force without explicit permission from Congress. Yet, presidents still court legislative approval on select occasions. Why do presidents sometimes seek congressional authorization and other times do not? I explain authorization‐seeking behavior according to variations in presidential bargaining strength. I argue that both weak and strong presidents prefer authorization‐seeking; by obtaining congressional backing, weak presidents conceal a lack of national resolve from international audiences, while strong ones use approval to enhance their coercive authority. Presidents with mid‐level bargaining strength, however, prefer unilateral action; on the one hand, unilateral action may demonstrate resolve in the face of potential legislative resistance, while on the other, it avoids contentious debate that risks “muddying” the diplomatic waters. I illustrate these arguments by revisiting four prominent historical cases: the Korean War, the Gulf of Tonkin crisis, the invasion of Cambodia, and the Persian Gulf War.
{"title":"War power through restraint: The politics of unilateral military action after 1945","authors":"Katherine Irajpanah","doi":"10.1111/psq.12869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12869","url":null,"abstract":"From a historical perspective, presidents have frequently directed the use of military force without explicit permission from Congress. Yet, presidents still court legislative approval on select occasions. Why do presidents sometimes seek congressional authorization and other times do not? I explain authorization‐seeking behavior according to variations in presidential bargaining strength. I argue that both weak and strong presidents prefer authorization‐seeking; by obtaining congressional backing, weak presidents conceal a lack of national resolve from international audiences, while strong ones use approval to enhance their coercive authority. Presidents with mid‐level bargaining strength, however, prefer unilateral action; on the one hand, unilateral action may demonstrate resolve in the face of potential legislative resistance, while on the other, it avoids contentious debate that risks “muddying” the diplomatic waters. I illustrate these arguments by revisiting four prominent historical cases: the Korean War, the Gulf of Tonkin crisis, the invasion of Cambodia, and the Persian Gulf War.","PeriodicalId":46768,"journal":{"name":"Presidential Studies Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140424521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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