Equal Societies, Autonomous Lives: Reconciling social equality and relational autonomy

Abstract

Relational egalitarians flesh out the idea of what it means to treat persons as equals in society. On many influential accounts, relating as equals requires, among other things, to respect others as equal, autonomous agents (Hojlund, 2021; Scheffler, 2015; Schemmel 2021a; Schuppert, 2015). However, the attempt to subsume respect for personal autonomy under social equality is prima facie suspect: people can presumably endorse social inequalities. We can ask two sets of questions when confronted with situations such as these: first, are these truly autonomous choices? For instance, following substantivist approaches to autonomy, some may question whether choosing subservience or a subordinate status can be an autonomous choice because one would thereby fail to be self-respecting, to see what is effectively in their own interest, or because this choice is often made against a social background that diminishes their available options or controls over their life (Babbitt 1993; Hill, 1991; Oshana, 2006). And, second, these types of cases raise a challenge for relational egalitarians in that it is unclear what it means to treat presumably autonomous agents as equals here. On one hand, respecting their autonomy requires that one should respect their decisions to endorse social inequalities. On the other hand, relational egalitarians should be capable of criticizing social hierarchies and should aim to equalize them. How, then, can we resolve this apparent tension?

In this article, I show how debates between relational autonomy theorists hold important lessons for relational egalitarians. The connections between the two theoretical families have not been extensively studied (for recent exceptions, see Stoljar & Voigt, 2021a). Relational autonomy theorists argue that personal autonomy is deeply connected to the social relations we engage in our lives and our socio-political position in society (Mackenzie, 2014; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000a, 2000b; Meyers, 2002, 2005; Westlund, 2009). Similarly, relational egalitarians argue that egalitarians should be concerned first and foremost with how people are treated and regarded in society (Anderson, 1999; Fourie et al., 2015; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018; Schemmel, 2021a). I argue that by connecting social equality and relational autonomy, it is possible to resolve this apparent tension between respect for autonomy and the protection of social equality. More precisely, I argue that relational egalitarians should adopt a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy. I point out that a constitutivist, externalist understanding of autonomy is not designed to evaluated particular individual decisions, but rather to identify the required external conditions to guarantee a substantive level of personal autonomy. The externalist approach consequently allows to say both that some non-egalitarian choices can be deserving of respect and that egalitarian should adopt a structural perspective to promote personal autonomy globally.

Below, I first briefly introduce relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy. Second, I distinguish between three ways of conceptualizing the connection between social equality and autonomy: the instrumental approach, the deontic approach, and the constitutivist position. I argue that both the instrumental and deontic approaches fail to provide convincing answers to the tension between autonomy and (social) equality. Consequently, I show that if relational egalitarians want to argue that social equality requires, among other things, to treat autonomous agents as equals qua autonomous agents, they should adopt a constitutive, externalist conception of autonomy.

Relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy share many aspects. As Stoljar and Voigt (2021b) points out, first, they both consider that theories of justice “should take the fact of people's social embeddedness as their starting point” (2021b, 1). Second, for both relational egalitarianism and relational autonomy, they do not refer to single theories but are “umbrella terms that encompass different conceptions of the way in which social conditions should be included in an analysis of autonomy and equality” (2021b, 1). However, both theoretical families have fundamentally different aims. Relational autonomy theorists identify the conditions under which an agent is autonomous. In contrast, relational egalitarians identify the conditions ensuring that people are treated as equals in society. Nonetheless, given their family resemblance, their connection is fruitful especially since many relational egalitarians presume that social equality requires, among other things, that autonomous agents should be treated as equals in society. Moreover, beyond this family resemblance, the move toward relational autonomy provides relational egalitarians with precious resources to think through what it means to respect and foster personal autonomy in society. This, in turn, enables us to clarify what it means to treat persons as equals.

There are two things to note here, however. First, this is not to say that autonomy is the only reason explaining why social equality is required or valuable. The claim here is simply that since many relational egalitarians aim to respect autonomous agents equally, it is relevant to explore what adopting a relational conception of autonomy would mean for our conception of social equality. Second, it does not follow that we should treat nonautonomous or nonagential persons as unequals in society (see Bengtson & Lippert-Rasmussen, 2023; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2022).¹

There are at least three ways to connect social equality and relational autonomy. In this section, I consider each in turn. I start with the instrumental approach. Second, I consider procedural and weakly substantive approaches. Third, I evaluate constitutivist positions. I argue that only the latter are promising to resolve the tension between SEC and AC.

In conclusion, since many relational egalitarians consider that social equality requires, among other things, that we respect autonomous agents equally qua autonomous agents, then they should be pulled toward a constitutive, externalist conception of relational autonomy.

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.