Anti‐Exceptionalism about Logic (Part I): From Naturalism to Anti‐Exceptionalism

Abstract

According to anti‐exceptionalism about logic (AEL), logic is not as exceptional in terms of its epistemology and subject matter as has been conventionally thought. Whereas logic's epistemology has often been considered distinct from those of the recognised sciences, in virtue of being both non‐inferential and a priori, it is in fact neither. Logics are justified on the basis of similar mechanisms of theory‐choice as theories in the sciences, and further the sources of evidence which inform these theory choices are (at least) not wholly a priori. In this first part of a two‐part entry on AEL, we trace these epistemological elements of AEL back to Quine's naturalism and evidential holism, but then highlight important differences between the motivations and commitments of Quine's version of AEL and those within the contemporary literature. This demonstrates the need to assess contemporary anti‐exceptionalist positions on their own merits, rather than treating them as mere reincarnations of Quine's evidential holism.