{"title":"Gratitude: Its Nature and Normativity","authors":"Max Lewis","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13015","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Gratitude is a pervasive, if often overlooked, aspect of our daily lives. At its core, it is a response to being benefitted. Yet, several philosophical puzzles surround this ostensibly ordinary emotion. This article is an overview of the major philosophical debates concerning gratitude. We start with personal gratitude, i.e., gratitude directed <jats:italic>to</jats:italic> an agent for something they have done. We consider what personal gratitude consists in. We then consider its normativity, i.e., when it is fitting, owed, a directed duty, or a virtue. We then turn to impersonal gratitude, i.e., gratitude for something without gratitude to any agent for it. We consider the normativity of this attitude, i.e., when it is fitting. We end by considering whether personal gratitude and impersonal gratitude are two species of the same genus—as their names suggest—or whether they are distinct attitudes.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy Compass","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13015","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Gratitude is a pervasive, if often overlooked, aspect of our daily lives. At its core, it is a response to being benefitted. Yet, several philosophical puzzles surround this ostensibly ordinary emotion. This article is an overview of the major philosophical debates concerning gratitude. We start with personal gratitude, i.e., gratitude directed to an agent for something they have done. We consider what personal gratitude consists in. We then consider its normativity, i.e., when it is fitting, owed, a directed duty, or a virtue. We then turn to impersonal gratitude, i.e., gratitude for something without gratitude to any agent for it. We consider the normativity of this attitude, i.e., when it is fitting. We end by considering whether personal gratitude and impersonal gratitude are two species of the same genus—as their names suggest—or whether they are distinct attitudes.